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The main component of this thesis, found in the first chapter, is an 
investigation of earnings instability, which can be thought of as the fluctuations 
around permanent earnings over time of a worker’s labor market earnings.  This 
chapter reflects my interests in labor economics and in economic analysis using 
longitudinal, linked worker-firm data.   
The instability of labor earnings in the United States contributes to earnings 
inequality and may diminish household welfare.  Despite the importance of earnings 
instability little is known about its correlates or causes.  This study seeks to better 
understand whom earnings instability affects and why it affects them.  Using both 
parametric and semi-parametric techniques, I provide an in-depth investigation into 
the relationship between earnings instability and worker skill.  I find that earnings 
instability follows a U-shape over skill, with low-skill workers experiencing the least 
stable earnings, middle-skill workers experiencing the most stable, and high-skill 
workers falling in between the two.  This finding is robust to a number of controls, 
sample selections, and other statistical concerns, and is not driven by workers entering 
and leaving employment, changing jobs, or holding multiple jobs.  I then investigate 
whether firm characteristics affect the stability of worker earnings.  I am the first to 
directly test the relationship between earnings instability and firm employment 
instability using linked employer-employee data.  I find a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the two that remains when the effect is estimated 
using only within-firm variation.  This suggests that the effect is a feature of the way 
 
 
workers are being paid by their employer.  The size of the effect varies by a worker’s 
position in the earnings distribution: low-earning worker are passed a greater share of 
firm employment instability than higher-earning workers.  This finding helps to 
explain the left tail of the U-shape of earnings instability over skill.  I find significant 
heterogeneity in the magnitude and significance of the effect across industries and 
explore how the competitiveness of an industry relates to the size of the industry-
specific effect. 
My interest in the economics of education is reflected in the second essay of 
this thesis, which studies a public policy innovation using administrative records.  The 
effects of single-sex education are hotly contested, both in academic and policy 
circles. Despite this heated debate, there exists little credible empirical evidence of the 
effect of a U.S. public school's decision to offer single-sex classrooms on the 
educational outcomes of students. This study seeks to fill this hole. Using 
administrative records for third through eighth graders in North Carolina public 
schools, the chapter finds evidence that the offering of single-sex mathematics courses 
is associated with lower performance on end-of-grade math exams, and finds no 
evidence that the offering of single-sex reading scores increases performance on 
reading exams. Evidence of significant heterogeneity in the effect across schools is 
also presented. 
Finally, my interest in public policy is further reflected in the third chapter of 
this thesis, coauthored with Donald Morgan and Ihab Seblani.  Despite a dozen 
studies, the welfare effects of payday credit are still debatable.  We contribute new 
evidence to the debate by studying how payday credit access affects bank overdrafts 
(such as returned checks), bankruptcy, and household complaints against lenders and 
debt collectors.  We find some evidence that Chapter 13 bankruptcy rates decrease 
after payday credit bans, but where we find that, we also find that complaints against 
 
 
lenders and debt collectors increase. The welfare implications of these offsetting 
movements are unclear. Our most robust finding is that returned check numbers and 
overdraft fee income at banks increase after payday credit bans. Bouncing a check 
may cost more than a payday loan, so this finding suggests that payday credit access 
helps households avoid costlier alternatives. While our findings obviously do not settle 
the welfare debate over payday lending, we hope they resolve it to some extent by 
illuminating how households rearrange their financial affairs when payday loan supply 
changes. 
In summary, this thesis nicely reflects my interests in labor economics, public 
policy, economic analysis using linked and administrative data, and education 
economics, and the econometric and research skills I have acquired during my five 
years as a graduate student in economics at Cornell. 
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING EARNINGS INSTABILITY: 
SKILLS AND EMPLOYERS1 
 
 
Michael R. Strain2 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The instability of labor earnings in the United States contributes to earnings 
inequality and may diminish household welfare.  Despite the importance of earnings 
instability little is known about its correlates or causes.  This study seeks to better 
understand whom earnings instability affects and why it affects them.  Using both 
parametric and semi-parametric techniques, I provide an in-depth investigation into 
the relationship between earnings instability and worker skill.  I find that earnings 
instability follows a U-shape over skill, with low-skill workers experiencing the least 
stable earnings, middle-skill workers experiencing the most stable, and high-skill 
workers falling in between the two.  This finding is robust to a number of controls, 
sample selections, and other statistical concerns, and is not driven by workers entering 
and leaving employment, changing jobs, or holding multiple jobs.  I then investigate 
whether firm characteristics affect the stability of worker earnings.  I am the first to 
                                                 
1 Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no 
confidential information is disclosed. This research uses data from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal 
Employer Household Dynamics Program, which was partially supported by the following National 
Science Foundation Grants 
2 Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  14853.  Author’s email: 
mrs274@cornell.edu 
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directly test the relationship between earnings instability and firm employment 
instability using linked employer-employee data.  I find a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the two that remains when the effect is estimated 
using only within-firm variation.  This suggests that the effect is a feature of the way 
workers are being paid by their employer.  The size of the effect varies by a worker’s 
position in the earnings distribution: low-earning worker are passed a greater share of 
firm employment instability than higher-earning workers.  This finding helps to 
explain the left tail of the U-shape of earnings instability over skill.  I find significant 
heterogeneity in the magnitude and significance of the effect across industries and 
explore how the competitiveness of an industry relates to the size of the industry-
specific effect. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
The earnings of American workers have grown significantly more volatile 
since the 1970s.   This earnings instability — the fluctuations over time in a worker’s 
earnings — plays an important role in earnings inequality:  the rise in earnings 
instability accounts for nearly one-third of the increase in earnings inequality from 
1970 to 2004 (Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2008).  Earnings instability lowers household 
welfare because risk averse households prefer stable to unstable earnings, even if 
average earnings are the same.   There is evidence that households have trouble 
smoothing consumption in the face of earnings instability (Dynarski and Gruber, 1997 
and Gorbachev, 2011).  Households of lesser means may only be able to partially 
insure their consumption against transitory income shocks (Blundell et al., 2008).  
Income volatility is associated with volatile food consumption, particularly for 
traditionally-vulnerable households (Gorbachev, 2011).   
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Despite the importance of earnings instability, little empirical evidence has 
been documented on its causes and correlates — most of the research to date has 
focused on documenting the trends in aggregate earnings instability.3  With this study 
I add to our understanding of earnings instability by providing evidence of whom 
earnings instability affects and why it affects them.  Specifically, I examine whether 
workers of differing skill levels have differing amounts of time-series variance in their 
earnings.  The results from this analysis suggest that the relationship between earnings 
instability and skill may be a function of the way that workers are paid by their 
employing firms, as opposed to being driven by workers entering and leaving 
employment, changing jobs, or holding multiple jobs.  This finding invites the second 
component of my paper, wherein I investigate the relationship between earnings 
instability and an important firm characteristic: the instability of firm employment.  To 
carry out this investigation I use linked employer-employee data for the U.S. labor 
market — the first time linked data have been used to estimate this relationship. 
Earnings instability is a complex and interesting issue because it may mean 
different things to different workers.  The risk preferences of higher-skilled workers 
and the compensation schemes into which they select may suggest that earnings 
instability and skill are positively related.  At the same time, if earnings instability is 
driven by a breakdown in implicit contracts fueled by increasingly competitive global 
markets, then one might conjecture that lesser-skilled workers would have less stable 
earnings as labor markets increasingly operate like spot markets.   
                                                 
3 There have been some studies in this literature which do not focus on the trends.  For example, 
changing jobs does affect the stability of a worker’s earnings, but the trends found in the data remain 
even when only workers who do not change jobs are studied (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994).  Job 
instability has been linked to earnings instability — displaced workers experienced substantially 
increased earnings instability in the years following the loss of their job (Huff Stevens, 2001).  Comin et 
al. (2009) find evidence that the instability of the average wage paid by a firm is associated with firm 
employment and sales instability, and interpret this as evidence that firms are passing volatility in their 
sales and employment to their workers in the form of more volatile wages. 
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My study of earnings instability and skill begins by drawing on simple models 
in the compensation literature.  Workers of different skill level sorting into different 
compensation schemes can naturally generate a relationship between skill and 
earnings instability — differences in skill across workers predict not only differences 
in mean earnings, but also differences in the variance of earnings over time. 
   A simple extension to a model from Lazear (1995) explores this with two 
different piece-rate compensation schemes and finds that higher skill workers will sort 
into schemes characterized by less stable earnings. While this motivates the 
relationship between skill and earnings instability, the true labor market is 
significantly more complex.  A rigorous empirical investigation is needed to establish 
the nature of the relationship between earnings instability and skill. 
 In this paper, I study the relationship between a worker’s skill (i.e., her 
unobserved person-specific heterogeneity associated with earnings, or “ability”) and 
her earnings instability using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979, a well known and commonly used panel.  To proxy for the worker’s unobserved 
heterogeneity I use the worker’s score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), 
a variable often used for this purpose in the economics literature.   
 Instead of a monotonic relationship between earnings instability and AFQT 
scores, I find a U-shape, with middle-skill workers experiencing more stable earnings 
than either high- or low-skill workers.  The right tail of the U is less pronounced than 
the left tail: low-skill workers are found to have the least stable earnings, workers of 
middling ability are found to have the most stable earnings, and high-skill workers fall 
between the two.  This relationship is estimated using a fully parametric model and 
using semi-parametric techniques, and is robust to different sample restrictions, 
control variables, and estimation strategies. 
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 This finding is most closely related to the examination of earnings instability 
trends for different education subgroups.  While Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) focus 
on documenting the trends in aggregate earnings instability, they do examine the 
trends for three education subgroups: less than twelve years of school, twelve or more, 
and sixteen or more.  They find that the least educated workers have the least stable 
earnings and that the most educated workers have the most stable earnings. Gottschalk 
and Moffitt (2009) conduct a similar exercise, except they restrict their attention to 
two mutually exclusive subgroups: workers with twelve or fewer years of school and 
workers with more than twelve years.  They compute average earnings instability for 
each subgroup, as before, and find that in the 1970s both groups had about the same 
level of earnings instability, in the 1980s the less educated group had less stable 
earnings than the more educated group, but in the 1990s it was the more educated 
workers with less stable earnings.  Cameron and Tracy (1998) also present trends by 
subgroup, and find that transitory earnings variance declines with a worker’s level of 
education, and that most of the decline occurs if a worker is a high school graduate.  
Earnings instability rose for all education categories in the 1980s in their study, with 
the largest relative increase experienced by high school dropouts.   
In addition to education, permanent earnings are another cousin of skill.  
Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) place individuals into three groups based on the 
percentile rank of their permanent earnings: bottom quartile, top quartile, and middle 
quartiles.  They find that the bottom quartile had the least stable earnings in all the 
time periods, and that the largest increase in instability occurred for this group 
between the 1970s and 1980s. 
 I build on these subgroup-trend analyses in a number of ways, and provide a 
more thorough and reliable analysis of the link between skill and earnings instability.  
First, I use a worker’s AFQT score as a measure of his skill.  AFQT is a much finer 
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measure than has been previously used, and will allow me to examine the relationship 
between earnings instability and skill at a much more detailed level than would 
looking at two education categories or three categories of permanent earnings.  
Second, AFQT is plausibly exogenous — workers are not selecting their AFQT score 
in order to attain a desired level or variance of earnings, as they may be with 
education.  Third, instead of studying subgroup trends I study the underlying 
relationship between skill and earnings instability.  The literature has focused on the 
trends because the original motivation for studying earnings instability was to 
understand better the growth over time in earnings inequality.  My primary interest is 
in understanding whom earnings instability affects and why it affects them.  Fourth, 
instead of simply computing average earnings instability by subgroup and time period, 
I study the relationship in more depth, using both parametric and semi-parametric 
regression methods and a variety of economically interesting samples. 
In addition to the U-shape of earnings instability over skill, this paper presents 
the following results on the relationship between earnings instability and skill: (1) 
Low-skill workers have less stable earnings than either middle- or high-skill workers 
— the right tail of the U is less pronounced than the left.  (2) The U-shaped 
relationship is stronger for workers who do not change jobs, and so is not driven by 
earnings fluctuations associated with switching employers or job loss, and implying 
that the pattern may be related to a feature of compensation.  (3) While single-job 
holders have more stable earnings than the sample of workers who are allowed to hold 
multiple jobs, the U-shape is strongest for single-job holders.  This suggests that the U 
may be a feature of compensation in “better” jobs.  (4) The result that low-skill 
workers experience less stable earnings than high-skill workers occurs in both the 
1990s and 2000s, but the result that high-skill workers have less stable earnings than 
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middle-skill workers only holds for the 2000s.  (5) The instability of total family 
income does not follow a U-shape over skill.  Instead, it seems to follow a W. 
What might explain these findings?  The U-shape is robust to workers entering 
and leaving employment, changing jobs, and holding multiple jobs.  I provide a 
speculative discussion in the paper which relates the U-shape of earnings instability 
over skill to the hollowing out of the skill distribution.  Autor and Dorn (2011) find 
that from 1980 to 2005 both employment growth and wage growth follow a U-shape 
over skill.  If employment and average wages are growing in low-skill and high-skill 
occupations at faster rates than middle-skill occupations, then it may follow that the 
variance of earnings for workers of low- and high-skill will be relatively larger.  
Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, earnings variance may be driven by 
fundamentally different forces for low- and high-skill workers, with high-skill workers 
hoping for a large positive shock and low-skill workers operating in something similar 
to a secondary labor market characterized by a breakdown of implicit contracts 
governing earnings. 
 Results from the analysis of earnings instability and skill suggest that the U-
shape may be driven in part by compensation practices — by the way that workers are 
paid by their employers.  This suggestion invites the study of the firm-level 
characteristics which are associated with their workers’ earnings instability.  To 
investigate this, I study the relationship between earnings instability and an important 
characteristic of a firm: the instability of employment at the worker’s employing firm.  
Firm employment is a natural measure of the scope of economic activity undertaken 
by the firm, and firm employment instability is a natural measure of fluctuations in the 
scope of economic activity.  
Models of perfect competition predict that a worker’s earnings are unrelated to 
firm performance: the price of labor is set in the market, and both firms and workers 
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take the price of labor as given.  Other models — including contract models, 
bargaining models, and monopsony models — predict that firms have some control 
over the earnings they pay their workers, and suggest a link between the market 
outcomes of a firm and the earnings dynamics of the firm’s employees.   The core of 
this issue is the motivation behind implicit contracts: Do firms insure the earnings of 
their risk-averse workers from shocks by smoothing the earnings of their workers from 
period to period? 
 Bertrand (2004) finds that a firm may decide to reduce the protection from 
external labor market conditions which it provides to its workers’ earnings when 
competition from imports increases.  This suggests a possible link between firm 
instability and earnings instability: firms which operate in increasingly hostile markets 
are less willing to insure the earnings of their workers from shocks.   To my 
knowledge, Comin et al. (2009) provide the only direct test of whether firms pass 
volatility onto workers’ earnings.  Using COMPUSTAT data on publicly traded firms, 
they find a robust relationship between the instability of sales and employment of a 
firm and the instability of the average earnings paid by that firm, implying that firms 
may be passing instability onto workers in the form of more volatile earnings. 
 While Comin et al. (2009) is compelling, there remains more work to do on the 
question.  Comin et al. (2009) use a sample of firms restricted to those which are 
publicly traded, but publicly traded firms have very different patterns of volatility than 
do privately held firms (Davis et al., 2006).  In addition, Comin et al. (2009) use 
average earnings paid by the firm, calculated by dividing a firm’s total annual wage 
bill by total employment — they study the instability of average earnings at the firm.  
While this is perhaps the best measure that can be found in COMPUSTAT, worker-
level earnings data are needed to fully explore this question.  
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To study the relationship between firm employment instability and worker 
earnings instability I use worker-level earnings linked to firm-level variables.  The 
linked employer-employee data I use come from the LEHD program of the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  These linked employer-employee data provide me with the ability to 
directly investigate the question at hand because I have information about individual 
workers and the firms in which they are employed. 
 I present three main findings on the effect of firm employment instability on 
earnings instability.  (1) I find a positive relationship between the instability of a firm's 
employment and the instability of the earnings of workers in that firm.  This result is 
robust to a number of demographic and firm controls and remains when estimated 
using within-firm variation, suggesting that the effect is a feature of the way workers 
are being paid by firms.  (2) I find that low-earning workers are being passed more 
than twice as much instability as high-earning workers — the size of the effect 
decreases over earnings quintile.  This helps to explain one of the major results of my 
study of earnings instability and skill: that low-skill workers experience more earnings 
instability than middle- or high-skill workers.  And (3), I find significant heterogeneity 
in the magnitude and statistical significance of the effect across industries.   
 The third finding is particularly interesting.  In the canonical implicit contract 
model, the fully-insured wage enjoyed by the worker is driven by the assumption that 
firms are risk neutral and workers risk averse.  Is an increasingly competitive economy 
introducing risk aversion into firms’ utility over profits?  Does increasing competition 
drive down corporate profits, and thus weaken the ability of a firm to honor implicit 
contracts?  If so, then variation across industries in competitive pressure may explain 
the variation across industries in the magnitude of the effect.  At the same time, 
variation across industries in the power of firms to affect the earnings of their workers 
may also shed some light on the inter-industry heterogeneity of the effect.  I present 
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preliminary evidence of a relationship between the magnitude of the pass-through 
effect and the competitiveness of the industry. 
 This paper proceeds as follows.  The next section will discuss earnings 
instability with more rigor, and specify the measure used in this paper.  Section III will 
present the investigation of earnings instability and skill.  Section IV will present the 
analysis of the effect of firm employment instability on earnings instability, and the 
fifth section will conclude. 
 
II.  Earnings Instability: Motivation & Measurement 
At least since Milton Friedman (1957), economists have found it natural to 
think of a worker’s earnings as consisting of a time-invariant permanent component 
and a time-varying transitory component.  The transitory component can be thought of 
as a “random” shock to earnings, causing earnings to be unstable over time.  
Attempting to better understand this earnings instability is the focus of this paper. 
To help build intuition, think of these transitory shocks in a number of labor 
market settings.  Among high-skill workers, a lawyer who wins a once-in-a-decade 
case or a corporate vice president who receives an unusually generous annual bonus 
has received a positive transitory shock to her permanent earnings, and a hedge fund 
manager who makes a bad investment decision and earns no bonus in a given year can 
be thought of as experiencing a negative transitory shock.  Among low-skill workers, a 
negative transitory shock to earnings could come in the form of a factory layoff, a 
business slowdown that results in weekly hours being temporarily cut from forty to 
thirty, or an unusually slow summer in a landscaping occupation.  In each case, the 
worker’s average or permanent earnings are being hit by a shock which dies out 
quickly — which would not be expected to affect earnings into the future.   
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Earnings instability is an important component of many interesting economic 
questions.  It is a critical component of cross-sectional earnings inequality.  Assuming 
that transitory shocks to earnings are a random process which is uncorrelated with 
permanent earnings, the cross-sectional variance of earnings at any point in time is 
simply the sum of the cross-sectional variance of permanent earnings and the cross-
sectional variance of transitory earnings.   
 A conceptual example helps to clarify this point.  Imagine that you observe the 
distribution over earnings at two points in time, ݐ and ݐ′.  At ݐ all workers earn exactly 
the same amount of money.  There is no spread in the earnings distribution, and thus 
there is no earnings inequality.  At ݐ′, one worker receives a random shock to his 
earnings, causing him to earn more than the other workers in the distribution.  All 
other workers retain the same earnings as in ݐ.  Now, at ݐ′, there is non-zero variance 
in the distribution, and we conclude that earnings inequality has increased from ݐ to ݐ′, 
though nothing in the structure of the labor market has actually changed. 
Peter Gottschalk and Robert Moffitt have studied the trends in earnings 
instability in a series of papers (1994, 2002, 2008, and 2009).  Using the Michigan 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they find that the rise in transitory earnings 
variance accounts for 31 percent of the total rise in cross-sectional earnings variance 
from 1970 to 2004 (Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2008).  Standard explanations of 
increasing earnings inequality — increasing demand for high-skill workers, increasing 
supply of low-skill workers, and structural changes such as a decrease in union 
membership — apply to permanent earnings, but we would not expect them to affect 
transitory shocks.  Supply and demand factors evolve slowly over time, and while a 
gradual increase in the demand for college-educated workers would be expected to 
raise the average wage of a college-educated worker over time, it seems less likely that 
this change in demand would affect deviations from the worker’s average wage. To 
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better understand earnings inequality, then, we must better understand earnings 
instability. 
 Earnings instability also plays a significant role in consumer welfare.  Abstract 
away from savings behavior and assume that a household consumes all of its earnings 
in the form of goods and services.  For households with a concave utility function — a 
standard assumption — we know that the utility of the expected value of earnings is 
greater than the expected utility of the gamble:  
 
ݑሺߜݕ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻݕ′ሻ ൒ ߜݑሺݕሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻݑሺݕ′ሻ, where ߜ	߳	ሺ0,1ሻ. 
 
If ݕ ൌ ݕ′ — if the household has perfectly stable earnings — then the two expressions 
are equivalent.  But if not, household welfare is higher in the scenario to the left of the 
inequality, when the household income is not uncertain.4   
Household welfare may also be affected by earnings instability as it relates to 
consumption smoothing.  Dynarski and Gruber (1997) find that households may have 
trouble smoothing in the face of earnings instability, particularly with respect to 
durable goods.  Blundell et al. (2008) find that low-wealth households are only able to 
partially insure their consumption against transitory income shocks.  Similarly, 
Gorbachev (2011) finds that income volatility is associated with volatile consumption 
of food, particularly for traditionally-vulnerable households. 
 Instability of earnings also has a clear relationship with earnings mobility; 
depending on the size of the transitory shock, a worker’s relative position in the 
                                                 
4 In addition to preferring the expected value of the gamble to the gamble, it is the case that the 
household prefers smaller variance in expected earnings to larger variance.  Let ݕ be a random level of 
earnings for a given year, with ߤ௬ ൌ ܧሾݕሿ and ߪ௬ ൌ ݒܽݎሺݕሻ ൐ 0.  Let ܷ be utility over earnings, with 
ܷᇱᇱሺݕሻ ൏ 0.  Consider ݕᇱ ൌ ݕ ൅ ݓ, where ݓ is a mean-zero random variable which is independent of ݕ, 
such that ܿ݋ݒሺݕ, ݓሻ ൌ 0.  Then ܧሾݕᇱሿ ൌ ܧሾݕሿ ൌ ߤ௬, but ݒܽݎሺݕᇱሻ ൌ ߪ௬ ൅ ߪ௪ ൐ ߪ௬.  It is a well known 
result that ܧሾܷሺݕሻሿ ൐ ܧሾܷሺݕᇱሻሿ. 
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earnings distribution could change.  Finally, earnings dynamics are interesting in and 
of themselves, and earnings instability plays a clear role in the path of earnings over 
time. 
 The decomposition of annual earnings into a permanent and transitory 
component can be summarized by the following equation: 
 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݑ௜ ൅ ݒ௜௧, 
 
where ݕ௜௧ is annual earnings for person ݅ in year ݐ, ݑ௜ is a time-invariate component 
specific to individual ݅, and ݒ௜௧ is the transitory shock experienced by worker ݅ in year 
ݐ.  The dynamics of ݒ௜௧ cause annual earnings to change from year to year, introducing 
instability. 
 The canonical model can be further developed.  For example, it is natural to 
think that permanent earnings may change over time — investments in human capital 
surely affect permanent earnings, or changes in occupation and industry due to a 
layoff, or a severe illness.  We also might expect a transitory shock to linger for more 
than one period. 
 These features can be incorporated into a richer model: 
     ݕ௜ఛ௧ ൌ ݑ௜ఛ ൅ ݒ௜ఛ௧    (a) 
     ݑ௜ఛ ൌ ݑ௜,ఛିଵ ൅ ߜ௜ ൅ ߱௜ఛ   (b) 
    ݒ௜ఛ௧ ൌ ߩݒ௜ఛ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜ఛ௧    (c) 
Here, equation (a) is the same as the canonical model, except all three terms 
are indexed by ߬.  The symbol ߬ identifies a group of years.  So permanent earnings 
are assumed to be constant during that time window, and the sum of permanent 
earnings and a transitory shock equals observed annual earnings. 
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 Permanent earnings are assumed to follow a random walk with a growth 
process.  The growth factor, ߜ௜, allows for some individuals to have permanently 
higher or lower earnings than others, perhaps due to a genetic ability endowment or to 
environmental factors.  Permanent earnings are hit by a shock during time interval ߬, 
߱௜ఛ, which does not die out over time.  The transitory component of earnings is 
assumed to be a first-order autoregressive process.  During each year ݐ in each time 
interval ߬, the transitory component is hit by a shock, ߝ௜ఛ௧, which fades away 
according to 0 ൏ ߩ ൏ 1. 
 Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) estimate a parametric error components model 
based on a three-equation system very similar to the one presented above (along with 
distributional assumptions governing the means, variances, and covariances of the 
components), and conclude that the method of estimating earnings instability used, for 
example, in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), Comin et al. (2009), and this paper 
approximates the trends from the richer model closely.5  That method is to use the  
following formula: 
 
݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሺݕ௜௧ሻ ൌ 1ܽ ൅ ܾ െ 1 ෍ ൫ݕ௜,௧ା௝ െ ݕത௜,ሾ୲ି௔,୲ା௕ሿ൯
ଶ
௝ୀ௕
௝ୀି௔
. 
 
                                                 
5 Similar earnings decompositions are very common in the labor economics literature.  See Abowd and 
Card (1989) as an example.  DeBacker, Heim, Panousi, and Vidangos (2010) estimate earnings 
instability trends using two modeling choices: they allow the transitory component of earnings to follow 
an ARMA(1,1) process and an AR(1) process.  In addition, they estimate earnings instability using the 
method used in this paper, and using a similar method from Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010). They find 
that the trends in earnings instability are sufficiently similar across the four methods, but that the shares 
of cross-sectional earnings variance explained by the permanent and transitory components differ.  
Haider (2001) estimates a parametric model of life-cycle earnings to study whether the increase in 
earnings inequality during the 1970s and 1980s was caused by lifetime earnings inequality increasing or 
the receipt of lifetime earnings becoming less stable.  He finds that earnings instability increased 
significantly over the period, with most of the increase occurring in the 1970s. 
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Here, ݕ௜௧ is log annual earnings for worker ݅ in year ݐ.  The parameters ܽ and ܾ 
represent years before and after year ݐ, respectively.  ݕത௜,ሾ୲ି௔,୲ା௕ሿ is the average 
earnings for worker ݅ during the time interval defined by ܽ and ܾ. 
 Essentially, this is a rolling variance window.  A compelling feature of this 
methodology is that is allows for the calculation of worker-level earnings instability.  
This is critical for this study because I seek to examine the relationship between 
worker-level earnings instability and both worker skill and the instability of 
employment of the worker’s employer.   
To measure the instability of worker ݅’s earnings in year ݐ using, say, a nine-
year window, compute the variance of his log annual earnings over the nine-year 
period starting four years before ݐ and ending four years after ݐ (ܽ ൌ ܾ ൌ 4).  The 
permanent component of earnings during that nine-year window is simply the average 
earnings during the window, and the transitory component for each year is the 
deviation from the average. 
 Computing this measure for every worker ݅ in every year ݐ generates a time 
series of earnings instability for each worker  — earnings instability is calculated for, 
say, the year 2000 by computing the variance of earnings from 1996 through 2004, 
and then earnings instability is calculated for 2001 by computing the variance of 
earnings from 1997 through 2005, etc.   
 The length of the time window is very important in this calculation.  Following 
the previous literature, I use windows of two lengths: nine years, and five years.  Five 
years allows the permanent component to shift frequently, and captures very high-
frequency variation in earnings (Comin et al., 2009).  Nine years is the original length 
suggested by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).  The results in this paper are 
substantively the same regardless of which window is used. 
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III.  Earnings Instability & Skill 
Economists are used to thinking about averages, and it is well known that 
differences in skill across workers can produce differences in average earnings.  
Whether a relationship exists between skill and the variance over time of workers’ 
earnings is less clear.  In this section, I present two simple exercises to demonstrate 
that the relationship between earnings instability and skill can be found by extending 
standard models. 
The idea that low-skill workers will sort into fixed-pay jobs while high-skill 
workers will sort into piece-rate jobs is intuitive, and is prevalent in the compensation 
literature.  Lazear (1986) derives a model which implies this result, and Lazear (2000) 
finds evidence supporting the prediction using data from the Safelite Glass 
Corporation, an automobile glass installation company.   
In the mid-1990s Safelite changed its compensation scheme from hourly wages 
to piece-rate pay, with a guaranteed minimum rate.  If the worker installed enough 
windows such that his piece-rate pay was higher than the guaranteed minimum, he 
was given the piece-rate pay.  If not, he was given the hourly minimum.  Lazear finds 
that higher-quality workers sorted into Safelite after the piece-rate scheme was 
implemented, and that average worker ability rose (as well as average output and 
output variance) after the change in compensation structure.   
To present a simple argument based on Lazear (1995), imagine that a worker is 
deciding between two firms.  Firm 1 offers a high base salary and a low performance 
pay component.  Firm 2 offers a low base salary and a high performance pay 
component.6  This situation can be summarized by the following equations: 
 
                                                 
6 This could just as easily be two compensation schemes within the same firm, or two industries, 
provided that the shock affects workers within firm or across industries in the same manner. 
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݌ܽݕଵ௜௧ ൌ ܽଵ ൅ ܾଵݍ௜௧ 
݌ܽݕଶ௜௧ ൌ ܽଶ ൅ ܾଶݍ௜௧ 
 
where ܽଵ ൐ ܽଶ ൐ 0, reflecting the higher base salary offered by Firm 1; 0 ൏ ܾଵ ൏ ܾଶ, 
reflecting the higher performance-pay component offered by Firm 2; and ݍ௜௧ ൐ 0 is 
the output of the worker during period ݐ.  Let the worker’s output be a linear function 
of the worker’s skill and a random component which affects both workers: ݍ௜௧ ൌ
݂ሺݏ௜ሻ ൌ ߙݏ௜ ൅ ߦ௧, where ݏ is skill, ߙ is a parameter, and ߦ௧ is a shock.7  It may be most 
intuitive to think of ߦ௧ as a technology shock.   
Then we have the following: 
 
݌ܽݕଵ௜௧ ൌ ܽଵ ൅ ܾଵሺߙݏ௜ ൅ ߦ௧ሻ 
݌ܽݕଶ௜௧ ൌ ܽଶ ൅ ܾଶሺߙݏ௜ ൅ ߦ௧ሻ 
 
For some level of skill, call it ̅ݏ, ݌ܽݕଵ௜௧ ൌ ݌ܽݕଶ௜௧.  Worker with skill level ݏ ൏ ̅ݏ will 
receive higher pay with Firm 1, while workers with skill level ݏ ൐ ̅ݏ will receive 
higher pay with Firm 2.  Thus, workers of higher skill will sort into the firm with a 
larger performance pay component, and less-skilled workers will sort into the firm 
with a larger base salary component. 
 This compensation scheme captures the intuition that workers of relatively 
higher skill may experience less stable wages than lower skill workers.  Note that 
output is more variable than base pay due to the presence of the time-varying shock.  
This is by construction, but it may be reasonable to think that base pay will experience 
smaller year-to-year changes than output.  The pay scheme implies that 
                                                 
7 For the result to hold, the assumption of linearity is unnecessary.  If ݍ௜௧ ൌ ݄ሺݏ௜ሻ ൅ ߦ௧, the result will 
still hold provided that ݄ሺሻ is increasing in skill and unbounded.  
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ݒܽݎ൫݌ܽݕ௙௜௧൯ ൌ ௙ܾଶݒܽݎሺߦ௧ሻ, ݂ ൌ 1,2.  Since ܾଶଶ ൐ ܾଵଶ, the firm which offers the larger 
performance pay component will see workers with less stable earnings. 
 In addition to this stylized example, the result that workers of different skill 
will experience different levels of earnings instability can be found in a standard 
general equilibrium model of a perfectly competitive market. 
 Suppose that two workers, a higher-skilled worker and a lesser-skilled worker, 
maximize utility from leisure and consumption and are endowed with nothing but 
time.  Suppose further that workers’ labor supply is inelastic, and that both workers 
supply one unit of labor to a firm. 
 The firm chooses the quantity of higher-skilled labor and the quantity of lesser-
skilled labor to maximize profit.  The production function is Cobb-Douglas.  The 
profit function is: 
 
ߴ௧ ுܰ௧ఈ ௅ܰ௧ఉ െ ݓு௧ ுܰ௧ െ ݓ௅௧ ௅ܰ௧, 
 
where ுܰ௧ is the quantity of higher-skilled labor the firm chooses in period ݐ, ௅ܰ௧ is 
the quantity of lesser-skilled labor chosen, ߙ and ߚ are the marginal products of labor, 
ߙ ൐ ߚ, and ݓு௧ and ݓ௅௧ are the wage rates.  The parameter ߴ௧ is a shock.  This can be 
thought of as a time-varying output price or as a time-varying productivity shock 
which affects both types of workers. 
 Labor demand is a function of the wage, the marginal product, and the shock, 
and is as follows: ுܰ௧ ൌ ߙ ణ೟௪ಹ೟ and ௅ܰ௧ ൌ ߚ
ణ೟
௪ಽ೟.  Setting labor supply equal to labor 
demand ( ுܰ௧ ൌ ௅ܰ௧ ൌ 1) gives equilibrium wages of: ݓഥு௧ ൌ ߙߴ௧ and ݓഥ௅௧ ൌ ߚߴ௧.  
Since ߙଶ ൐ ߚଶ, we have the result that ݒܽݎሺݓு௧ሻ ൐ ݒܽݎሺݓ௅௧ሻ. 
 To be clear, I do not intend to test these models in this paper.  The purpose of 
presenting these exercises is to demonstrate how readily a relationship between 
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earnings instability and skill can be found using standard models, both stylized and 
general equilibrium.  In these models, differences in skill produce not only difference 
in mean earnings, but also differences in the time-series variance of earnings.  Having 
developed some intuition regarding the relationship, I now turn to the data and 
descriptive statistics.8 
 
3.1.  Data, Samples, & Descriptive Statistics 
 The data used in this paper come from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979.  The NLSY79 follows a cohort of American youths aged fourteen to 
twenty-one at the time of first interview in 1979 and records detailed information 
about their labor market outcomes.  The cohort is interviewed every year from 1979 
through 1994, and every other year thereafter.  The NLSY79 oversampled Hispanic, 
black, and economically-disadvantaged whites, so sample weights are used throughout 
this paper. 
 The annual earnings variable used is the log of total income from wages and 
salaries.  The respondent is asked to recall his total earnings for the previous year from 
working, which includes wages, salaries, commissions, and tips from all jobs, before 
taxes or other deductions.  Measurement error is clearly a concern here, but provided 
that the share of measurement error in the individual’s annual report does not vary 
significantly over time, the earnings instability measure should be largely unaffected.9 
                                                 
8 In ongoing research I am directly testing the extent to which the increasing prevalence of performance 
pay is related to the macro earnings instability trends. 
9 Consider the case where a respondent misreports his earnings by ݔ percent per year, each year of the 
rolling variance window.  Reported earnings are actual earnings ݕ plus error, equal to ݕሺ1 ൅ ݔሻ.  The 
earnings instability formula can be written such that the term which is being squared (and then 
summed) is lnൣݕ௧ሺ1 ൅ ݔሻ ൫∏ ሺݕሺ1 ൅ ݔሻሻଵ/்் ൯⁄ ൧.  As the measurement error is in both the numerator and 
denominator of the fraction, the measurement error cancels out, and the instability of reported earnings 
is identical to the instability of actual earnings. 
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 The “skill” variable in the NLSY79 used in this paper is a worker’s AFQT 
score.  In the summer and fall of 1980, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery — the standardized aptitude test used by the military to assist in assigning 
service members to jobs — was administered to the NLSY79 cohort, and was 
completed by approximately ninety-four percent of the sample.  The AFQT score is 
calculated using the arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, 
and numerical operations components of the ASVAB, and is frequently used in labor 
economics to proxy for unobserved ability or skill (see, for example, Heckman and 
LaFontaine, 2006).  A benefit of using this particular measure of unobserved skill is 
that it is plausibly exogenous to future labor market experiences — i.e., workers are 
not choosing their AFQT score in order to affect their earnings and earnings dynamics.  
In addition, there is no reason to be concerned that a worker’s earnings are causing the 
worker’s AFQT score. 
 A unit of observation is a worker-year, and the analysis sample consists of 
males older than twenty-five years of age who are not enrolled in school and who have 
positive earnings for the year, and runs from 1979 through 2008.  The data are annual, 
and males are studied to avoid confounding labor supply issues.  Workers older than 
twenty-five are studied to avoid the confounding volatility which may be associated 
with beginning a career.  Students are excluded because their labor supply patterns are 
likely quite different than non-students.  Workers with positive earnings are studied 
because they are the observations in the sample which are being paid by a firm, and 
the primary purpose of this paper is to study the instability of labor income — to see if 
the instability of earnings paid to workers by firms is related to the skill level of 
workers.  (Total family income, described later, is also studied.) 
Earnings are deflated using the CPI-U.  Following the literature, I delete 
worker-years in the bottom one percent and the top one percent of the log earnings 
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distribution.  This is done to eliminate reporting errors, to deal with the problem of 
top-coding, and to ensure that outliers are not driving the regression results.  When 
interpreting the results, note that they only apply to the middle ninety-eight percent of 
the log earnings distribution. 
 I follow Gottschalk and Moffitt (2002) by computing the instability measure 
on log earnings, and not on the residuals from a log earnings regression.  This 
generalizes the results and ensures that the choice of first-stage specification is not 
driving the results.  Standard control variables (years of schooling, experience and 
experience squared, race, region of residence, marital status, urban residence, hours, 
occupation, and industry) are included in the regressions. 
 An issue with using the NLSY79 is that after 1994 the respondents cease being 
surveyed annually and are instead surveyed every other year.  For odd-numbered years 
following 1994 there are no data on earnings.  Following Comin et al. (2009), I deal 
with this issue by modifying the earnings instability measure by calculating it only on 
every other year of data.  (Comin et al. refer to this as a “skipping years” 
methodology.)  To ensure consistency, I use the skipping years methodology on the 
entire sample.  All results in this paper use this methodology. 
 This paper studies earnings instability measured by rolling variance windows 
of two different lengths; consequently, there are two different analysis samples.  In 
addition, much of the analysis is conducted on a subsample of observations which 
contain worker-years where the worker did not change his primary employer at any 
time during the window — e.g., for the nine-year window centered on the year 2000, 
the earnings instability measure is only computed if the worker did not change jobs 
from 1996 through 2004.  Job stayers are interesting to study because we can be sure 
that the instability of their earnings is a function of the way they are being paid by 
their employer, and not a function of changing employers.  Consequently, there are 
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four analysis samples for total labor earnings: the nine-year window and the five-year 
window, both for job stayers only and for both job stayers and job changers.   
 All four samples contain workers with strong labor market attachment, and the 
two samples of job stayers contain workers with quite strong attachment to a particular 
employer.  It is intuitive to think that some of these workers are less risk taking than 
those who experience periods of unemployment and job changing, and that many of 
them are more likely to have less variable earnings than the job changers and the 
sometimes unemployed.  Studying these workers is interesting because doing so helps 
to control for entry and exit from employment and entry and exit from employers 
when estimating the relationship between earnings instability and skill.  Studying 
workers who work continuously throughout the window, and studying those who work 
continuously for the same primary employer, helps to ensure that what we are learning 
about is the way these workers are paid, without the confounding effects of job 
changing and entry/exit from working. 
 Figure 1.1 plots the distribution over annual earnings for each of the four 
subsamples.  The four distributions look very similar.  The mean for the five-year 
window consisting of both job stayers and job changes is slightly less than its nine-
year counterpart; the same holds for the subsamples of only job stayers.  Stayers have 
slightly higher earnings than stayers and changers.   
Figure 1.2 plots the distribution over AFQT percentile score for each of the 
four subsamples.  A potential concern might be that in selecting the four analysis 
samples a disproportionate number of observations from a particular part of the AFQT 
distribution may not be included — e.g., that by examining job stayers in the nine-year 
window we may effectively eliminating low-skill workers from the sample.    
Looking at Figure 1.2, it is clear that there is mass above each point of support.  
The mean values of the distributions are all very close to each other.  Overall, the  
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FIGURE 1.1:  Distribution over annual earnings by subsample. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.2:  Distribution over AFQT score by subsample. 
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TABLE 1.1: Summary statistics 
Panel A: Primary sample: Total labor earnings 
 Subsamples 
 Five-year window  Nine-year window  Five-year window   Nine-year window 
           Job stayers   Job stayers 
             
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
             
Earnings instability 0.146 0.390  0.136 0.287  0.117 0.339   0.108 0.249 
Labor earnings 21674.840 13221.700  22556.190 12822.700  22718.370 13206.120   23624.350 12787.900 
Total income 34605.280 52108.020  35327.360 49085.830  36166.080 53823.590   36939.940 50423.280 
AFQT 0.433 0.295  0.443 0.291  0.447 0.296   0.456 0.292 
Years of school 13.047 2.383  13.086 2.308  13.147 2.395   13.191 2.314 
             
Percent Hispanic 17.930   17.670   17.620    17.250  
Percent black 25.690   24.550   24.460    23.770  
Observations 25287     13515     22262      11504   
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TABLE 1.1 (Continued) 
Panel B: Single-job holder sample 
 Subsamples 
 Five-year window  Nine-year window  Five-year window   Nine-year window 
           Job stayers   Job stayers 
             
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
             
Earnings instability 0.088 0.297  0.072 0.200  0.069 0.249   0.059 0.160 
Labor earnings 24741.650 14110.300  26033.940 13415.830  25341.670 14047.460   26439.700 13405.760 
Total income 38950.030 56148.420  41433.880 61289.930  39652.380 56391.410   41818.710 60740.040 
AFQT 0.459 0.300  0.472 0.300  0.467 0.299   0.478 0.299 
Years of school 13.148 2.381  13.140 2.296  13.196 2.388   13.182 2.308 
             
Percent Hispanic 17.540   16.670   17.250    16.370  
Percent black 22.420   21.090   21.520    20.580  
Observations 11028     4320     10294      4057   
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pictures indicate that the entire support of the AFQT distribution is well represented in 
each of the four analysis subsamples. 
Panel A of Table 1.1 reports some summary statistics of key variables for the 
four analysis samples.  Computing earnings instability using a five-year window 
results in a slightly higher value for earnings instability than using the nine-year 
window.  This is true for both the sample of only job stayers and the sample of both 
job stayers and job changers.  Using either window length, stayers have more stable 
earnings than the sample of both stayers and changers.  This is intuitive — earnings 
instability should be less when employer changes are controlled for.  
Demographically, all four samples look very similar.  Stayers seem to have about 0.1 
years of schooling more than the sample of stayers and changers.  In all four samples, 
17 to 18 percent of the sample is Hispanic, and 24 to 26 percent is black. 
 
Single-Job Holders 
In addition to studying the relationship between earnings instability and skill 
using the total labor earnings variable described above, another interesting sample 
consists of those workers who only work at one employer in a given year — single-job 
holders. 
Workers select into holding multiple jobs at a time for a variety of reasons.  
Hours constraints at a primary job have been found to be an important reason why 
some workers may take a second job (Paxson and Sicherman, 1996).  Longer hours 
and higher income in a primary job have been found to deter workers from holding a 
second job (Krishnan, 1990).  This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
workers select into multiple job holding to supplement income, which may increase 
earnings instability for those workers.  At the same time, if workers have concave 
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utility over earnings, it may also be the case that some workers select into holding a 
second job to smooth their income over time — to decrease their earnings instability.   
 Panel B of Table 1.1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of worker-
years where the worker is a single-job holder.  The same four subsamples and 
measures are generated from this sample as in the sample previously discussed: five-
year earnings instability, nine-year earnings instability, five-year earnings instability 
for job stayers only, and nine-year earnings instability for job stayers only.  
Interestingly, average earnings instability for the sample of worker-years with only 
one job is nearly half that of the sample for all worker-years, with both single and 
multiple job holding.  For single-job holders, the five-year instability measure 
averages 0.088; for single- and multiple-job holders, the measure averages 0.147.  
This disparity also holds for job stayers.  The average earnings instability for single-
job holders who do not change jobs during the window equals 0.069.  For single- and 
multiple-job holders, the average of the measure is 0.117. 
 The sample of single-job holders is different than the sample of single- and 
multiple-job holders.  For the five-year and five-year-stayers subsamples, average 
earnings are 14 and 12 percent higher, respectively.  This is consistent with the 
literature, which suggests that higher-income workers are less likely to select into a 
second job.  In addition, single-job holders have higher AFQT scores and are less 
likely to be a minority. 
 All the sample cuts studied in this paper consist of workers with very strong 
labor market attachment.  For the subsamples of job stayers only, the workers 
additionally have very strong employer attachment.  The sample of worker-years who 
hold only one job are perhaps the most stable: not only do they work every year in the 
window, but also they work for only one employer, and for the job-stayer subsamples 
they work only for the same employer.  If the relationship between skill and earnings 
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instability is the same for this group as for the group previously discussed, that is 
evidence that the relationship between skill and earnings instability is a strong and 
persistent feature of the way workers are paid.  In addition, studying the earnings 
instability of these workers controls for instability generated by multiple income 
streams. 
 
Total Family Income 
The total family income variable in the NLSY79 captures receipts from labor 
earnings, described above, and in addition from business and farm income, social 
insurance programs, including unemployment compensation, AFDC payments, food 
stamps, education and disability benefits, and other welfare and SSI payments. 
 From the descriptive statistics in Table 1.1, we see that the earnings instability 
measure calculated on total family income and the earnings instability measure 
calculated on total labor income have similar average magnitudes.  However, this says 
nothing about the relationship between the instability of total family income and skill.  
If labor earnings are systematically different for workers of different skill level, then 
investigating whether the relationship between labor earnings and skill is different 
than the relationship between total income and skill is of interest. 
 
3.2.  Empirical Strategies & Regression Results 
Using sample means, interesting evidence on earnings instability was 
presented in the previous section.  This section will study the relationship between 
earnings instability and skill by employing regression analysis.  A flexible technique 
using categorical variables is presented first, followed by a semi-parametric technique, 
local linear regression, and finally a parametric model.  The analysis will first be 
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conducted on the total labor earnings variable, and then subsequently the labor 
earnings of single-job holders and total family income will be studied. 
 
Categorical Variable Model 
 To gain an understanding of the shape of the relationship, I create AFQT 
quintile indicator variables.  AFQT20 equals 1 if the worker has an AFQT percentile 
score less than or equal to twenty, and 0 otherwise.  AFQT40 equals 1 if the worker’s 
score is both greater than twenty and less than or equal to forty, and 0 otherwise.  
AFQT60, AFQT80, and AFQT100 are analogously defined.  The empirical 
specification is presented below as Eq. 1: 
 
 
݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሺݕ௜௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ෍ߚ௞ܣܨܳ ௞ܶ
௞∈ట
൅ ௜ܺ௧ߜ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
߰ ≝ ሼ20, 40, 80, 100ሽ, 
(1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the instability of the log of total labor earnings for 
worker ݅ in the window centered on year ݐ, ߙ is a constant, ߝ௜௧ is the residual, ߜ is a 
parameter vector, and ௜ܺ௧ is a matrix of control variables. The symbol ߰ signifies the 
four-element set ሼ20, 40, 80, 100ሽ, so ߚ௞ is the coefficient on each of the four AFQT 
categorical variables.  Standard errors are robust, and the regressions are weighted.  
AFQT60 is omitted and used as the comparison group. 
 Before turning to the regression results, it is helpful to examine the average 
level of earnings instability for each AFQT group.  Column 1 of Table 1.2 reports the 
means by AFQT quintile for total labor earnings.  For each of the four subsamples — 
five-year, five-year stayers, nine-year, and nine-year stayers — the quintile with the 
least stable earnings is the lowest quintile.  Interestingly, the quintile with the most 
stable earnings is the middle quintile, AFQT60.  
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TABLE 1.2: Average instability of earnings and income by AFQT quintile 
     
 Five-year window measure/subsample  
     
 Labor earnings Labor earnings Total income  
  Single-job holders   
0 < AFQT ≤ 20 0.186 0.120 0.200  
20 < AFQT ≤ 40 0.150 0.095 0.151  
40 < AFQT ≤ 60 0.118 0.056 0.139  
60 < AFQT ≤ 80 0.118 0.071 0.114  
80 < AFQT ≤ 100 0.126 0.080 0.130  
     
 
Five-year window 
measure/subsample: Job stayers only  
 Labor earnings Labor earnings Total income  
  Single-job holders   
     
0 < AFQT ≤ 20 0.146 0.090 0.168  
20 < AFQT ≤ 40 0.117 0.076 0.132  
40 < AFQT ≤ 60 0.092 0.046 0.122  
60 < AFQT ≤ 80 0.097 0.059 0.101  
80 < AFQT ≤ 100 0.113 0.067 0.122  
     
 Nine-year window measure/subsample  
 Labor earnings Labor earnings Total income  
  Single-job holders   
     
0 < AFQT ≤ 20 0.161 0.086 0.192  
20 < AFQT ≤ 40 0.138 0.082 0.157  
40 < AFQT ≤ 60 0.118 0.046 0.144  
60 < AFQT ≤ 80 0.121 0.060 0.116  
80 < AFQT ≤ 100 0.124 0.077 0.133  
     
 
Nine-year window 
measure/subsample: Job stayers only  
 Labor earnings Labor earnings Total income  
  Single-job holders   
     
0 < AFQT ≤ 20 0.123 0.064 0.155  
20 < AFQT ≤ 40 0.110 0.074 0.144  
40 < AFQT ≤ 60 0.090 0.038 0.119  
60 < AFQT ≤ 80 0.097 0.052 0.102  
80 < AFQT ≤ 100 0.112 0.062 0.124  
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These quintile-specific means imply that earnings instability follows a U-shape over 
skill.  Importantly, the left tail is much larger than the right.  For the five-year 
subsample, for example, the average earnings instability for AFQT20 is approximately 
57 percent larger than the average earnings instability for AFQT60, while AFQT100 is 
only approximately 7 percent larger than the middle quintile.  This pattern holds for 
the subsample of job stayers.  The nine-year stayers subsample finds average earnings 
instability of AFQT20 to be approximately 36 percent larger than the middle quintile, 
with AFQT100 approximately 24 percent larger. 
The magnitude of the difference is economically significant.  Imagine two 
workers, each of whom earns 22,000 dollars in year ݐ, which is approximately the  
mean inflation-adjusted value of earnings in the regression samples.  Between years 
ݐ െ 2 and ݐ ൅ 2, the first worker starts at 26,000 dollars, suffers a 2,000 dollar pay cut 
each year, and so is earning 18,000 dollars in the last year of the five-year window.  
The second worker receives a pay cut of 4,000 dollars per year, starts at 30,000 dollars 
in year ݐ െ 2, and finishes at 14,000 dollars in year ݐ ൅ 2.  The earnings instability 
measure for the second worker is larger than the earnings instability measure for the 
first worker by a magnitude of 0.07.  This difference of 0.07 is the same as the 
difference for the five-year subsample between the middle AFQT quintile and the 
lowest AFQT quintile. 
 To control for other economic and demographic factors, I now turn to 
regression estimates of this relationship.  First, consider the subsamples of job stayers 
and changers.  Table 1.3 reports the results from these regressions.  The first five 
columns of the table report results using the five-year window, and the last five 
columns report results using the nine-year window.  For each subsample, the first 
regression is uncontrolled.  The second regression includes a control for the log of  
 TABLE 1.3: Earnings instability on AFQT indicator variables 
  
The table reports estimates of Eq. 1.  The dependent variable for each regression is the earnings instability measure using either a nine-year or five-
year rolling window. (See text for details.) In addition to the control variables shown in the table, regressions which are labeled as including 
demographic controls include dummies for year, race, region of residence, marital status, and urban residence.  Regressions are weighted. Standard 
errors are robust. The AFQT indicators equal 1 if the worker's AFQT score falls within the specified interval, otherwise 0. 
 Five-year window measure/subsample  Nine-year window measure/subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
0 < AFQT ≤ 20 Indicator 0.051*** 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.020**  0.030*** 0.027*** 0.012 0.014 0.009 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009]  [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
20 < AFQT ≤ 40 Indicator 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.021** 0.018** 0.013  0.026*** 0.023** 0.016* 0.016* 0.013 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
60 < AFQT ≤ 80 Indicator 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.013  0.003 0.006 0.01 0.011 0.015 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] 
80 < AFQT ≤ 100 
Indicator 0.007 0.007 0.022** 0.018** 0.021**  0.001 0.003 0.013 0.012 0.018* 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]  [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
Log hours worked  -0.140***  -0.123*** -0.114***   -0.088***  -0.077*** -0.074*** 
  [0.014]  [0.014] [0.013]   [0.011]  [0.011] [0.012] 
Years of school   -0.007*** -0.005** -0.005*    -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007** 
   [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]    [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Experience   -0.004 -0.005 -0.008**    -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.019*** 
   [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]    [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Experience squared   0.000 0.000 0.000*    0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.113*** 1.192*** 0.298*** 1.222*** 1.125***  0.115*** 0.793*** 0.486*** 1.056*** 0.926*** 
 [0.005] [0.106] [0.065] [0.127] [0.138]  [0.006] [0.089] [0.060] [0.109] [0.140] 
            
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Occ and industry controls No No No No Yes  No No No No Yes 
            
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.021 0.02 0.033 0.125  0.002 0.016 0.024 0.034 0.175 
Number of observations 25287 24850 25029 24599 24446   13515 13292 13432 13210 13122 
Standard errors in brackets.  *** signifies statistical significance at the one-percent level, ** signifies the five-percent level, and * the one-percent level.
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hours worked.  Earnings instability could be driven by hours variation, so this is an 
important control to consider.  The third regression removes the hours control, and 
adds controls for years of schooling, experience and its square, and indicator variables 
for race, region of residence, marital status, urban residence, and year.  The fourth 
regression returns the hours control to the estimating equation.  And the fifth 
regression adds controls for industry and occupation. 
 The coefficient for the log of hours worked is negative and statistically 
significant in each equation in which it is included — longer hours are associated with 
more stable earnings.  Years of schooling also consistently has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient.  The coefficients suggest that the instability-
experience profile has a negative slope. 
 On balance, using the five-year subsample, there appears to be a U-shaped 
relationship between earnings instability and AFQT.  The excluded AFQT category in 
the regressions is AFQT60 — AFQT scores between 40 and 60.  The coefficients on 
AFQT20 are statistically significant and positive in all five regressions, and the 
coefficients on AFQT40 are statistically significant and positive in all but one, 
implying that low-skill workers experience greater earnings instability than middle-
skill workers.  In the three fully controlled regressions, AFQT100 has a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient.  Taken together, this subsample indicates that both 
high- and low-skill workers have less stable earnings than middle-skill workers.  
When earnings instability is calculated using the nine-year window, the shape of the 
relationship is less clear.  The control variables eliminate the statistical significance of 
the AFQT20 variable (although the statistical significance of AFQT40 survives in two 
of the three), and AFQT100 is statistically significant in only one of the five 
regressions. 
 Some of the earnings instability captured in these two subsamples may come 
from workers changing jobs.  Table 1.4 presents regression results again using the 
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five- and nine-year windows, but now on a sample of workers who not only worked 
every year in the window, but also who did not change their primary employer during 
the window.   
 Compellingly, every AFQT coefficient is statistically significant and positive 
in sign, providing fairly strong evidence that low- and high-skill workers have less 
stable earnings than middle-skill workers.  Using the five-year window, the low-skill 
workers have less stable earnings than the high-skill workers.  However, using the 
longer window, the reverse is true: it is the high-skill workers with the least stable 
earnings of all the quintiles. 
 Taken together, the results from these four subsamples indicate three findings:  
First, that the instability in total labor earnings follows a U-shape over skill, with low-
skill workers experience less stable labor earnings than high-skill workers, and 
middle-skill workers experiencing the most stable earnings.  Second, the relationship 
is more robust for the subsample of workers who do not change their primary job 
during the rolling window.  And third, low-skill workers experience less stable 
earnings than high-skill workers.10  In addition, note that relative instability is more 
equal between low- and high-skill workers when the longer window is used to 
calculate earnings instability. 
                                                 
10 There is some evidence that relative to middle-skill workers and after regression adjustment, low-
skill workers have less stable short-term earnings than high-skill workers, but high-skill workers have 
less stable longer-term earnings.  However, as the next two sections will show, this result is not robust. 
 TABLE 1.4: Earnings instability on AFQT indicator variables: Job stayers   
The table reports estimates of Eq. 1.  The dependent variable for each regression is the earnings instability measure using either a nine-year or 
five-year rolling window. (See text for details.) In addition to the control variables shown in the table, regressions which are labeled as including 
demographic controls include dummies for year, race, region of residence, marital status, and urban residence.  Regressions are weighted. 
Standard errors are robust. The AFQT indicators equal 1 if the worker's AFQT score falls within the specified interval, otherwise 0.  Only 
workers who do not change their primary employer during the rolling window are included in the sample. (See text for details.)  
 Five-year window measure/subsample  Nine-year window measure/subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
0 < AFQT ≤ 20 Indicator 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.032***  0.028*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.017** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
20 < AFQT ≤ 40 
Indicator 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.022**  0.032*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.026** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
60 < AFQT ≤ 80 
Indicator 0.012* 0.012* 0.016** 0.015** 0.021***  0.012* 0.012* 0.016** 0.015** 0.021*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
80 < AFQT ≤ 100 
Indicator 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.026***  0.020*** 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]  [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] 
Log hours worked  -0.064***  -0.055*** -0.049***   -0.030***  -0.025** -0.021* 
  [0.013]  [0.013] [0.013]   [0.011]  [0.011] [0.012] 
Years of school   -0.004** -0.004** -0.003    -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005** 
   [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]    [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Experience   -0.007** -0.007** -0.011***    -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.018*** 
   [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]    [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Experience squared   0.000 0.000 0.000**    0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.085*** 0.584*** 0.303*** 0.717*** 0.601***  0.084*** 0.316*** 0.420*** 0.569*** 0.375*** 
 [0.004] [0.097] [0.090] [0.137] [0.140]  [0.004] [0.087] [0.105] [0.107] [0.139] 
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Occ and industry controls No No No No Yes  No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.017 0.119  0.002 0.004 0.019 0.02 0.185 
Number of observations 22262 21957 22049 21750 21628   11504 11360 11441 11297 11227 
Standard errors in brackets.  *** signifies statistical significance at the one-percent level, ** signifies the five-percent level, and * the one-percent level. 
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Local Linear Regression 
 The OLS regressions with skill indicator variables presented above offer a very 
flexible technique towards discovering the relationship between earnings instability 
and skill.  As an even more flexible technique, I turn to a semi-parametric econometric 
method, local linear regression, which I will now discuss following Hansen (2009) and 
Li and Racine (2007).   
The goal is to find a function which relates the expected value of earnings 
instability (calculated using the log of total labor earnings) to each value of AFQT.  
Call this function ݃ሺሻ, where: 
 
݃ሺܣܨܳܶሻ ൌ ܧሺ݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ	݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ|ܣܨܳܶ ൌ ܣܨܳ ଴ܶሻ. 
 
ܣܨܳ ଴ܶ is a specific value of AFQT. 
 To this end a series of local regressions are estimated, of the form: 
 
݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሺݕ௜ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚሺܣܨܳ ௜ܶ െ ܣܨܳ ଴ܶሻ ൅ ߝ௜. 
 
Note that the AFQT variable is defined as deviations from the specific level of AFQT, 
called ܣܨܳ ଴ܶ.  The estimators are the solution to the following minimization problem: 
 
minఈ,ఉ ෍ሾ݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሺݕ௜ሻ െ ߙ െ ߚሺܣܨܳ ௜ܶ െ ܣܨܳ ଴ܶሻሿଶ	1ሺ|ܣܨܳܶ െ ܣܨܳ ଴ܶ| ൑ ݄ሻ,
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
 
where ݄ is the bandwidth, and 1ሺሻ is an indicator function.  A kernel is substituted for 
the indicator function, and the estimators are algebraically equivalent to the weighted 
least squares estimators, where in this case the weight is the kernel function. 
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 Once we have estimates of the parameters ߙ and ߚ, for each local regression 
we can set ܣܨܳ ௜ܶ ൌ ܣܨܳ ଴ܶ, which gives our estimate of ݃ሺܣܨܳ ଴ܶሻ: ො݃ሺܣܨܳ ଴ܶሻ ൌ
ߙොሺܣܨܳ ଴ܶሻ.  In other words, for each local regression, the estimate of the intercept in 
the local linear regression gives us our estimate of the conditional expectation. 
 In addition to looking at the local linear plots, it may be helpful to look at some 
potentially more-familiar kernel regressions.  Figure 1.3 plots results using standard 
kernel regression for each of the four subsamples.  Figure 1.4 plots semi-parametric 
results using the local linear technique described above.  The pictures were generated 
using an epanechnikov kernel and the optimal rule-of-thumb bandwidth.   
The plots largely confirm the conclusion from the categorical variable models.  For the 
portion of the AFQT distribution to the right of the middle-fifties, earnings instability 
is rising in AFQT.  For the portion to the left, earnings instability is falling in AFQT.  
Over the entire AFQT distribution earnings instability is U-shaped.  Job stayers exhibit 
a stronger U-pattern than the sample which allows workers to change jobs during the 
rolling window.  Low-skill workers have greater earnings instability than high-skill 
workers — indeed, in some of the pictures, the right tail is rather weak.  And low- and 
high-skill workers are most equal using the longer window. 
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FIGURE 1.3:  Kernel regression results by subsample. 
FIGURE 1.4:  Local linear regression results by subsample. 
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFQT score
95% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 4.95, pwidth = 7.43
Five-year instability
.1
.1
2
.1
4
.1
6
.1
8
.2
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFQT score
95% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 6.48, pwidth = 9.72
Nine-year instability
.0
8
.1
.1
2.
14
.1
6.
18
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFQT score
95% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 5.96, pwidth = 8.95
Job stayers only
Five-year instability
.0
8
.1
.1
2
.1
4
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFQT score
95% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 7.09, pwidth = 10.63
Job stayers only
Nine-year instability
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFQT score
95% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 4.95, pwidth = 7.43
Five-year instability
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFQT score
95% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 6.48, pwidth = 9.72
Nine-year instability
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFQT score
95% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5.96, pwidth = 8.95
Job stayers only
Five-year instability
.0
8
.1
.1
2.
14
.1
6.
18
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFQT score
95% CI lpoly smooth
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 7.09, pwidth = 10.63
Job stayers only
Nine-year instability
39 
Quadratic Model 
 The categorical variable model and semi-parametric techniques discussed 
above are quite flexible.  It is interesting to see if a parametric specification can be fit 
to the data successfully.  Since the previous results suggest a U-shaped relationship 
between earnings instability and AFQT, I estimate a model with a quadratic in AFQT.   
Specifically, the following equation, labeled Eq. 2, is estimated: 
  
݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሺݕ௜௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܣܨܳܶ ൅ ߚଶܣܨܳܶଶ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߜ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
 
(2) 
where everything is defined as in Eq. 1, and with a quadratic in AFQT replacing the 
four categorical variables.  The pattern of control variables from the categorical 
variable regressions in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 is repeated for Tables 1.5 and 1.6, which 
present the results from Eq. 2. 
 The quadratic specification confirms the evidence found by the previous two 
methods.  In every regression the coefficient ߚଵ is negative and the coefficient ߚଶ is 
positive, implying a U-shape of earnings instability over AFQT.  Both coefficients are 
statistically significant in each regression. 
This result is more readily seen by examining Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6.  Both 
figures plot the predicted level of earnings instability by using estimates of Eq. 2: 
ଓ݊ݏݐܾܽଓ݈ଓݐݕ෣ ሺݕ௜௧ሻ ൌ ߙො ൅ ߚመଵܣܨܳܶ ൅ ߚመଶܣܨܳܶଶ.  Figure 1.5 plots predicted earnings 
instability using the five-year and nine-year windows for the subsamples of job stayers 
and job changers, while Figure 1.6 plots predicted earnings instability for job stayers 
only.  The dashed line (colored blue) in both pictures are predicted earnings instability 
using the five-year window, and the solid line (colored red) is predicted earnings 
instability using the nine-year window. 
 TABLE 1.5: Earnings instability on AFQT score and AFQT score squared 
The table reports estimates of Eq. 2.  The dependent variable for each regression is the earnings instability measure using either a 
nine-year or five-year rolling window. (See text for details.) In addition to the control variables shown in the table, regressions 
which are labeled as including demographic controls include dummies for year, race, region of residence, marital status, and urban 
residence.  Regressions are weighted. Standard errors are robust.  AFQT ranges from 0.01 to 0.99. 
 Five-year window measure/subsample  Nine-year window measure/subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
AFQT -0.248*** -0.206*** -0.192*** -0.162*** -0.146***  -0.135*** -0.130*** -0.085** -0.087** -0.074* 
 [0.036] [0.036] [0.038] [0.038] [0.043]  [0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.036] [0.040] 
AFQT^2 0.184*** 0.157*** 0.168*** 0.142*** 0.141***  0.088** 0.091*** 0.070** 0.072** 0.074* 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.041]  [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.039] 
Log hours worked  -0.139***  -0.122*** -0.114***   -0.088***  -0.076*** -0.074*** 
  [0.014]  [0.014] [0.013]   [0.011]  [0.011] [0.012] 
Years of school   -0.006*** -0.005** -0.004*    -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006** 
   [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]    [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Experience   -0.003 -0.005 -0.008**    -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 
   [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]    [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Experience squared   0 0 0.000*    0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.195*** 1.254*** 0.335*** 1.252*** 1.156***  0.165*** 0.838*** 0.497*** 1.069*** 0.941*** 
 [0.008] [0.105] [0.063] [0.125] [0.135]  [0.007] [0.087] [0.059] [0.107] [0.137] 
            
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Occ and industry 
controls No No No No Yes  No No No No Yes 
            
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.022 0.02 0.034 0.125  0.003 0.017 0.025 0.034 0.175 
Number of 
observations 25287 24850 25029 24599 24446   13515 13292 13432 13210 13122 
Standard errors in brackets.  *** signifies statistical significance at the one-percent level, ** signifies the five-percent level, and * the one-percent level.
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 TABLE 1.6: Earnings instability on AFQT score and AFQT score squared: Job stayers 
The table reports estimates of Eq. 2.  The dependent variable for each regression is the earnings instability measure using either 
a nine-year or five-year rolling window. (See text for details.) In addition to the control variables shown in the table, regressions 
which are labeled as including demographic controls include dummies for year, race, region of residence, marital status, and 
urban residence.  Regressions are weighted. Standard errors are robust.  AFQT ranges from 0.01 to 0.99. Only workers who do 
not change their primary employer during the rolling window are included in the sample. (See text for details.) 
 Five-year window measure/subsample  Nine-year window measure/subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AFQT -0.223*** -0.207*** -0.200*** -0.188*** -0.159***  -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.097** 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.035] [0.039]  [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.033] [0.039] 
AFQT^2 0.183*** 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.164*** 0.144***  0.114*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.098*** 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.035] [0.037]  [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.037] 
Log hours worked  -0.064***  -0.055*** -0.049***   -0.030***  -0.025** -0.022* 
  [0.013]  [0.013] [0.013]   [0.011]  [0.011] [0.012] 
Years of school   -0.004* -0.003* -0.002    -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005* 
   [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]    [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Experience   -0.006** -0.007** -0.011***    -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
   [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]    [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Experience squared   0 0 0.000**    0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.158*** 0.649*** 0.355*** 0.765*** 0.648***  0.133*** 0.364*** 0.451*** 0.599*** 0.395*** 
 [0.007] [0.097] [0.089] [0.136] [0.138]  [0.007] [0.086] [0.105] [0.106] [0.137] 
            
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Occ and industry controls No No No No Yes  No No No No Yes 
            
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.119  0.002 0.003 0.018 0.019 0.184 
Number of observations 22262 21957 22049 21750 21628   11504 11360 11441 11297 11227 
Standard errors in brackets.  *** signifies statistical significance at the one-percent level, ** signifies the five-percent level, and * the one-percent level. 
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 The U-shape shown in the plots is evident.  For all four lines, the U bottoms 
out over the high-fifties and low-sixties of AFQT score.  The left tail is taller than the 
right tail, implying that extremely low-skill workers experience greater earnings 
instability than do extremely high-skill workers.  Figure 1.2 shows that these tails are 
not merely artifacts of the functional form; the distribution over AFQT approximates a 
uniform, and there is a good deal of mass over the very-low and very-high AFQT 
scores. 
 
Results For The 1990s & 2000s 
 Average, labor-market-wide earnings instability increased during the 1980s, 
remained at its new, higher level during the 1990s, and may have begun rising again in 
the early 2000s (Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2008).11  While the focus of this paper is not 
on the macro trends of earnings instability, it is interesting if the U-shaped relationship 
between earnings instability and skill documented above looks different in different 
decades, and if these differences correspond to periods in which the trends were 
changing. 
 Figures 1.7 and 1.8 plot the kernel regression and local linear regression 
estimates for the 1990s, estimated as described previously.  While a few of the 
pictures do seem to have an increasing right tail, on balance the evidence is that 
earnings instability was not larger in magnitude for high-skill workers than for middle-
skill workers.  Figure 1.8, the local linear regression plots, shows that earnings 
instability declines in AFQT score until approximately AFQT = 40, and then remains  
 
 
                                                 
11 Some authors have found that earnings instability did not increase over the 1980s — e.g., Dynarski 
and Gruber (1997).  These authors employ a differences model to calculate earnings instability, using as 
their measure of earnings instability the variance of year-to-year changes in earnings.  See Moffit and 
Gottschalk (2008) for a discussion of the differences between these methods. 
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FIGURE 1.5:  Predicted earnings instability 
 
 
FIGURE 1.6:  Predicted earnings instability.  Job Stayers only. 
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flat for the remainder of the AFQT distribution.  Figure 1.7 shows the same result in 
the top two panels, and shows a something of an upward bend for job stayers.  Figures 
9 and 10 produce analogous plots for the 2000s.  For nearly all of the plots for the 
2000s, earnings instability is rising in AFQT for AFQT scores greater than 60.12 
 To conclude, the result that low-skill workers experience less stable earnings 
than high-skill workers occurs in both the 1990s and 2000s.  However, the result that 
high-skill workers have less stable earnings than middle-skill workers only holds for 
the 2000s.  This implies the possibility that instability of earnings for high-skill 
workers is driving the increase in the macro trend for the 2000s.  A more detailed 
investigation of this result and its potential causes is the subject of future work. 
 
Single-Job Holders 
 The results discussed above are generated using total labor earnings for 
workers from all jobs.  Workers select into multiple-job holding to supplement 
income, which may have an effect on earnings instability.  In addition, it is easy to 
imagine that workers with volatile income may take a second job in order to smooth 
their total labor earnings.  Studying workers with only one job is interesting because it 
may be the case that these workers are in a more stable labor market situation than 
multiple-job holders.  If the U-shaped relationship found using total labor earnings 
holds for single-job holders, then we may be more convinced that this is a stable 
 
                                                 
12 In some of the (unreported) categorical variable regressions for the 2000s, the coefficient on AFQT20 
is insignificant, while the coefficient on AFQT100 is positive and significant.  In several of the 
categorical variable regressions, the magnitude of the AFQT100 coefficient is nearly as large or larger 
than for AFQT20.  A table of these results is available upon request. 
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FIGURE 1.7:  Kernel regression results by subsample. 
 
FIGURE 1.8:  Local linear regression results by subsample. 
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FIGURE 1.9:  Kernel regression results by subsample. 
 
FIGURE 1.10:  Local linear regression results by subsample. 
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feature of compensation, and not an artifact of income from multiple streams or from 
low-paying, low-hours jobs. 
 Table 1.1, previously discussed, shows that average earnings instability for the 
sample of single-job holders is nearly half that of the sample of single- and multiple-
job holders.  The second column of Table 1.2 shows that, although single-job holders 
have relatively more stable earnings, earnings instability still follows a U-shape 
pattern over skill.  For all four subsamples of single-job holders, workers in the middle 
AFQT quintile have the most stable earnings.   
Table 1.7 confirms the simple means from Table 1.2 by estimating Eq. 1, the 
categorical variable model, for the sample of single-job holders.  Everything is the 
same in these regressions as before, except that the sample used to estimate the 
coefficients is now worker-years where the worker held only one job.  Using either the 
nine- or five-year earnings instability measure, for the subsample of single-job holders 
who are allowed to change jobs during the window, the U-shape relationship is very 
strong.  Every coefficient in the top panel of Table 1.7 is positive, and nearly every 
coefficient is statistically significant.  The bottom panel reports results for job stayers.  
Using the five-year measure, the U-shape remains.  However, the controls wipe out 
the right tail of the U using the nine-year measure. 
 Figures 1.11 and 1.12 present the plots from kernel and local linear regression 
for single-job holders.  These plots confirm the results from the categorical variable 
regression.  Taken together, the sample of single-job holders allows us to conclude 
that the U-shape of earnings instability over skill is not a function of multiple-job 
holding.  In addition, these results suggest that high- and low-skill workers have more 
 TABLE 1.7: Earnings instability on AFQT indicator variables: Single-job holders  
The table reports estimates of Eq. 1.  The dependent variable for each regression is the earnings instability measure using either 
a nine-year or five-year rolling window. (See text for details.) In addition to the control variables shown in the table, 
regressions which are labeled as including demographic controls include dummies for year, race, region of residence, marital 
status, and urban residence, and controls for years of school, experience, and experience squared.  Regressions are weighted. 
Standard errirs are robust. The AFQT indicators equal 1 if the worker's AFQT  score falls within the specified interval, 
otherwise 0. Only worker-years for which the worker was a single-job holder are included in the estimation samples. (See text 
for details.) 
           
 Job stayers and job changers 
           
 Five-year window measure/subsample  Nine-year window measure/subsample 
            
0 < AFQT ≤ 20 Indicator 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.042***  0.026*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012]  [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.011] 
20 < AFQT ≤ 40 Indicator 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.026**  0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] 
60 < AFQT ≤ 80 Indicator 0.017** 0.018*** 0.015** 0.016** 0.017*  0.015** 0.014** 0.010 0.008 0.014 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009]  [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.010] 
80 < AFQT ≤ 100 
Indicator 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.024**  0.035*** 0.034*** 0.022** 0.019** 0.037*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010]  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.013] 
            
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.016 0.019 0.028 0.181  0.005 0.006 0.031 0.032 0.367 
Number of observations 11028 10931 10921 10825 10781   4320 4287 4296 4263 4252 
 
48 
 TABLE 1.7 (Continued) 
            
 Job stayers only 
            
 Five-year window measure/subsample  Nine-year window measure/subsample 
            
0 < AFQT ≤ 20 Indicator 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.040***  0.017*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]  [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] 
20 < AFQT ≤ 40 Indicator 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.020**  0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010]  [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] 
60 < AFQT ≤ 80 Indicator 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.015**  0.011** 0.011** 0.005 0.005 0.011 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008]  [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] 
80 < AFQT ≤ 100 
Indicator 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.01  0.024*** 0.024*** 0.009 0.009 0.018 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.011] 
            
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.016 0.017 0.193  0.006 0.006 0.036 0.036 0.392 
Number of observations 10294 10237 10193 10137 10105   4057 4038 4036 4017 4008 
            
Log hours control No Yes No Yes Yes  No Yes No Yes Yes 
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Occ and industry controls No No No No Yes   No No No No Yes 
                        
Standard errors in brackets.  *** signifies statistical significance at the one-percent level, ** signifies the five-percent level, and * the one-percent level. 
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volatile earnings than middle-skill workers, even among workers with extremely 
strong labor market attachment and who are in employment situations which do not 
compel them to select into multiple-job holding. 
 
Total Family Income 
 The total family income variable in the NLSY79 captures receipts from labor 
earnings from all jobs, from business and farm income, and from social insurance 
programs, including unemployment compensation, AFDC payments, food stamps, 
education and disability benefits, and other welfare and SSI payments.  One of the 
purposes of government transfer payments is to smooth labor market shocks — if you 
are injured and become disabled, your labor earnings will take a hit, so the 
government attempts to offset this by giving you a disability payment. 
 While the focus of this paper is on compensation — how workers are paid in 
the labor market — it is interesting to study whether the U-shape of earnings 
instability over skill holds for total family income, and not just for labor earnings.  If, 
say, low-skill and middle-skill workers are more likely to experience adverse, 
instability-inducing labor market shocks than high-skill workers, then this might 
explain the left-tail of the U.  If broadening labor earnings to total family income 
eliminates the U-shape, then this is evidence that transfer payments (and/or other 
forms of income) are working with respect to the smoothing of labor income. 
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FIGURE 1.11: Kernel regression results by subsample. 
FIGURE 1.12:  Local linear regression results by subsample. 
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Turning again to Table 1.2, we see three interesting items.  First, the instability 
of total family income is almost always larger in magnitude than the instability of 
labor earnings.  Second, for each of the four subsamples, the instability of total family 
income is most different from the instability of labor earnings for the middle quintile 
of the AFQT distribution.  Third, the U-shape disappears from the simple sample 
means.  Instead, the instability of total family income declines over the first four 
quintiles of the AFQT distribution, with AFQT100 always larger in magnitude than 
AFQT80, and sometimes larger than AFQT60. 
 Figures 1.13 and 1.14 show kernel and local linear regression plots of the 
relationship between the instability of total family income and AFQT score.  They are 
estimated as described above, the same as with labor earnings.  Family income 
instability declines steadily until around AFQT = 40, then rises over the next ten 
points, then falls again until AFQT = 60, and then rises.  This could be described as a 
W-shape of total income instability over AFQT, generated by the disproportionate 
increase in income instability over labor earnings instability for the middle quintile of 
the AFQT distribution.  Further investigation of this result is warranted. 
 
3.3.  Discussion 
 Using three different empirical strategies, this paper finds that the instability of 
total labor earnings follows a U-shape over AFQT scores, which are used here to 
proxy for skill.  Much of earnings instability is driven by workers changing jobs, but 
this paper finds that the U-shaped relationship holds even when earnings instability is 
only calculated for a worker during a time window when he is not changing 
employers.  Furthermore, the U-shaped relationship remains for single-job holders, 
who may be in an even more stable labor market situation. 
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FIGURE 1.13:  Kernel regression results by subsample. 
 
FIGURE 1.14: Local linear regression results by subsample. 
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With entry and exit from employment, job changing, and multiple-job holding 
accounted for, one might think that hours of work explains much of the time-series 
variation in individual earnings: perhaps high-skill workers have relatively more 
volatile pay because they choose to work longer and more variable hours than middle-
skill workers, and perhaps low-skill workers have relatively more volatile pay because 
they are subject to hours restrictions.  However, we find that the U-shape holds both 
when hours are controlled for and when hours are excluded from the empirical model. 
 Another likely candidate is occupation and industry — perhaps some 
occupations and industries have more volatile earnings than others.  There is some 
evidence for this: in some of the categorical variable regressions using the longer 
window, the specification which controls for occupation and industry has imprecise 
coefficients.  However, on balance, the weight of the evidence is that controlling for 
occupation and industry does not eliminate the U-shape. 
 One possible explanation for the finding is that earnings instability means 
something different for high-skill and low-skill workers.  Perhaps low-skill workers 
experience earnings instability because they are in “bad jobs”, both within and across 
industry and occupation.  The existence of a continuum of job quality has been 
postulated by many economists (for example, Abowd et al., 1999 and Schmutte, 
2010), and there is evidence that labor market segmentation results in some workers 
holding jobs with scant returns to education and experience (Dickens and Lang, 1985).  
These “bad jobs” have been thought to be characterized by low returns to education 
and experience, periods of unemployment, and little opportunity for advancement.  
The results from this paper suggests that we may want to add unstable earnings to this 
list of characteristics.   
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High-skill workers, on the other hand, may welcome unstable earnings due to a 
mean-variance tradeoff — they may be hoping for a big payday — and middle-skill 
workers may simply fall between the two. 
 An alternative explanation builds on the research examining the hollowing out 
of the skill distribution.  Autor et al. (2003) finds evidence that computers substitute 
for middle-skill workers who are employed to perform routine tasks, like bookkeepers 
or bank tellers.  These jobs were never the lowest paid, and they were never offered to 
the lowest-skilled workers.  They required precision and repetition, so middle-skill, 
middle-income workers were employed in these jobs.  But they are easily replaced by 
computers.  (For example, bookkeepers are replaced by Quicken and bank tellers by 
ATM machines.)  At the same time, computers largely had no effect on the lowest-
skill jobs, such as janitors, and they had a complementary effect on high-skill workers.  
Autor et al. finds evidence that as the price of computers fell over recent decades the 
relative demand for middle-skill workers (whose jobs could be replaced by computers) 
fell. 
 Goos and Manning (2007) add to this evidence by documenting that the pattern 
of employment changes in Britain from 1975 through 1999 shows a relative increase 
in employment in low- and high-paying jobs, associated with nonroutine tasks, and a 
relative decrease in employment in middle-paying jobs — employment changes 
exhibit a U-shaped pattern over skill level.  This is precisely what one would expect to 
see if computers were replacing middle-skill workers working in jobs which require 
routine tasks.  Autor et al. (2006) finds similar results for the United States.  Autor and 
Dorn (2011) find that from 1980 to 2005 both employment growth and wage growth 
follow a U-shape over skill.  If employment and average wages are growing in low-
skill and high-skill occupations at faster rate than middle-skill occupations, then it may 
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follow that the variance of earnings for workers of low- and high-skill will be 
relatively larger.   
 Perhaps the relationship between earnings instability and skill level 
documented in this paper is related to the hollowing out of the skill distribution.  
Perhaps all the action is outside of the middle — employment growth is concentrated 
among high- and low-skill jobs, middle-skill workers are sorting into those jobs, and 
this activity is generating relatively higher earnings instability for low- and high-skill 
workers.  More research is needed to support or refute this hypothesis. 
 
IV. Earnings Instability & Firm Instability 
 The results we have seen so far suggest that firms pay workers of different skill 
earnings which differentially vary over time.  This suggestion invites a deeper study of 
why firms pay unstable earnings.  Specifically, I now turn to a study of the 
relationship between the instability of firm employment and the instability of the 
earnings paid to the firm’s workers. 
 In the perfectly competitive model of the labor market firms take the price of 
labor as given.  The price of labor is set at the market level, and responds to market 
level demand and supply conditions.  The firm faces a perfectly elastic labor supply 
curve, pays the going rate for labor, and derives its labor demand from profit 
maximization. 
 In this model of the labor market, the firm does not have the option to pass 
volatility onto its workers, or to protect workers from volatile economic conditions.  
The firm enters the labor market as a price taker facing a perfectly elastic labor supply 
curve.  If the firm pays above the market price it will earn negative profits and go out 
of business.  If the firm pays below the market price then it will lose all its workers 
and shut down.  A firm experiencing volatility would have to adjust along margins 
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other than the price of labor, and a firm wishing to shield its workers from external 
conditions would be unable to do so. 
 Other models of the labor market offer different predictions.  Perhaps the 
simplest model is one in which a firm’s profits or output are distributed among its 
workers in each period.  If profits or outputs experience time series variation, then so 
too will worker’s earnings.  As another simple exercise, consider a general equilibrium 
economy with one worker and one firm.  The worker supplies one unit of labor to the 
firm, irrespective of his earnings.  The firm produces output according to ݂ሺܰሻ ൌ ௧ܰఊ೟, 
where ௧ܰ is labor input and 0 ൏ ߛ௧ ൏ 1.  Interpret the parameter ߛ௧ as the firm’s time-
varying technology which converts labor into output.  The firm maximizes profit, 
taking the price of labor as given, and demands labor according to the following 
function: ௧ܰௗ ൌ ൫ߛ௧ ݓ⁄ ௧൯
ଵ ଵିఊ೟ൗ .  In this model, the equilibrium wage will be a function 
of the time-varying technology parameter.  So the introduction of new technology to 
the firm (say, computers) will affect the earnings of workers in that firm. 
 Richer models also suggest that the firm will pass volatility onto its workers.  
Consider a firm-employee negotiation.  Both firm and worker know that the firm will 
experience shocks.  The firm and worker want to write a contract which specifies both 
the wage the worker will receive and the hours the worker will work in each state of 
the world.  Call the shock ߙ.  Call the contract ܥሺߙሻ ൌ ሼݓሺߙሻ, ݄ሺߙሻሽ, where ݄ሺߙሻ are 
the hours worked conditional on ߙ and ݓሺߙሻ is the wage paid conditional on ߙ.  
Suppose that both the firm and the worker have concave utility, the firm over profits 
and the worker over the wage and leisure.  Suppose that the worker is endowed with 
one unit of time. 
 The prospective employee must be induced to work at the firm — at the time 
the contract is signed, the expected utility of the contract must exceed the workers 
opportunity cost.  Let the workers next-best offer be summarized by ഥܷ.  Then the 
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contract ensures the survival of both the firm and the worker by satisfying the 
following: 
 
max஼ሺఈሻ ܧܸሾߨሺߙሻሿ			ݏ. ݐ.			ܧܷሾݓሺߙሻ, 1 െ ݄ሺߙሻሿ ൒ ഥܷ. 
 
The contract maximizes the expected utility of profit for the firm ܧܸሾߨሺߙሻሿ subject to 
the participation constraint of the worker. 
Let the worker’s utility function be logݓሺߙሻ ൅ log	ሺ1 െ ݄ሺߙሻሻ.  A first order 
condition for the maximization problem is ܸ′ሾߨሺߙሻሿ ൌ ߣ ݓሺߙሻ⁄ , where ߣ is the 
Lagrange multiplier.  For state of the world ݖ and ݖ′, we have the following result: 
 
ܸ′ሾߨሺݖሻሿ
ܸ′ሾߨሺݖ′ሻሿ ൌ
ݓሺݖᇱሻ
ݓሺݖሻ . 
 
It is evident that the firm and the worker share the risk associated with the shock.  
Specifically, if ݖ′ ് ݖ then ݓሺݖᇱሻ ് ݓሺݖሻ.  The shock ߙ which hits the firm will be 
absorbed partly by the firm, but the firm will pass some of this risk onto the worker, 
inducing time series variation in the worker’s wage.13 
 In bargaining models, increasing firm performance is correlated with higher 
wages for workers — the time series variance of firm performance is positively 
correlated with the time series variance of worker earnings.  Finally, in models of 
                                                 
13 See Sherwin Rosen (1985) for a survey of the implicit contracts literature.  If the firm in this example 
were risk neutral — i.e., if it did not have concave utility over profits — then the model would result in 
a constant wage for the worker.  However, the firm would still adjust hours in response to the shock, 
which would cause time-series variation in labor earnings, the variable of interest in this paper.  The 
example also assumes that workers face prohibitive costs in switching firms, as the only parameter 
which matters in writing the contract is the opportunity cost at the time the contract is written.  For an 
implicit contract model with costly mobility see Beaudry and DiNardo (1991).  For empirical 
investigations of contract models, see Card (1986), Abowd and Card (1987), and Ham and Reilly 
(2002). 
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monopsony, the monopsonistic firm faces the upward sloping, market level labor 
supply curve, inducing a positive correlation between firm size and worker earnings. 
 Empirically, there is evidence that firms have some measure of control over the 
earnings of their workers — that firms are not pure price takers in the labor market.  
The existence of sizable firm effects in earnings regressions using linked employer-
employee data is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that firms have some discretion 
in the compensation of their workers (Abowd et al., 1999; Goux and Maurin, 1999).  
Recent research by Brummund (2011) and Webber (2011) finds a distribution over 
market power at the firm level, implying that variance exists over the ability of firms 
to influence the earnings of their workers.  If firms do have this ability, then some may 
choose to vary worker earnings with firm performance. 
 Bertrand (2004) studies the extent to which product market competition 
influences a firm’s decision to shield its workers from external labor market 
conditions.  Specifically, she studies whether increased competition from imports 
induced by globalization increases the sensitivity of workers’ earnings to the current 
unemployment rate and decreases the sensitivity of workers’ earnings to the 
unemployment rate at the time of hire.  She finds evidence of both effects, and 
concludes that the labor market is more like a spot market than it used to be. 
 While Bertrand (2004) does not specifically study the relationship between the 
instability of firm performance and the instability of worker earnings, her results imply 
that the correlation may exist: if increasing foreign competition makes firms less likely 
to shield workers from external conditions, then the earnings of those workers will be 
characterized by an increase in time series variation.  Provided that increasing foreign 
competition makes the product market riskier for firms, the two may be correlated.  
 To my knowledge, Comin et al. (2009) provide the only direct test of whether 
firms pass volatility onto workers’ earnings.  Using COMPUSTAT data on publicly 
 60
traded firms, they study whether the instability of the average wage paid by a firm is 
correlated with the instability of firm sales and employment.  They find a robust 
relationship between the two, implying that firms are passing instability onto workers 
in the form of more volatile earnings. 
 While Comin et al. (2009) has compelling results, the paper is not without 
limitations.  The sample of firms is restricted to publicly traded firms.  It has been 
shown that firm instability follows very different patterns for privately-held firms than 
for publicly traded firms (Davis et al., 2006).   In addition, since Comin et al. (2009) 
do not have linked data, they study the instability of average earnings at a firm-year, 
and not the instability of worker-level earnings.  Furthermore, Comin et al. (2009) use 
a noisy measure of average earnings — they divide the firms total annual wage bill by 
total employment, and are not able to control for the entry and exit of workers.  
Finally, only twenty percent of COMPUSTAT firms report their wage bill, and those 
which do report have less firm volatility than those which do not. 
 Linked employer-employee data are needed for a more complete investigation 
of the question at hand.  In this paper, I investigate the relationship between firm 
employment instability and earnings instability using data from the Longitudinal 
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program of the U.S. Census Bureau.14  In the 
next section, I describe the data. 
 
                                                 
14 The LEHD data have been used to study earnings instability topics prior to this paper.  Gottschalk, 
McEntarfer, and Moffitt (2008) estimate the trend in earnings instability from 1991 to 2003 in the 
LEHD data and compare it to the estimated trend in the PSID.  They find that the trend is very similar 
in the two data sets.  (They also find that the cross-sectional variance of earnings is quite different.)  
Celik et al. (2009) use LEHD data to study the importance of employment fluctuations and job changes 
in explaining the trends in earnings instability. 
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4.1.  LEHD Data & Sample 
 The LEHD program is a federal-state partnership between the U.S. Census 
Bureau and all fifty states.15  The states supply LEHD with Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) administrative files, providing LEHD with a report of worker-level UI-covered 
quarterly earnings.  UI records cover approximately ninety-eight percent of wage and 
salary payments in private, non-farm jobs.  Each earnings record is associated with a 
state UI account number which identifies the employing entity of the worker.  In 
addition, the states supply an extract of their ES-202 report, providing LEHD with 
information on the firms in which the workers are employed, including employment 
and industry. 
The UI and ES-202 files are the core of the LEHD data.   The UI records are a 
worker-employer link — a job.  So the LEHD data are a job frame.  The unique person 
identifier for each record allows for the workers’ demographic characteristics to be 
linked from other administrative and survey records.  Demographic information in the 
LEHD data now includes sex, date and place of birth, citizenship status, race, 
ethnicity, and education.  The unique identifiers for workers and firms allow for the 
study of a wide variety of topics, including job-to-job transitions, worker earnings 
histories, and coworker characteristics.  Abowd et al. (2009) provides a 
comprehensive overview and description of the LEHD data.16 
 
                                                 
15 LEHD currently has data for every state except Massachusetts, the most recent state to join. 
16 Interested researchers can access these data through the network of Census Research Data Centers.  
There are currently twelve Census RDCs in the United States.  The RDC network is part of the Center 
for Economic Studies of the U.S. Census Bureau.  The RDCs are Census Bureau facilities housed in 
partner institutions.  For more information on conducting research using the LEHD data (or other data) 
in a Census RDC, please see this website: http://www.census.gov/ces/rdcresearch/index.html. 
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Sample 
 The sample of LEHD data on which the earnings and firm employment 
instability measures were computed consists of all male long-form Census 2000 
records, an (approximately) random one-in-six sample of the U.S. population, from the 
states of California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin, for the years 1992 through 2009.17  As with the 
previous analysis of earnings instability and worker skill, workers younger than 
twenty-five and older than sixty-five are dropped in order to avoid the time series 
variation in earnings associated with beginning and ending a career.  To ensure that 
outliers are not driving the regression results, worker-years with earnings in the first 
and ninety-ninth percentile of the earnings distribution are dropped.  For each worker, 
only the dominant job in each quarter is studied.  Quarterly earnings from dominant 
jobs are summed to create annual earnings, which are then logged.  The earnings 
instability measure is calculated on log annual earnings as previously described.   
 The nine-year earnings instability measure for year ݐ requires four years of 
data on each side of ݐ.  With earnings data starting in 1992, the earliest year for which 
a worker’s earnings instability could be calculated is thus 1996.  Likewise, the last 
year for which the worker’s earnings instability could be calculated is 2005.  Unlike 
with the previous analysis of earnings instability and skill, I keep only those records 
for which both the five-year and the nine-year earnings instability measure are 
calculated.18  Also unlike the previous analysis, only job stayers are studied.  The 
research question of interest is whether firms are passing instability to workers’ 
                                                 
17 The LEHD data are relatively new, and many states do not start until later in the 1990s.  These states 
were chosen because their data begin in either 1991 or 1992, and because many of them are large and 
representative.  Gottschalk, McEntarfer, and Moffitt (2008) use the LEHD data to study earnings 
instability, and use a subset of the states in this paper.  Celik et al. (2009) use a similar set of states. 
18 This was done to avoid internal Census complications associated with releasing analysis conducted 
on two different but very similar samples of confidential Census data.  In addition, unlike the NLSY79, 
the sample sizes in the LEHD data are so large that there is little cost to doing this. 
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earnings, so looking at workers who change jobs is not helpful.  This leaves a baseline 
sample of approximately five million worker-years composed of approximately one 
million unique workers and 250,000 unique firms running from 1996 through 2005, 
and from the states listed previously.19 
 As discussed previously, this sample of workers is characterized by very strong 
labor market and employer attachment.  To have earnings instability calculated for a 
given year, the worker must have worked for the same employer for four years before 
and four years after the year in question.  These workers may be among the most 
stable employed by their respective firms.  Studying them will go a long way towards 
eliminating the concern that a relationship between earnings and firm stability is being 
driven by workers changing jobs, or workers entering and leaving employment, or 
workers who are not strongly committed to the labor market.  We can be reasonably 
confident, then, that the relationship between earnings and firm employment 
instability calculated on this sample of workers reflects a feature of the way workers 
are paid, and is not driven by other factors. 
 Tables 1.8a and 1.8b present summary statistics from the regression sample.  
Average earnings instability is roughly comparable in magnitude to the average from 
the NLSY79.  Unlike the instability measured calculated using the NSLY79, though, 
earnings instability is larger in magnitude using the longer window.   
Firm employment instability is measured using log annual employment, and is 
calculated in exactly the same way as earnings instability.  Employment is a natural 
measure of the scope of economic activity taking place at the firm, and it is intuitive to 
think that a firm with relatively greater time series variance in employment — in 
economic activity — is in some sense relatively less stable.   
 
                                                 
19 Observation numbers are rounded for confidentiality protection. 
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TABLE 1.8a: LEHD sample summary statistics 
    
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Log annual 
earnings  10.132 0.601 
Firm size  4540.987 12561.390 
    
Earnings 
instability    
   Nine-year  0.100 0.275 
   Five-year  0.042 0.192 
    
Firm instability    
   Nine-year  0.044 0.134 
   Five-year  0.023 0.092 
       
 
Table 1.8b presents the distributions for the sample over North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) sector, race, state, and education categories.  Over 
one-quarter of the observations come from the manufacturing sector.  Over ten percent 
come from public administration, with an additional ten percent from educational 
services.  Construction, wholesale trade, retail trade, and transportation and 
warehousing are the remaining industries which constitute over five percent of the 
sample.  The sample is 83.3 percent white.  Interestingly, the number of observations 
with an African American worker is roughly the same as the number with an Asian 
worker.  Over sixty percent of the samples have at least some college education. 
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TABLE 1.8b: LEHD sample summary statistics 
Distribution over: 
NAICS sector Race 
 Percent  Percent 
Agriculture (11) 1.85  White 83.3 
Mining (21) 0.54  Black 4.47 
Utilities (22) 2.41  U.S. Indian or Alaskan Native 0.91 
Construction (23) 7.14  Asian 4.55 
Manufacturing (31-33) 26.03  Pacific Islander 0.18 
Wholesale Trade (42) 6.27  Two or more 6.6 
Retail Trade (44-45) 7.84    
Transportation and Warehousing (48-49) 5.13    
Information (51) 2.42    
Finance and Insurance (52) 2.26    
Real Estate (53) 0.94    
Professional Services (54) 3.7    
Management (55) 1.04    
Administrative (56) 1.84    
Educational Services (61) 10.3    
Health Care and Social Assistance (62) 3.99    
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71) 1.03    
Accommodation and Food Services (72) 1.8    
Other Services (81) 2.24    
Public Administration (92) 11.23    
Education categories State 
 Percent  Percent 
No school 1.02  California 31.6 
Nursery to 4th grade 0.57  Colorado 4.7 
5th or 6th grade 1.64  Idaho 1.83 
7th or 8th grade 1.17  Illinois 19.02 
9th grade 1.18  Indiana 3.65 
10th grade 1.41  Kansas  4.78 
11th grade 1.56  North Carolina 7.73 
12th grade, no diploma 2.72  Oregon 4.61 
High school graduate 26.22  Washington 7.28 
< 1 year of college 7.77  Wisconsin 14.81 
1+ years of college 16.55    
Associate degree 8.61    
Bachelor's degree 18.64    
Master's degree 7.27    
Professional degree 1.89    
Doctorate degree 1.79    
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4.2.  Empirical Strategies & Regression Results 
 To investigate the relationship between the instability of firm employment and 
the instability of the earnings of the firm’s workers, the following equation, Eq. 3, is 
estimated: 
  
݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ൫ݕ௜௙௧൯ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߮ ݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕሺ ௙݁௧ሻ ൅ ௜ܺ௙௧ߜ ൅ ߝ௜௙௧, 
 
(3) 
where ݕ௜௙௧ is the earnings of worker ݅ employed by firm ݂ in year ݐ; ௙݁௧ is 
employment of firm ݂ which employs worker ݅ in year ݐ;  ௜ܺ௙௧ is a matrix of firm and 
worker characteristics, and includes controls for industry, race, education category, 
age and age squared, year, and state.  Because the size of the firm may have an effect 
on the volatility of the earnings it pays its workers, the log of employment is included 
in ௜ܺ௙௧ as well.   ߝ௜௙௧ is the error term, and ߜ and ߙ are parameters.  The parameter of 
interest is ߮, which measures the effect of firm employment instability on earnings 
instability. 
Columns 1 through 8 of Table 1.9 report the results.  The odd-numbered 
columns use the five-year instability measure for both earnings and firm employment 
instability, and the even-numbered columns use the nine-year measure.  The first two 
columns are estimated with no control variables.  They show a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between earnings instability and firm employment 
instability.  Columns 3 and 4 add a control for firm size.  The coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant, suggesting that larger firms pay more stable earnings to 
their workers.  The sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on firm 
employment instability, ߮, is robust to this control.  Columns 5 through 8 add controls  
  
TABLE 1.9: Earnings instability and firm instability 
The table reports estimates of Eq. 3 and Eq. 4.  The dependent variable for each regression is the earnings instability measure using either 
a nine-year or five-year rolling window. The odd-numbered columns use the five-year window, and the even use the nine-year window. 
(See text for details.) Firm and worker controls include race, education category, industry, year, and state dummies, and age and age 
squared. Standard errors are clustered on firm. 
           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Firm instability (Five-year) 0.152***  0.143***  0.142***  0.138***  0.074***  
 [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.008]  
Firm instability (Nine-year)  0.189***  0.183***  0.180***  0.178***  0.148*** 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.010] 
Log number of employees   -0.003*** -0.002***   -0.002*** -0.001 -0.008*** 0.005 
   [0.001] [0.001]   [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] 
Constant 0.038*** 0.092*** 0.053*** 0.106*** 0.259*** 0.740*** 0.264*** 0.744*** 0.303*** 0.765*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004] [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.018] [0.034] [0.034] 
           
Firm fixed effects No No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm and worker controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations ~5000000 ~5000000 ~5000000 ~5000000 ~5000000 ~5000000 ~5000000 ~5000000 ~5000000 ~5000000 
R-squared 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.029 0.012 0.03 0.222 0.197 
                      
Standard errors in brackets.  *** signifies statistical significance at the one-percent level, ** signifies the five-percent level, and * the one-percent level.  
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for workers and firms, described above.  Columns 5 and 6 do not include the 
firm-size control, though it is returned in Columns 7 and 8.  As before, the sign 
and significance of ߮ is robust to these controls.  Across the four 
specifications, the five-year firm employment instability coefficient ߮ ranges 
in size from 0.138 to 0.152.  The nine-year coefficient ranges from 0.178 to 
0.189.  Its magnitude is largely unaffected by the inclusion of the controls. 
Consider two states of the world for a given firm.  The firm experiences 
greater time series variance in employment in the first state, and less in the 
second state.  The thought experiment of interest here is whether, ceteris 
paribus, the firm’s workers will experience less stable earnings in the first state 
of the world than in the second.  This line of thinking suggests including a firm 
fixed effect in Eq. 3, allowing us to estimate ߮ using within-firm variation.  
Call this Eq. 4: 
 
 
݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ൫ݕ௜௙௧൯ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߮ ݅݊ݏݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ൫ ௙݁௧൯ ൅ ௜ܺ௙௧ߜ ൅ ߠ௙ ൅ ߝ௜௙௧, 
 
(4) 
where everything is as in Eq. 3 except ߠ௙, a firm effect.  This firm effect 
controls for persistent, time-invariant features of firms, including 
compensation practices, other HR practices, preferences over worker 
characteristics, occupational composition, and other factors which may be of 
importance to both earnings and employment instability. 
Columns 9 and 10 of Table 1.9 report estimates of Eq. 4.  The 
coefficient retains its statistical significance and positive sign in both 
regressions.  The five-year regression sees the coefficient’s magnitude nearly 
cut in half, suggesting that the estimates of Eq. 3 were driven in part by 
between-firm comovements in earnings and employment instability.  The 
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coefficient on the nine-year coefficient is reduced in magnitude, but not nearly 
as much as the five-year coefficient. 
 A potential concern with the interpretation that firms are passing 
instability onto workers earnings is reverse causality.  As Comin et al. (2009) 
argue, reverse causality — that unstable earnings of workers are causing their 
employer to experience unstable employment — is unlikely here.  Earnings are 
determined by the supply of and demand for labor.  Changes in labor supply 
are usually gradual, driven by population growth and other factors.  At the 
frequencies studied in this paper, it is unlikely that unstable labor supply 
causes unstable earnings, which in turn cause unstable employment levels of 
employing firms.  Volatile labor demand may influence earnings volatility, but 
labor demand is not determined by earnings — rather, the opposite is true.  (I 
attempt to control for these aggregate factors by including year effects and 
industry effects in the regressions.)  Finally, it is unlikely that the worker’s 
personal demand for the products of the firm influences the size of the firm, so 
earnings instability almost surely does not induce employment instability along 
this margin. 
 The weight of the evidence presented in Table 1.9 suggests that firms 
are passing instability in the scope of undertaken economic activity onto their 
workers in the form of less stable earnings.  While I want to stress that these 
findings do not rise to the level of causal, it is the case that the finding is robust 
to a host of control variables, including demographic controls of workers, 
industry effects which control for aggregate, industry-level conditions, year 
effects, and firm size.  In addition, the effect exists when estimated using 
within-firm variation, providing strong support for the hypothesis that what is 
being estimated is a feature of the way workers are paid by their employers. 
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Results By Earnings Quintile 
 Related to the results presented previously of the relationship between 
earnings instability and AFQT, it is of interest to see if the effect of firm 
employment instability on earnings instability is different for workers of 
different skill.  To this end, I group each worker-year into an earnings quintile 
and estimate Eq. 4 separately on each quintile. 
 Table 1.10 reports the results.  Each regression in the table is an 
estimate of Eq. 4 — the model with full worker and firm controls, and firm 
effects.  The odd-numbered columns estimate firm and earnings instability 
using the five-year measure, and the even-numbered columns use the nine-year 
measure.  Columns 1 and 2 report results estimated on the first earnings 
quintile, Columns 3 and 4 on the second earnings quintile, and so on. 
 The results are interesting.  In each regression, the coefficient on firm 
employment instability is positive and statistically significant.  The coefficient 
magnitude is considerably larger for the lowest earnings workers than for the 
highest.  For the nine-year measure, the coefficient ߮ strictly decreases over 
earnings quintile.  The magnitude of the coefficient estimated on the lowest 
quintile of earnings (0.230) is over double the magnitude of  ߮ estimated for 
the highest earnings quintile.  For the five-year measure, except for a slight 
increase between the second and third quintile, the coefficient magnitude 
decreases over earnings quintile as well.  The magnitude of the first earnings 
quintile’s coefficient is over 3.5 times as large as the magnitude of the highest 
earnings quintile. 
 TABLE 1.10: Earnings instability and firm instability by earnings quintile 
The table reports estimates of Eq. 4.  The dependent variable for each regression is the earnings instability measure using 
either a nine-year or five-year rolling window. The odd-numbered columns use the five-year window, and the even use the 
nine-year window. (See text for details.) Firm and worker controls include race, education category, industry, year, and state 
dummies, and age and age squared.  Standard errors are clustered on firm.  Regressions estimated separately by earnings 
quintile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
               
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
               
Firm instability (Five-
year) 0.157***   0.057***   0.059***   0.050***   0.044***  
 [0.016]   [0.008]   [0.015]   [0.018]   [0.008]  
Firm instability 
(Nine-year)  0.230***   0.169***   0.159***   0.134***   0.114*** 
  [0.018]   [0.018]   [0.018]   [0.022]   [0.012] 
Log number of 
employees -0.007** 0.001  0 0.008***  0.007 0.020**  0.006 0.020*  -0.004 0.011*** 
 [0.003] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003]  [0.009] [0.008]  [0.011] [0.012]  [0.003] [0.004] 
Constant 0.306*** 0.651***  0.161*** 0.532***  0.141** 0.601***  0.135 0.699***  0.280*** 0.908*** 
 [0.029] [0.030]  [0.023] [0.025]  [0.067] [0.063]  [0.087] [0.100]  [0.026] [0.046] 
               
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm and worker 
controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
               
Observations ~1000000 ~1000000  ~1000000 ~1000000  ~1000000 ~1000000  ~1000000 ~1000000  ~1000000 ~1000000 
R-squared 0.426 0.417   0.292 0.279   0.238 0.231   0.184 0.191   0.252 0.203 
Standard errors in brackets.  *** signifies statistical significance at the one-percent level, ** signifies the five-percent level, and * the one-percent level. 
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 These results strongly suggest that low-earnings workers have more instability 
passed to them from their employers than do high-earnings workers, and may help to 
explain the finding presented previously that low-skill workers have much higher 
earnings instability than workers of other skill groups. 
 
Industry Analysis 
  Due to across-industry variation in competition, monitoring technology, and a 
host of factors, we may expect that the magnitude of ߮ — the amount of firm 
employment instability passed to employees in the form of earnings instability — may 
vary across industries.  I compute estimates of Eq. 4 — the fully controlled model with 
firm effects — for each North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
sector using both the five- and nine-year measures and report the estimates of ߮ in 
Table 1.11.  
There is significant heterogeneity in the statistical significance and magnitude 
of the coefficient ߮.20  Using the five-year measure, the construction industry has the 
largest coefficient, equal to 0.187, while transportation and warehousing has the 
smallest (precisely estimated) coefficient, which is less than one-third the magnitude 
of construction.  Utilities, manufacturing, administrative, and construction have large 
estimates of ߮, while mining, management, accommodation and food service, and 
education have small or imprecise estimates of ߮.   
 
                                                 
20 There is also significant heterogeneity in the number of observations in each sector-specific 
regression.  The sector with the largest number of observations is the manufacturing sector, with 
approximately 1.3 million records.  The smallest sector is mining, with approximately 27,000 records.  
For the number of records in a regression, refer to Table 8b for the distribution over industries. 
 TABLE 1.11: Earnings instability and firm instability by industry 
This table reports the coefficient on firm instability estimated from Eq. 4, by industry.  The dependent variable in each regression is the 
earnings instability measure using either a nine-year or five-year rolling window.  (See text for details.)  Each regression controls for 
race, education category, industry, year, age and age squared, and includes a firm fixed effect.  Standard errors are clustered on firm.  
Regressions estimated separately by industry. 
      
  Firm instability  
NAICS sector      
  Five-year  Nine-year  
Agriculture (11)  0.059***  0.111***  
Mining (21)  0.021  0.050  
Utilities (22)  0.152**  0.158  
Construction (23)  0.187***  0.326***  
Manufacturing (31-33)  0.059***  0.167***  
Wholesale Trade (42)  0.075***  0.154***  
Retail Trade (44-45)  0.074***  0.103***  
Transportation and Warehousing (48-49)  0.056***  0.131***  
Information (51)  0.085*  0.097***  
Finance and Insurance (52)  0.061**  0.146***  
Real Estate (53)  0.080**  0.130***  
Professional Services (54)  0.138***  0.185***  
Management (55)  0.015  0.041***  
Administrative (56)  0.092***  0.225***  
Educational Services (61)  0.025  0.043  
Health Care and Social Assistance (62)  0.071***  0.133***  
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71)  0.104  0.132***  
Accommodation and Food Services (72)  0.057***  0.096***  
Other Services (81)  0.082**  0.181***  
Public Administration (92)  0.03  0.054*  
*** signifies statistical significance at the one-percent level, ** signifies the five-percent level, and * the one-percent level. 
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As discussed previously, Bertrand (2004) finds that firms which experience 
greater import competition employ workers whose wages are more sensitive to current 
labor market conditions.  She interprets this as evidence that firms in increasingly 
competitive markets are providing less shielding to workers’ earnings from external 
conditions.  If so, then we may expect that the size of the coefficient ߮ would be 
positively correlated with the amount of competition in an industry — greater 
competition leads to less shielding, which leads to a stronger relationship between firm 
and earnings instability.  On the other hand, classes of models which assume that firms 
have market power allow for firms to control the earnings of their workers.  Under this 
framework, we may expect that the coefficient ߮ is negatively correlated with 
competition — less competitive industries may have larger values of ߮. 
To conclude the investigation of the effect of firm employment instability on 
the instability of worker earnings, I offer a preliminary test of the relationship between 
the magnitude of the subsector-specific pass-through coefficient ߮ and the 
competitiveness of the industry.  I estimate Eq. 4 for each NAICS subsector (often 
referred to as three-digit NAICS) and collect the subsector-specific estimates of the ߮ 
coefficients.  I measure subsector competitiveness as the ratio of receipts, revenue, 
sales, or value added of the top N firms in a subsector to the total receipts, revenue, 
sales, or value added of that subsector.  N equals four, eight, twenty, or fifty.  The 
concentration ratio data come from the 2002 Economic Census.  Sector-level 
concentration ratios are reported in Table 1.12; subsector-level concentration ratios are 
used in the analysis.   
A major caveat is in order.  First, there is no concentration ratio data available 
for the following five sectors: management, mining, public administration, agriculture, 
and construction.  In addition, there are a small number of other NAICS subsectors for 
which there are no data.  This leaves data on concentration ratios available for 77 of  
 TABLE 1.12: Concentration ratios by NAICS sector, 2002 Economic Census 
This table contains concentration ratios for each NAICS sector from the 2002 Economic Census.  There are four concentration 
ratios for each industry.  Each represents the percent of sector-level revenue, sales, or receipts accounted for by the N largest 
firms, where N = 4, 8, 20, or 50. 
  Percent of total industry receipts accounted for 
   by N largest firms, where N = …  
NAICS sector       
  Four Eight Twenty Fifty  
Management (55)  N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Mining (21)  N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Educational Services (61)  6.5 10.6 15.6 21.4  
Public Administration (92)  N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Transportation and Warehousing (48-49)  14.8 18.3 25.2 33  
Accommodation and Food Services (72)  5.1 8.9 16.5 23.1  
Agriculture (11)  N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Manufacturing (31-33)  N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Finance and Insurance (52)  9.9 16.1 28.2 44.9  
Health Care and Social Assistance (62)  3.9 5.4 9 14.7  
Retail Trade (44-45)  11 15.3 23.9 31.7  
Wholesale Trade (42)  7.5 11.6 18.7 27.2  
Real Estate (53)  6.5 10.4 17.1 24.4  
Other Services (81)  N/A N/A 7.1 11.2  
Information (51)  23.2 34.4 48.5 62  
Administrative (56)  6 9 14.9 21.9  
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation (71)  5.4 7.7 12.4 19.6  
Professional Services (54)  3.9 6.4 11.1 16.2  
Utilities (22)  13.4 24.6 44.9 69  
Construction (23)  N/A N/A N/A N/A  
These data can be found at http://www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html    
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the 100 NAICS subsectors.  The concentration ratios for these 77 subsectors were 
matched to their respective subsector-specific ߮ coefficient.  Two of the 77 ߮ 
coefficients could not be used in the analysis due to Census Bureau disclosure 
avoidance rules — the two subsectors were too small, and so statistical output relating 
to those subsectors could not be released.  These leaves 75 ߮-concentration ratio 
matches. 
Using the five-year measure, 32 of the 75 estimates of ߮ are statistically 
significant, demonstrating that the sector-level heterogeneity reported in Table 1.11 is 
also present at the subsector level.  Fifty-three of the 75 estimates of ߮ are statistically 
significant using the nine-year measure. 
The question at hand is whether the level of competition in a subsector, as 
measured by the concentration ratio, is predictive of the size of the coefficient ߮ for 
that subsector.  To that end, I plot ߮ against the four concentration ratios.  I only use 
those coefficients with associated t-statistics greater than two, as those are the 
coefficients estimated with precision, so the five-year plots have 32 observations, and 
the nine-year plots have 53.  
Figures 1.15 and 1.16 present the scatter plots of the subsector-specific 
estimate of ߮ against the corresponding subsector’s concentration ratio.  Figure 1.15 
plots the coefficients estimated using the five-year measure.  The line of best fit is 
upward sloping, suggesting that the amount of firm employment instability passed to 
employees in the form of earnings instability is increasing in the share of the market 
accounted for by the top firms.  I regress ߮ against the concentration ratio to learn 
more about the relationship.  The coefficient on the concentration ratio is statistically 
significant when the concentration ratio is measured using ܰ ൌ 8 and ܰ ൌ 20.  Figure 
1.16 plots the coefficients estimated using the nine-year measure against the  
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FIGURE 1.15:  Estimated phi against subsector concentration ratio – 5-year 
measure.
FIGURE 1.16:  Estimated phi against subsector concentration ratio – 9-year 
measure. 
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concentration ratios.  Unlike the plots with the five-year measures, the line of best fit 
here is negative, not positive.  However, in a regression of ߮ using the nine-year 
measure against the concentration ratios, the coefficient on the concentration ratio is 
statistically insignificant in all four regressions. 
To conclude, there is significant heterogeneity in the size and significance of ߮ 
across both NAICS subsectors and NAICS sectors.  I present preliminary evidence 
that the level of competition in an industry as measured by concentration ratios is 
predictive of the size of ߮.  In ongoing research I am attempting to come to a better 
understanding of the size of ߮ — of the amount of firm employment instability passed 
to employees in the form of earnings instability. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Earnings instability affects earnings inequality, may lower household welfare, 
and impacts other important economic phenomena, yet little evidence has been 
documented on its causes and correlates.  This paper adds to our understanding of 
earnings instability by studying whom earnings instability affects and why.  
Specifically, its relationship with both worker skill and firm employment instability is 
investigated. 
This paper argues that differences in skill across workers contribute not only to 
differences in mean earnings, but also differences in the time-series variance of 
earnings.  A detailed investigation of the relationship between worker skill (proxied by 
a worker’s AFQT score) and earnings instability is presented.  Using three different 
empirical methods a U-shaped relationship is documented, with low-skill workers 
experiencing the least stable earnings, middle-skill workers experiencing the most 
stable earnings, and high-skill workers falling in between the two.   
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 This U-shaped relationship is more robust for workers who do not change jobs 
than for workers who may.  Although there is evidence that the U-shape is more 
pronounced for the sample of single-job holders than for the sample of workers who 
are allowed to hold multiple jobs, single-job holders have more stable earnings than 
the less restrictive sample.  The left-tail of the U is present during both the decade of 
the 1990s and the decade of the 2000s.  However, the right-tail only exists in the 
2000s.  This implies the possibility that instability of earnings for high-skill workers is 
driving the increase in the macro trend for the 2000s.  Finally, the instability of total 
family income does not follow a U-shape over skill.  Instead, evidence is presented 
that it follows a W. 
 The evidence presented of the relationship between earnings instability and 
skill suggests that firms may pay workers of different skill earnings which fluctuate 
differently over time.  This invites a study of why firms may pay unstable earnings. 
Models of the labor market offer different predictions as to whether firms can 
affect the volatility of their workers’ earnings.  This paper is the first to directly test 
the relationship between firm employment instability and earnings instability using 
linked worker-firm data.  The data are created by the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) program of the U.S. Census Bureau.  LEHD earnings 
data come from unemployment insurance earnings records, and firm data come from 
ES-202 reports.  Firm employment instability is defined as the instability of 
employment, as employment is a natural measure of the scope of economic activity 
undertaken by the firm. 
Three main findings are presented in this paper.  First, the effect of firm 
employment instability on the instability of its workers’ earnings is positive, 
statistically significant, robust to a number of firm and worker controls, and remains 
when estimated using within-firm variation.  This suggests that the effect is a feature 
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of the way workers are being paid by firms.  Second, the effect is much stronger for 
low-earning workers than it is for high-earning workers.  This helps to explain the left 
tail of the U-shape of earnings instability over skill.  Finally, I find significant 
heterogeneity in the magnitude and statistical significance of the effect across NAICS 
sectors.  I present preliminary evidence of the relationship between the 
competitiveness of the industry and the size of the effect, which suggests that the 
presence of large firms in an industry is positively associated with the amount of firm 
employment instability passed to employees in the form of earnings instability. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SINGLE-SEX CLASSES & STUDENT OUTCOMES:  
EVIDENCE FROM NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
Michael R. Strain21 
 
ABSTRACT 
The effects of single-sex education are hotly contested, both in academic and 
policy circles.  Despite this heated debate, there exists little credible empirical 
evidence of the effect of a U.S. public school's decision to offer single-sex classrooms 
on the educational outcomes of students.  This study seeks to fill this hole.  Using 
administrative records for third through eighth graders in North Carolina public 
schools, the paper finds evidence that the offering of single-sex mathematics courses is 
associated with lower performance on end-of-grade math exams, and finds no 
evidence that the offering of single-sex reading scores increases performance on 
reading exams.  Evidence of significant heterogeneity in the effect across schools is 
also presented. 
 
I. Introduction 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) instituted many reforms in 
public education.  Among them was a provision which allowed public school districts 
to use funds to offer single-sex schools and single-sex classes.  In October 2006, the 
U.S. Department of Education followed up on NCLB by amending Title IX, thereby 
                                                 
21 Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  14853. 
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granting school districts even greater flexibility to offer single-sex schools and classes 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2008). 
These reforms seem to be having an effect — school districts are responding 
by offering single-sex programs.  The National Association for Single Sex Public 
Education (NASSPE), a nonprofit whose purpose is to advance single-sex programs, 
reports that as of January 2009 there were at least 518 public schools in America 
which offered single-sex programs.  At least 95 of the 518 schools were single-sex 
schools, as opposed to schools with single-sex classes (NASSPE, 2009).  During the 
1990s, only a handful of public schools with single-sex programs existed (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2008). 
Despite the proliferation of single-sex programs and a heated debate about the 
efficacy and discriminatory effects of single-sex education, there is little credible 
empirical evidence on whether enrollment in single-sex programs enhances the 
educational outcomes of students in public schools.   
There are many reasons to believe these programs would enhance educational 
outcomes.  Single-sex programs might enhance educational outcomes by decreasing 
distractions in the classroom; by allowing teachers to cater teaching methods and style 
to personality differences between genders; by increasing teachers’ ability to maintain 
order in and control of the classroom; by facilitating better peer interactions among 
students; by giving students greater freedom to pursue activities and goals which are 
stereotypically assigned to members of the opposite sex; by removing the need for 
teachers to take into account the different maturity levels of elementary-school-aged 
boys and girls; by allowing students to have teachers of their own gender who could 
serve as a more effective role model to the students; less sex-bias in student/teacher 
interactions; and by facilitating a greater sense of community in the classroom. 
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At the same time, there are many reasons to believe that single-sex programs 
would be detrimental to educational outcomes.  For example, instead of giving 
students greater freedom to pursue activities and goals stereotypically assigned to the 
opposite gender, segregating schools/classes by sex might easily have the opposite 
effect of enforcing those stereotypes.  Instead of enhancing teachers’ ability to 
maintain order and control of their classes, single-sex classes might decrease that 
ability by concentrating unruly students in the same classroom.   
Perhaps most importantly, if single-sex programs increase educational 
outcomes for one gender but decrease them for the opposite gender, then it may be 
discriminatory to allow single-sex programs to continue.22 
It is also important to note that single-sex programs are not generic.  Some 
schools are reportedly implementing innovative teaching techniques to compliment 
their single-sex classes.  An all-boys mathematics class, for example, might find the 
students standing in a circle throwing a football to each other while the teacher quizzes 
the students on their multiplication tables.  At the same time, other schools may 
simply be separating students by gender while continuing traditional instruction.  It 
may be that the effects of these two single-sex programs are different. 
For a starting point, we may turn to the literature on Catholic schools (some of 
which are single-sex) and the literature on peer effects in education.  Studies have 
found a positive effect of Catholic school attendance on educational outcomes (see, for 
example, Neal, 1997 and Evans and Schwab, 1995).  However, we may not want to 
extrapolate from these results to single-sex programs since it is unknown (a) whether 
the schools in these samples were single-sex, and (b) whether the Catholic effect or the 
single-sex effect is driving the results. 
                                                 
22 This paper will use the word discriminatory to describe a policy which benefits students of one 
gender at the expense of the other.  The word is not being used in its legal sense, nor is it used to ascribe 
motivation. 
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There is evidence that peer effects exist in classes.  An increase in the 
proportion of girls in a classroom has been shown to significantly increase educational 
outcomes — classroom disruptions and violence are decreased, inter-student and 
student-teacher relationships improve, teacher fatigue lessens, and student satisfaction 
increases (Lavy and Schlosser, 2007).  Hoxby (2000) finds that classes with a higher 
proportion of girls perform better in writing and math, and attributes this to classroom 
conduct.  Peer effects also seem to be present at the college-level: Students at 
women’s colleges are more likely to study traditionally male subjects (Solnick, 1995) 
and women were more likely to study traditionally male subjects before their all-
female college switched to coeducation (Billger, 2002).  Peer effects in single-sex 
schools have been shown to drive student performance in mathematics: Girls in 
Thailand see their math scores increase when they enroll in single-sex schools, while 
the single-sex environment decreases boys’ math scores (Jimenez and Lockheed, 
1989).  However, there may be a large difference between a classroom with a high 
proportion of female students and a classroom with only female students.  As such, the 
peer effects literature can only take us so far in understanding the effects of single-sex 
education. 
Billger (2009) studies private, single-sex schools and finds that girls are less 
likely to go to college and that graduates have the least sex-segregated college major 
choices.  In contrast, Jackson (2010) finds that attending a single-sex school has no 
effect on exam performance, course selection, and secondary school leaving among 
students in Trinidad and Tobago.   
This paper contributes to the small number of existing studies on single-sex 
education by estimating its effect on students enrolled in North Carolina in grades 
three through eight.  The effect is identified using a difference-in-differences 
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estimation strategy which exploits the previously-discussed policy changes in value-
added regression models.   
Data on which schools offer single-sex classes in which years and for which 
grades are taken from the Student Activity Reports (SAR) database from the North 
Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC), which records the distribution 
over gender for all activities (included mathematics and reading/English classes) in 
North Carolina public schools.  The dependent variables in the regressions are the 
number of days a student is suspended from school and the standardized end-of-grade 
reading and mathematics scores of North Carolina public school students, also 
provided by the NCERDC. 
Five main finding are presented in this paper.  (1) There is evidence that 
offering single-sex mathematics classes hurts the performance of students on their 
end-of-grade math exams.  (2) While the evidence that single-sex reading/English 
classes hurt student outcomes is less strong than the evidence for math, we can say 
that there is no evidence that offering single-sex reading/English and mathematics 
classes in a school-year-grade is associated with higher average end-of-grade reading 
scores.  (3) There is significant heterogeneity in the effect of single-sex classes across 
schools.  (4) There is weak evidence of a discriminatory effect due to these single-sex 
programs.  (5) There is no evidence that these classes have an effect on the number of 
days a student is suspended from school. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the data, and 
presents a detailed discussion of the method of coding the treatment variable.  Section 
3 discusses the empirical strategy and the regression models estimated in this study.  
Section 4 presents sample statistics, the baseline results of the estimation, investigates 
the sensitivity of the results to different control variables and to different methods of 
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coding the treatment variable, and presents a falsification test.  Section 5 offers a 
concluding discussion with suggestions for future research. 
 
II. Data and Treatment-Variable Construction 
The data for this paper come from the North Carolina Education Research Data 
Center (NCERDC), a data source which has been increasingly used in education 
research over the past several years.23  From the NCERDC website: “This ongoing 
project was established in 2000 through a partnership with the N.C. Department of 
Public Instruction to store and manage data on the state’s public schools, students and 
teachers.”  This longitudinal dataset allows researchers to follow a student’s end-of-
grade test scores over time, knowing her grade level and the school in which she was 
enrolled.   
This paper studies a sample of students in the third through eighth grades in 
North Carolina, drawn from a population of roughly 2.2 million between 1997 and 
2009.  (There were approximately 7.7 million student-years over this time period.)  
The outcomes studied are end-of-grade test scores in mathematics and reading, and the 
number of days which a student was suspended from school.  I create a standardized 
test score for each student-year by subtracting the year-specific, grade-specific mean 
from each observation and dividing that difference by the standard deviation.24  This 
ensures comparability across years in the test score variable. 
The NCERDC maintains a School Activity Report (SAR) database which 
consists of student demographic counts for each activity occurring in the school on a 
                                                 
23 For example, Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006), Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006), and 
Jackson (2009).  The NCERDC maintains a list of projects which use their data which can be accessed 
on their website: http://www.childandfamilypolicy.duke.edu/research/publications.php 
24 The mean of this variable equals zero and the standard deviation equals one.  This is a common 
strategy when using test-score data.  See, for example, Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), Ost (2010), and 
Rothstein (2010). 
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given school day.  A record in this dataset is at the year-school-activity-section-grade 
level; for example, a record could by a third-period mathematics course for seventh 
graders in school s in year y.  The variables for each record include student 
demographic counts, so for the mathematics course above the data will tell you how 
many male students are in the classroom and how many female students are in the 
classroom.  (Note that the data do not tell you which students are in the classroom, 
only that there were, say, seven boys and six girls.) 
 From these data I am able to code the single-sex classes treatment variable at 
the year-school-grade level — I am able to identify which schools offer single-sex 
classes in a given year, and for which grades the classes are offered.  A year-school-
grade cell is at risk of being coded as offering single-sex classes if it contains 
classrooms with more than fifteen students and if the number of single-sex math and 
reading/English classes in that school-year pair exceeds a threshold level.  A detailed 
description of the data exercise is now presented. 
The purpose of this data exercise is to determine which North Carolina schools 
offered same-sex math and reading/English classes in which years and for which grade 
levels, using the SAR data.  The final output from this data exercise will be a list of 
school-year-grades for which same-sex classes were offered. 
The SAR, also known as the Student Count file, is actually a series of datasets, 
one for each year, where a record is at the district-school-activity-section-grade level.  
The information recorded for each record is demographic: the number of, say, white 
females participating in that activity, or Asian males.  Activities in this dataset include 
academic courses, so the data can be used to identify which district-school-course-
section is composed entirely of male/female students. 
I begin by collecting all the year-specific files and creating a master dataset 
spanning all years.  I then select the sample: I keep only activities for students in third 
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through eighth grade.  In addition, I use only records which identify the activity as 
being in the first semester, dropping the other records.  For activities assigned a grade 
level of third through eighth, 62.09 percent are coded with semester equal to one, 
32.28 percent with semester equal to two, and roughly three percent each with 
semester equal to three and four.  Assuming that these math and reading/English 
classes are year-long courses (whereas non-classroom activities and classes like band 
are often one semester in length) which start in the first semester, the distribution over 
semesters seems reasonable.   
I checked the sensitivity of the results to this sample selection.  Redoing the 
analysis with the classes coded based of records with semester equal to two results in 
an identical list of schools for math.  For reading, coding the records using semester 
equal to two results in the same list as when using semester equal to one except for the 
addition of one school.  For the analysis I will use the coding with semester equal to 
one, as a class which starts in the second semester is likely to be a non-traditional 
reading/English course. 
A classroom activity in these data can span more than one observation in the 
dataset, as the data are at the year-district-school-activity-section-grade level.  This 
would only happen if a classroom activity had, say, both fourth and fifth grade 
students enrolled.  Care must be taken to arrive at accurate counts of these records. 
I generate a variable which records class size by taking the sum of the total 
student count variable for each year-district-school-activity-section cell.  I then 
generate variables which record the total number of males and the total number of 
females for each cell.  This variable is calculated by summing over the race-sex count 
variables.  The sum of the male and female totals should equal the value of the class 
size variable for each observation in the dataset.  The sum of the male and female 
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variables equals the class size variable for all but nine records out of approximately 
3.5 million. 
At this point, I identify math and reading/English classes using subject codes 
provided in the data.25  Same-sex classes are identified as those classes with a ratio of 
the total number of male students to the total size of the class equal to either one or 
zero.  Records for which this ratio does not equal one or zero are dropped. 
Many of the same-sex classrooms identified up to this point are not standard 
classrooms, and are thus not the type of classrooms which this paper is intended to 
study.  Fully eighty-five percent of the same-sex math classrooms, for example, have 
less than six students enrolled.  Over one-third of the same-sex math classrooms 
contain only one student.  To deal with this issue, only classrooms with more than 
fifteen students are kept.26 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution over years of same-sex classes, conditional on 
the sample selection discussed above.  Note that there are same-sex math and 
reading/English classes for each year from 1996 through 2009.  For both 
reading/English and math there is a large spike in 2003 — this is consistent with the 
2001 No Child Left Behind law.  There is also a large spike in 2008, consistent with 
the 2006 changes to Title IX.  This table is taken as evidence that the policy change 
had an effect on the offering of same-sex classes in North Carolina. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Math classes are identified as those activities for which the first two characters of the subject code 
(variable name: subject) equal 20.  Reading/English classes are identified as those activities with subject 
code equal to 1001 or 1010. 
26 Imposing class-size cutoffs is necessary when using the NCERDC data due to the problem of small 
classes — e.g., Rothstein (2010), Rothstein (2009), and Ost (2010).  These classes could be special 
education classes, tutoring classes, measurement error, or actual classes which had to be small due to 
extenuating circumstances.   
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TABLE 2.1: Number of single-sex classes with more than 15 students, by 
year 
       
Math  Reading/English 
         
Year Freq. Percent Cum.  Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
         
1996 1 0.25 0.25  1996 1 0.18 0.18 
1997 4 1.01 1.27  1997 5 0.89 1.07 
1998 1 0.25 1.52  1998 5 0.89 1.96 
1999 2 0.51 2.03  1999 2 0.36 2.31 
2000 5 1.27 3.29  2000 9 1.6 3.91 
2001 2 0.51 3.8  2001 1 0.18 4.09 
2002 6 1.52 5.32  2002 5 0.89 4.98 
2003 38 9.62 14.94  2003 88 15.66 20.64 
2004 36 9.11 24.05  2004 31 5.52 26.16 
2005 26 6.58 30.63  2005 18 3.2 29.36 
2006 25 6.33 36.96  2006 27 4.8 34.16 
2007 38 9.62 46.58  2007 42 7.47 41.64 
2008 106 26.84 73.42  2008 165 29.36 71 
2009 105 26.58 100  2009 163 29 100 
                          
 
However, there are same-sex classes in these data prior to the 2001 policy 
change.  It is possible that some of these classes occurred due to special circumstances 
at their respective school.  It is also possible that they are a function of measurement 
error.  Regardless of the reason, this must be dealt with.  To do so, I construct a 
variable which records the number of same-sex math and reading/English classes for 
each school in each year.  I require that a school-year offer more than φ same-sex 
classes in order to be included in the final list of school-year-grades which are coded 
as offering same-sex classes.  (φ is a positive integer.)  I calibrate φ such that there is 
no φ' < φ where same-sex classes did not exist prior to 2001.  This method ensures that 
a consistent standard is used across all years.  For math φ equals four and for reading φ 
equals eight.   
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Table 2.2 shows the distribution over years for same-sex classes for math and 
reading after the sample selection criterion described in the preceding paragraph is 
applied.  As intended, there are no same-sex classes prior to 2001.  Table 2.3 shows 
the two-way distribution over year-grade pairs.  The treatment variable will be defined 
at the year-school-grade level, and this table shows that there is variance both within 
grades across years and within years across grades.  
 
TABLE 2.2: Number of single-sex classes by year -- all sample restrictions 
        
Math  Reading/English 
         
Year Freq. Percent Cum.  Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
         
2003 17 21.25 21.25  2003 45 35.71 35.71 
2005 17 21.25 42.5  2006 16 12.7 48.41 
2006 8 10 52.5  2008 55 43.65 92.06 
2008 26 32.5 85  2009 10 7.94 100 
2009 12 15 100      
                 
 
This year-district-school-course-grade level file is collapsed to the school-year-
grade level.  The remaining school-year-grades are those which are coded as offering 
same-sex classes.  There are twenty-eight such school-year-grades for math and 
twenty-two for reading/English.  For the analysis of end-of-grade math tests, student-
years which are matched to these twenty-eight school-year-grades are the math 
treatment group, and student-years which are not matched to these twenty-eight 
  
 97
TABLE 2.3: Number of single-sex classes by year-grade -- all sample 
restrictions 
 
                   
Math  
       
  Grade 
Year  3 4 5 6 7 8  Total 
          
2003  1 2 7 2 3 2  17 
2005  0 0 0 10 4 3  17 
2006  0 0 0 8 0 0  8 
2008  4 2 2 11 2 5  26 
2009  2 2 1 4 1 2  12 
          
Total  7 6 10 35 10 12  80 
          
          
Reading/English  
       
                  Grade   
Year  3 4 5 6 7 8  Total 
          
2003  8 13 22 2 0 0  45 
2006  0 0 0 16 0 0  16 
2008  7 4 4 24 4 12  55 
2009  4 4 2 0 0 0  10 
          
Total  19 21 28 42 4 12  126 
          
 
school-year-grades are the math control group.  Likewise, for the end-of-grade reading 
analysis, student-years which are matched to the twenty-two school-year-grades are 
the reading treatment group, and all other students are the reading control group. 
 The first single-sex math and reading/English classes found in the data and 
subject to the sample restrictions occur in the year 2003, consistent with the 2001 No 
Child Left Behind policy change.  Single-sex math classes are found in the years 2003, 
2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009; single-sex reading classes are found in the years 2003, 
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2006, 2008, and 2009.  Single-sex math classes are found in nine non-charter schools, 
and single-sex reading/English classes are found in seven.  There are 2,104 total non-
charter schools in the data. 
 That there are some years with no school-grades offering single-sex classes is 
consistent with reports from the NASSPE that schools are experimenting with this 
policy intervention — year-to-year variation in school leadership and parental cohorts 
could result in a school adopting single-sex classes for a year or two and then 
discontinuing them.    The number of schools which offer single-sex classes should 
inspire confidence in the sample selection, as we would not expect a large number of 
schools offering these classes given the relatively small number of schools nationwide 
reported to do so by organizations such as the NASSPE. 
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
 The first component of the empirical strategy is to select the analysis sample.  I 
conduct the analysis only on those student-years which are associated with a school 
district which ever offered single-sex classes.  I do this under the assumption that the 
characteristics (likely unobservable) which drive a school to offer single-sex classes 
are more similar between two schools in the same district than between two schools in 
different districts.   To help keep “all else constant”, I limit the control group to those 
schools which are located in school districts which ever offered single-sex classes.  I 
conduct the analysis separately for math and reading/English, as the SAR data allow 
course subjects to be identified — i.e., the end-of-grade reading regressions and the 
end-of-grade math regressions are run on different samples.  Conditional on a student-
year being present in a school district which ever offered single-sex math classes, 0.60 
percent of student-years are matched to year-school-grades which offered single-sex 
math classes.  The corresponding statistic for single-sex reading/English classes is 
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0.42 percent.  There are a total of 223 schools in the end-of-grade math analysis 
sample, and 185 schools in the end-of-grade reading analysis sample.  As more 
schools offer single-sex math classes than reading/English, there are 621,620 student-
years in the baseline end-of-grade math analysis sample, and 523,150 in the end-of-
grade reading sample. 
 To study the effects of single-sex classes on student outcomes a differences-in-
differences model is estimated using a value-added framework.  Specifically, the 
following equation is estimated: 
 
 ݕ௜௚௦௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚݕ௜௚௦௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ ௚ܶ௦௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௚௦௧ᇱ ߠ ൅ ߱௦௧ ൅ ߝ௜௚௧௦.                                   (1) 
 
where ݕ௜௚௧௦ is a student-level outcome defined for student i at school s in year t in 
grade g, either an end-of-grade exam score or the number of days the student is 
suspended, and ݕ௜௚௦௧ିଵ is its lag; ߱௦௧ is a school-by-year effect; ௜ܺ௚௦௧ is a matrix of 
control variables with associated coefficient vector ߠ; ߝ௜௚௧௦ is a standard residual; and 
ߙ, ߚ are parameters.   The left-hand side of the equation can be rewritten as ሺݕ௜௚௧௦ െ
ߚݕ௜௚௦௧ିଵሻ, allowing the coefficients in the model to be interpreted as measuring the 
impact of the variables on gains in test scores over the previous year.  Studying gains 
using a value-added specification is a widely-used technique in the literature and 
allows the researcher to control for initial conditions, including the prior history of 
school inputs and home inputs, which affect a student’s year t test score (Rivkin et al., 
2005). 
 ௚ܶ௦௧ is a dummy variable equal to one if school s in year t offers single-sex 
classes for grade g, and equal to zero otherwise.  This is the variable which will be 
used to identify the effect of being in a school which offers single-sex classes.  The 
parameter ߛ is the estimate of the effect of the treatment on the student, and is equal to 
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the average difference in y between student outcomes in school-year-grades which 
offer single-sex classes and those which do not, holding constant the other covariates. 
Take care to note that the treatment is defined as being enrolled in a school-
year-grade which offers single-sex classes, and not being enrolled in a single-sex 
classroom.  Though the data link students to schools, grades, and years, the data are 
not sufficiently detailed as to indicate which students belong to which classes.   
Apart from mechanical data issues described in the previous section, defining 
the treatment variable in this way is the policy-relevant definition.  The control group 
is surely contaminated by the policy change — students who select into single-sex 
classes by definition will not be in mixed-sex classes, so their selection into single-sex 
classes changes the distribution over unobservables in the traditional, co-ed classes.  
Thus, the policy change affects all the students in the school, and not just those 
students who choose to select into single-sex classes.   
In addition, this definition allows us to avoid the problem of students selecting 
into single-sex classes.  The proper, policy-relevant way to view the treatment group is 
that it contains all students in a school-year-grade, regardless of which students 
actually remain in a co-ed class and which select into single-sex classes.  Because of 
this, we need to know neither which students selected into single-sex classes nor why 
they chose to do so. 
A school decides to offer single-sex classes, parents/students decide what is 
best for them, and sorting occurs.  The parameter ߛ identifies the effect of the policy 
change, then, on all the students in the school, which is proper due to the fact that the 
treatment affects all the students in the school. 
 A potential concern with this analysis is that the estimated effect of single-sex 
classes could be confounded by other factors.  Perhaps there is something about these 
schools — a new and dynamic principal, say, or a particularly involved cohort of 
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parents — which both affects test scores and affects the school’s decision to offer 
single-sex classes.  If so, then this correlation between the error term and the treatment 
variable will bias the coefficient of interest. 
Since the treatment effect is coded at the school-year-grade level, I am able to 
include ߱௦௧, a school-by-year effect.  This effect will go a long way towards 
mitigating the concern that the treatment coefficient is picking up the effect not of 
single-sex classes but instead of a new principal coming in to the school and 
instituting a set of changes.  This specification, conditional on the covariates, looks 
within a school-year cell, using variation across grades to estimate the effect of the 
treatment.  Using within-school-by-year variation to estimate the effect of a school 
offering single-sex classes helps to ensure that the coefficient ߛ is truly capturing the 
effect of the treatment — it is unlikely that the presence of a dynamic principal in a 
given year only affects sixth-grade students and not all the students in the school.  By 
“comparing” two students in the same school-year but in different grades, we can ease 
the concern that the treatment coefficient is picking up a host of unobservable school-
level changes.   
 In addition to using within-school-by-year variation, the school-year-grade 
treatment variable allows for the estimation of the treatment effect using within-year-
by-grade variation.  Specifically, the following equation can be estimated: 
 
 ݕ௜௚௦௧ ൌ ߙ′ ൅ ߚ′ݕ௜௚௦௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ′ ௚ܶ௦௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௚௦௧ᇱ ߠ′ ൅ ߬௧௚ ൅ ߝ௜௧௦ᇱ .                                  (2) 
 
The terms in equation (2) are the same as equation (1) with the exception of ߬௧௚, the 
year-by-grade effect.  Under this specification, the treatment effect is estimated, all 
else equal, by looking across schools within a year-grade pair.  Any common 
component effecting test scores for a year-grade pair is held constant, and the effect is 
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estimated using variation across schools, some of which offer single-sex classes, and 
some of which do not. 
Measurement error is a concern here, and could either be found in the 
microdata or be generated by the treatment-variable coding algorithm, or both.  The 
procedure used to select the school-year-grades which are coded as offering single-sex 
classes is quite conservative, so on balance the more likely nature of the measurement 
error is having school-year-grades which should be in the treatment group incorrectly 
assigned to the control group.   
 What effect would this misassignment-generated measurement error have on 
the treatment coefficient?  Under the assumption of a relatively homogenous treatment 
effect across schools, having schools-year-grades which actually offer single-sex 
classes but which are coded as not offering single-sex classes should bias the 
coefficient on the treatment variable towards zero — contaminating the control group 
with treated observations will attenuate the average difference between the two group.   
However, imagine that there are some schools which enthusiastically adopt 
single-sex classes, and some schools which are more lukewarm in their adoption.  If 
the lukewarm schools are systematically misassigned to the control group while the 
enthusiastic schools are systematically and correctly assigned to the treatment group, 
then under the assumption that the enthusiastic schools will have a stronger treatment 
effect than the lukewarm schools, this misassignment could actually lead to a 
treatment coefficient which overstates the magnitude of the true effect.  It is important 
to keep this in mind when reviewing the results, to which we now turn.27 
  
                                                 
27 This concern is investigated in Section 4.  The baseline results are calculated using the treatment-
variable coding scheme described in this section.  An additional set of results is reported in Section 4 
which removes the requirement of a school-year-grade offering multiple single-sex classes in a given 
school-year to be eligible to be assigned to the treatment group.  Effectively, the additional results 
require that φ = 1. 
 103
IV. Results 
 Table 2.4a presents descriptive statistics for the end-of-grade math sample.  
The table is split into three panels.  The top panel presents summary statistics for the 
entire analysis sample.  After sample selection, the mean test score is 0.034, with a 
standard deviation of 1.04.  The distribution over student race shows that 
approximately half the students are white, a little over one-third are black, with the 
remainder spread between Asian, Hispanic, American Indian, multi-racial, and other. 
 Of interest is whether the performance of students compelled a school to offer 
single-sex classes — whether the pre-treatment control and treatment groups look 
similar.  No schools offered single-sex classes prior to 2003, so to examine the pre-
treatment control and treatment group distributions I will use pre-2003 data.  Using the 
common pre-treatment period of pre-2003, the mean end-of-grade math score for the 
schools which will be treated in the future is 0.001, and for school which will be 
control in the future is -0.050.  There is no evidence that the treated schools were 
performing poorly in the pre-treatment period.  In fact, these statistics suggest that the 
treated schools were outperforming the untreated schools.28 
 Table 2.4b presents the same statistics for the end-of-grade reading sample.  
For the total analysis sample, the mean end-of-grade reading score is 0.007, with a 
standard deviation of 1.030.  The distribution over race looks similar to the end-of-
grade math sample.  As with the end-of-grade math sample, the reading sample shows 
that the treated schools are outperforming the control schools, pre-treatment. 
Table 2.5 presents estimates of equations (1) and (2).  There are twenty-one 
regressions represented in Table 2.5, and each coefficient and standard error estimate 
is the estimate of the treatment effect for that regression.  Columns (A) through (G) 
determine the control variables used in the regression.  For example, the regressions  
                                                 
28 A t-test rejects the null of equality with a t-statistic of 6.53. 
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TABLE 2.4a: Summary statistics for math specifications. 
This table reports summary statistics for specifications with end-of-grade mathematics 
score as the outcome variable.  The first panel contains summary statistics for the total 
sample used in the regressions.  The next two panels report summary statistics for 
years prior to 2003. 
Total Sample   
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
End-of-grade math score 621620 0.034 1.040 -3.610 3.640  
Number of days suspended 621620 0.270 2.280 0.000 405.000  
Distribution over race       
Asian 3.940      
Black 36.300      
Hispanic 7.020      
American Indian 0.380      
Multi-racial 1.580      
Other 0.000      
White 50.790      
       
Treated schools prior to 2003   
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
End-of-grade math score 18940 0.001 1.030 -3.020 3.470  
Number of days suspended 18940 0.110 1.150 0.000 50.000  
Distribution over race       
Asian 2.940      
Black 37.580      
Hispanic 3.720      
American Indian 0.170      
Multi-racial 0.600      
Other 0.000      
White 54.990      
Untreated schools prior to 2003   
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
End-of-grade math score 225145 -0.050 1.050 -3.610 3.640  
Number of days suspended 225145 0.140 1.450 0.000 124.000  
Distribution over race       
Asian 3.730      
Black 35.590      
Hispanic 3.170      
American Indian 0.350      
Multi-racial 0.510      
Other 0.000      
White 56.660       
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TABLE 2.4b: Summary statistics for reading specifications 
This table reports summary statistics for specifications with end-of-grade reading 
score as the outcome variable.  The first panel contains summary statistics for the total 
sample used in the regressions.  The next two panels report summary statistics for 
years prior to 2003. 
Total Sample   
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
End-of-grade reading score 523150 0.007 1.030 -4.040 3.100  
Number of days suspended 523150 0.260 2.090 0.000 186.000  
Distribution over race       
Asian 4.210      
Black 39.160      
Hispanic 6.880      
American Indian 0.410      
Multi-racial 1.650      
Other 0.000      
White 47.690      
       
Treated schools prior to 2003   
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
End-of-grade reading score 14421 0.091 1.020 -3.270 2.800  
Number of days suspended 14421 0.130 1.260 0.000 50.000  
Distribution over race       
Asian 3.180      
Black 39.130      
Hispanic 1.370      
American Indian 0.210      
Multi-racial 0.590      
Other 0.000      
White 55.510      
Untreated schools prior to 2003   
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
End-of-grade reading score 190837 -0.030 1.050 -4.040 3.100  
Number of days suspended 190837 0.160 1.540 0.000 124.000  
Distribution over race       
Asian 3.970      
Black 38.160      
Hispanic 3.130      
American Indian 0.370      
Multi-racial 0.500      
Other 0.010      
White 53.870       
 TABLE 2.5: Offering single-sex math classes reduces math test scores   
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is a student's end-of-grade test 
score in mathematics.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t offered single-sex classes for grade g, and 
equals zero otherwise.  All regressions control for the race of the student and for the student's lagged test 
score.  Standard errors are clustered on school. 
        
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
        
 Male and female students 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Single-sex math classes -0.072 -0.109 -0.146 -0.136 -0.099 -0.108 -0.134 
 [0.044]* [0.020]*** [0.059]** [0.053]** [0.035]*** [0.021]*** [0.027]***
        
Observations 621620 621620 621620 621620 621620 621620 621620
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.77
        
 Only male students 
        
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        
Single-sex math classes -0.077 -0.111 -0.135 -0.116 -0.101 -0.113 -0.117 
 [0.044]* [0.020]*** [0.070]* [0.066]* [0.034]*** [0.021]*** [0.037]***
        
Observations 313925 313925 313925 313925 313925 313925 313925
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.77
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 TABLE 2.5 (Continued) 
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
  
 Only female students 
        
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
        
Single-sex math classes -0.068 -0.108 -0.158 -0.155 -0.096 -0.102 -0.153 
 [0.045] [0.023]*** [0.050]*** [0.043]*** [0.038]** [0.024]*** [0.022]***
        
Observations 307695 307695 307695 307695 307695 307695 307695
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.77
        
School effects No Yes No No No Yes No
Grade effects No Yes No Yes No No No
Year effects No Yes No No No No No
School-by-year effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Year-by-grade effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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represented in column (F) — regressions (6), (13), and (20) — include school effects 
and year-by-grade effects, but not grade effects and school-by-year effects.  Likewise, 
the three regressions represented by column (B) — regressions (2), (9), and (16) — 
include school effects, year effects, and grade effects, but neither school-by-year nor 
year-by-grade effects.  The table is split into three panels.  The first panel presents 
results estimated on the pooled sample of male and female students; the second panel 
presents results estimated on male students only; and the third, on female students 
only.  The student-year level outcome variable is either number of days suspended in 
year t or an end-of-grade test score in year t.   
Turning first to the pooled sample (regressions (1) through (7)), the coefficient 
on the treatment variable is negative and statistically significant in each specification.  
The size of the coefficient ranges from -0.072 to -0.146.  The preferred estimating 
equations are represented by columns (D) through (G).  Rounded to two significant 
digits, the coefficient on the treatment variable is equal to at least -0.1 standard  
deviations.  For perspective, consider that the black-white test score gap measured in 
these regressions ranges from approximately 0.14 to 0.16. 
 The bottom two panels of Table 2.5 report estimates using a single-sex sample.  
The coefficients on the treatment variable are statistically significant in all the 
controlled specifications, and are negative in all the specifications.  Given a set of 
controls, the coefficients on the male-only regressions are about the same magnitude 
as the female-only regressions.  These results imply that there is not a discriminatory 
effect on end-of-grade math scores.29 
The results for specifications with end-of-grade reading are shown in Table 
2.6.  The coefficient is negative in twenty of the twenty-one regressions, and in all the  
                                                 
29 As noted above, what is implied by the word discriminatory is a policy which hurts students of one 
gender at the expense of the other.  The word is not intended to have a legal or motivational 
connotation. 
 TABLE 2.6: Offering single-sex reading/English classes reduces reading test scores 
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is a student's end-of-grade test  
score in  reading.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t offered single-sex  classes for grade g, and  
equals zero otherwise.  All regressions control for the race of the student and for the student's lagged test  
score.  Standard errors are clustered on school.           
        
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
        
 Male and female students 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Single-sex  -0.057 -0.054 -0.051 -0.021 -0.085 -0.057 -0.007 
     reading/English classes [0.020]*** [0.022]** [0.014]*** [0.023] [0.019]*** [0.024]** [0.012] 
        
Observations 523150 523150 523150 523150 523150 523150 523150
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
        
 Only male students 
        
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        
Single-sex  -0.043 -0.049 -0.072 -0.022 -0.066 -0.046 0.005 
     reading/English classes [0.025]* [0.025]** [0.010]*** [0.013]* [0.025]*** [0.027]* [0.026] 
        
Observations 263061 263061 263061 263061 263061 263061 263061
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.70
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 TABLE 2.6 (Continued)        
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
  
 Only female students 
        
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
        
Single-sex  -0.073 -0.058 -0.016 -0.007 -0.103 -0.066 -0.007 
     reading/English classes [0.021]*** [0.026]** [0.023] [0.038] [0.018]*** [0.027]** [0.021] 
        
Observations 260089 260089 260089 260089 260089 260089 260089 
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
School effects No Yes No No No Yes No 
Grade effects No Yes No Yes No No No 
Year effects No Yes No No No No No 
School-by-year effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Year-by-grade effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
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regressions with a statistically-significant treatment coefficient.  Not all the 
coefficients are estimated with precision, and the magnitude of many of the 
coefficients is smaller than in the end-of-grade mathematics regressions.  The 
estimates suggest that the effect on end-of-grade reading scores of being enrolled in a 
school-year-grade which offers single-sex reading/English classes is a decrease of 
approximately 0.05 to 0.09 standard deviations, though the statistically-insignificant 
coefficient in the school-by-year specification (controlling for grade) is evidence that 
the treatment has no effect on test scores.  Consistent with much of the education 
literature, the policy effect on reading scores is smaller than on math scores. 
Unlike the results for end-of-grade math, there does appear to be evidence of a 
discriminatory effect of single-sex reading/English classes, although the results are 
contradictory as to which sex is being penalized.  The two specifications with school-by-
year effects (columns (C) and (D)) have statistically insignificant estimates of the 
treatment coefficient for female students, while the estimates for male students imply a 
decrease of 0.07 and 0.02 standard deviations.  The specifications with year-by-grade 
effects (columns (E) and (F)), however, both imply a larger decrease for female students 
than for male students (-0.1 versus -0.07, and -0.07 versus -0.05).  (The treatment effect is 
estimated imprecisely in the model with both year-by-grade and school-by-year effects, 
shown in column (G)). 
Table 2.7 reports results for the conduct model.  The treatment variable is 
defined according to the following rule: If a school-year-grade offered either single-
sex math classes or single-sex reading/English classes, then single-sex suspensions 
treatment equals one; otherwise, single-sex suspensions treatment equals zero.  The 
coefficient on the treatment variable is positive and statistically insignificant in every 
regression.  This is perhaps unsurprising since being suspended is a fairly serious 
  
TABLE 2.7: Offering single-sex classes has no effect on suspensions      
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is the number of days the   
student was suspended in year t.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t offered single-sex  classes for grade 
g in either reading/English or mathematics, and equals zero otherwise.  All regressions control for the race of  
the student.  Standard errors are clustered on school.           
        
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
        
 Male and female students 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Single-sex  1.982 1.585 1.855 1.904 1.321 1.335 1.938 
     suspensions treatment [1.532] [1.417] [2.068] [2.051] [1.344] [1.351] [1.977] 
        
Observations 629253 629253 629253 629253 629253 629253 629253
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.17
        
 Only male students 
        
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        
Single-sex  2.796 2.202 2.968 3.014 1.858 1.870 3.038 
     suspensions treatment [2.133] [1.963] [3.095] [3.078] [1.865] [1.873] [2.975] 
        
Observations 320519 320519 320519 320519 320519 320519 320519
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.19
112 
 TABLE 2.7 (Continued)        
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
        
 Only female students 
        
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
        
Single-sex  1.103 0.900 0.879 0.935 0.731 0.744 0.990 
     suspensions treatment [0.879] [0.815] [1.069] [1.052] [0.769] [0.773] [1.013] 
        
Observations 308734 308734 308734 308734 308734 308734 308734
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.17
        
School effects No Yes No No No Yes No
Grade effects No Yes No Yes No No No
Year effects No Yes No No No No No
School-by-year effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Year-by-grade effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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infraction for students in grades three through eight.  A policy intervention would have 
to have a large effect on student conduct for it to affect suspensions. 
 
Heterogeneity Across Schools 
To the extent that the effect of single-sex education is a function of sex-
specific teaching methods, we might expect there to be variance in the treatment effect 
across schools which offer single-sex classes.  Tables 2.8 and 2.9 report school-
specific estimates of the treatment effect for end-of-grade math and reading, 
respectively.  Equation (2) is estimated.  Equation (1) is omitted because colinearity in 
the effects renders the equation inestimable. 
 Column (F) of Table 2.8 shows that the treatment effect of a school-year-grade 
offering single-sex math classes varies significantly across schools.  For two of the 
schools, the treatment effect is estimated without precision.  Among the seven schools 
measured with precision, the size of the effect ranges from -0.033 standard deviations 
to -0.281 standard deviations.  Column (F) of Table 2.9 looks at end-of-grade reading 
scores, and finds that two of the seven school-specific treatment coefficients are 
positive.  One of the two positive coefficients is statistically significant at the five-
percent level.  The statistically significant coefficients range from 0.018 on the high 
end to -0.166 on the low end. 
 If we interpret a statistically-insignificant treatment effect coefficient as 
evidence that the policy is neither increasing nor decreasing test scores, then the 
results from the end-of-grade math regressions suggest that in some schools single-sex 
classes are seriously lowering test scores (a coefficient of -0.281 is very large, 
probably implausibly so), in some schools single-sex classes are having a marginally 
negative effect, and in some the effect is nonexistent.  The end-of-grade reading 
results take this heterogeneity a qualitative step further: in one school the policy seems  
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TABLE 2.8: Heterogeneity across schools in math treatment effect    
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is a 
student's end-of-grade test score in  math.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t 
offered single-sex  classes for grade g, and equals zero otherwise.  All regressions 
control for the race of the student and for the student's lagged test score.  Standard 
errors are clustered on school. 
        
 (A) (B) (E) (F)    
        
School-specific treatment:        
        
     School 278 -0.013 -0.092 -0.069 -0.093    
 [0.008] [0.009]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]***    
     School 287 0.052 0.008 0.011 0.009    
 [0.007]*** [0.009] [0.011] [0.009]    
     School 989 -0.11 -0.125 -0.118 -0.123    
 [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.015]*** [0.010]***    
     School 1191 -0.267 -0.258 -0.318 -0.281    
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]***    
     School 1194 0.075 -0.126 0.003 -0.12    
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.017] [0.010]***    
     School 1274 -0.15 -0.192 -0.25 -0.223    
 [0.006]*** [0.009]*** [0.020]*** [0.012]***    
     School 1288 -0.12 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005    
 [0.006]*** [0.011] [0.018] [0.015]    
     School 1307 -0.112 -0.036 -0.119 -0.033    
 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.015]*** [0.011]***    
     School 1472 -0.181 -0.143 -0.177 -0.119    
  [0.006]*** [0.010]*** [0.021]*** [0.014]***      
        
Observations 621620 621620 621620 621620    
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.76      
        
School effects No Yes No Yes    
Grade effects No Yes No No    
Year effects No Yes No No    
School-by-year effects No No No No    
Year-by-grade effects No No Yes Yes      
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TABLE 2.9: Heterogeneity across schools in reading/English treatment effect  
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is a 
student's end-of-grade test score in reading.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t 
offered single-sex classes for grade g, and equals zero otherwise.  All regressions 
control for the race of the student and for the student's lagged test score.  Standard 
errors are clustered on school. 
        
 (A) (B) (E) (F)    
        
School-specific treatment:        
        
     School 271 -0.077 0.013 -0.118 0.005    
 [0.007]*** [0.007]* [0.009]*** [0.008]    
     School 278 0.045 0.009 0.003 -0.001    
 [0.008]*** [0.007] [0.008] [0.007]    
     School 287 0.01 0.026 -0.035 0.018    
 [0.007] [0.007]*** [0.009]*** [0.007]**    
     School 1191 -0.095 -0.081 -0.125 -0.083    
 [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]***    
     School 1274 -0.089 -0.093 -0.121 -0.095    
 [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]***    
     School 1288 -0.081 -0.144 -0.119 -0.166    
 [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.013]*** [0.010]***    
     School 1472 -0.093 -0.052 -0.065 -0.023    
  [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.015]*** [0.010]**      
        
Observations 523150 523150 523150 523150    
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70      
        
School effects No Yes No Yes    
Grade effects No Yes No No    
Year effects No Yes No No    
School-by-year effects No No No No    
Year-by-grade effects No No Yes Yes      
 
to be increasing scores, while in others it is decreasing scores.  While outside the 
scope of this paper, an investigation into why single-sex classes seem to work for 
some schools and not for others would clearly be interesting. 
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Controlling For Parental Education 
 The baseline results presented above do not control for parental education due 
to the fact that this variable was only collected through 2006.  It is reasonable to think 
that this is an important omitted variable — parental education is likely to affect both 
end-of-grade test scores and the decision of a school to adopt single-sex classes. 
 Tables 2.10 and 2.11 investigate the sensitivity of the results to the omission of 
parental education.  The analysis sample is identical in each regression in Table 2.10 
and in each regression in Table 2.11 (therefore, each regression in both tables only has 
observations through 2006); the only difference between the top panel and the bottom 
panel of each table is that the seven regressions in the top panel do not control for 
parental education while the seven regressions in the bottom panel do. 
 Table 2.10 presents end-of-grade math results.  First, we will compare the 
baseline results in Table 2.5 with the results in Table 2.10 which do not control for 
parental education.  As with the baseline results presented in Table 2.5, every 
coefficient in Table 2.10 is negative and statistically significant.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients is very similar between Tables 2.5 and 2.10.  For example, the 
specification with only main effects (year, school, and grade effects) features a 
coefficient of -0.109 in the baseline model and -0.090 in Table 2.10; the school-by-
year with grade models feature coefficients of -0.136 (Table 2.5) versus -0.149 (Table 
2.10); and the year-by-grade with school models feature coefficients of -0.108 (Table 
2.5) versus -0.085 (Table 2.10).  The object changing between these samples is the 
omission of post-2006 observations.  
 TABLE 2.10: Math results robust to parental education control      
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is a student's end-of-grade test score in  
mathematics.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t offered single-sex classes for grade g, and equals zero otherwise.  
All regressions control for the race of the student and for the student's lagged test score.  Standard errors are clustered on 
school. 
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
 No parental education control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Single-sex math classes -0.094 -0.090 -0.123 -0.149 -0.113 -0.085 -0.132 
 [0.029]*** [0.025]*** [0.008]*** [0.020]*** [0.027]*** [0.025]*** [0.021]*** 
        
Observations 466704 466704 466704 466704 466704 466704 466704
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77
        
 Parental education control 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        
Single-sex math classes -0.083 -0.086 -0.121 -0.148 -0.093 -0.082 -0.132 
 [0.029]*** [0.025]*** [0.005]*** [0.016]*** [0.027]*** [0.024]*** [0.018]*** 
        
Observations 466704 466704 466704 466704 466704 466704 466704
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77
        
School effects No Yes No No No Yes No
Grade effects No Yes No Yes No No No
Year effects No Yes No No No No No
School-by-year effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Year-by-grade effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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 TABLE 2.11: Reading results robust to parental education control      
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is a student's end-of-grade test score in  
reading.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t offered single-sex classes for grade g, and equals zero otherwise.  All 
regressions control for the race of the student and for the student's lagged test score.  Standard errors are clustered on 
school. 
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
 No parental education control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Single-sex  -0.015 0.006 -0.049 -0.033 -0.043 0.007 0.012 
     reading/English classes [0.030] [0.013] [0.013]*** [0.009]*** [0.027] [0.009] [0.016] 
        
Observations 392336 392336 392336 392336 392336 392336 392336
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71
        
 Parental education control 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Single-sex  -0.001 0.004 -0.058 -0.043 -0.018 0.006 0.000 
     reading/English classes [0.023] [0.017] [0.013]*** [0.009]*** [0.016] [0.013] [0.017] 
        
Observations 392336 392336 392336 392336 392336 392336 392336
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
        
School effects No Yes No No No Yes No
Grade effects No Yes No Yes No No No
Year effects No Yes No No No No No
School-by-year effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Year-by-grade effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Comparing the top and bottom panels of Table 2.10, we see that the coefficients are 
remarkably similar.  Model (D), with school-by-year and grade effects, shows that the 
coefficient on the treatment moves from -0.149 without controlling for parental 
education to -0.148 with the addition of the parental education control.  The 
coefficient in model (G), with year-by-grade and school effects, moves from -0.085 
without the control to -0.082 with the control.  Model (F), with both school-by-year 
and year-by-grade effects, shows that the addition of the parental education control has 
no effect on the coefficient estimate: both coefficients equal -0.132.   
 Turning to the reading results, we will again first compare the baseline reading 
results from Table 2.6, estimated on all available data, to the top panel of Table 2.11, 
estimated on pre-2007 data.  The results for reading are less robust to the change in 
sample than the results for math.  In the model with main effects, for example, the 
Table 2.6 baseline results has a coefficient of -0.054, while the coefficient in Table 
2.11 flips signs and is equal to 0.006 (the Table 2.6 coefficient is statistically 
significant, while the Table 2.11 coefficient is not).  Five of the seven regressions in 
the baseline results have statistically significant coefficients, while only the two 
regressions with school-by-year effects have statistically significant coefficients in the 
restricted sample.  Having said that, a comparison of those two models across the 
different samples shows that the coefficients are similar in magnitude (-0.051 in the 
baseline sample versus -0.049 in the restricted sample, and -0.033 versus -0.021). 
 As with the math results in Table 2.10, comparing the top and bottom panels of 
Table 2.11 shows that the addition of parental education as a control variable does not 
have a large effect on the results when using a consistent sample.  In both panels, only 
models (C’) and (D) have statistically significant coefficients.  The addition of the 
parental education control changes the magnitude of the coefficient by about 0.01 
standard deviations. 
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 While it is reassuring that the math results are robust to the change in sample, 
it is not particularly troubling that the reading results are not.  Returning to Table 2.2, 
we see that over half the single-sex reading/English classes and around half of the 
single-sex math classes occurred post-2006 — in the restricted samples of Tables 2.10 
and 2.11, none of these classes are included. 
 With respect to the same-sample comparison, the results shown in Tables 2.10 
and 2.11 suggest that the omission of parental education is not substantially biasing 
the estimate of the treatment effect.  A possible explanation for this is that the 
inclusion of the lagged test score is effectively controlling for the student’s prior 
history of home inputs (Rivkin et al., 2005). 
 
Different Sample Selection Criterion 
 Section 2 details the algorithm used to assign school-year-grades to treatment 
status.  ௚ܶ௦௧ ൌ 1 if a school-year-grade is determined to offer single-sex classes; 
௚ܶ௦௧ ൌ 0 otherwise.  Student-years enrolled in a school-year-grade with ௚ܶ௦௧ ൌ 1 are 
the treatment group, and student-years enrolled in a school-year-grade with ௚ܶ௦௧ ൌ 0 
are the control group.  In order for ௚ܶ௦௧ to equal one, it is required that the school-year 
associated with that school-year-grade offer more than φ single-sex classes.  So even if 
a classroom composed of, say, exclusively male students is found in the data for a 
particular school-year-grade, in order for that school-year-grade to have ௚ܶ௦௧ ൌ 1, it 
must be the case that at least φ single-sex classes are found in the data for that school-
year. 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution over years of single-sex classrooms prior to 
imposing that requirement.  Notice that single-sex classes are found prior to the 2001 
policy change.  Recall that the additional requirement is imposed as a check against 
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measurement error in the SAR data, and to ensure that there are no schools offering 
single-sex classes prior to the enactment of the 2001 NCLB law. 
 While I argue that the additional requirement is the correct coding strategy 
given the data, it is clearly possible that for at least some schools I am finding 
evidence of pre-2001 single-sex classes not because of measurement error, but instead 
because single-sex classes were actually offered in those years at those schools.  
Analyzing the data with φ equal to one is a useful check against the baseline results. 
 Using φ equal to one, the number of schools which offer single-sex classes is 
implausibly large.  In the preceding analysis, school-year-grades were coded as 
offering single-sex math classes in nine schools, and school-year-grades were coded as 
offering single-sex reading classes in seven.  Using φ equal to one — removing the 
requirement that a school-year offer multiple single-sex classes as a method of dealing 
with measurement error — results in school-year-grades being coded as offering 
single-sex math classes in 122 schools and in school-year-grades being coded as 
offering single-sex reading/English classes in 125 schools.   
 Recall from the introduction that the NASSPE reports that as of January 2009 
there were at least 518 schools which were either single-sex or which were co-ed but 
offering some single-sex classes operating in the United States.  It is unlikely that 
approximately twenty-five percent of those schools were in North Carolina. 
 With that caveat in mind, let us turn to the results.  Tables 2.12 and 2.13 
present estimates of the baseline models where the treatment variable, ௚ܶ௦௧, has been 
redefined as described above, with φ equal to one.  Notice first that the sample size for 
each regression increases dramatically.  The sample size for the baseline math 
regressions is 621,620 student-years, and for reading is 523,150.  However, when φ 
equals one, the new math and reading sample sizes are 3,220,463 and 3,003,708 
student-years, respectively.  This is because the control group is still defined as those 
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student-years enrolled in school-year-grades which did not offer single-sex classes, but 
which are in school districts which ever had a school which offered single-sex classes.  
Because the number of schools which are coded as offering single-sex classes has 
increased from a one-digit number to a three-digit number, the number of school 
districts included in the control group has increased as well, and hence the number of 
student-years.  
 Turning first to Table 2.12, we see that under the new, less conservative 
definition of the treatment variable, the treatment coefficient is dramatically 
attenuated, and in all twenty-one regressions the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant.  The coefficient estimate is as small as 0.000 in one regression, and the 
largest the coefficient gets in absolute value is less than three-hundredths of a standard 
deviation.  The results for reading, reported in Table 2.13, are very similar.  None of 
the coefficients is statistically significant, and the magnitude of the coefficients is very 
close to zero. 
 If it is the case, as the number of treated schools suggests, that the coding of 
௚ܶ௦௧used in the baseline results is closer to the truth than the coding using φ equal to 
one, then this type of attenuation is what you might expect to see.  Essentially, what is 
happening is the misassignment of control observations to the treatment group.   
The control group should experience no effect due to the policy, since it is by 
definition untreated.  If the policy has an effect, then the treatment group will 
experience the effect of the policy.  The result from incorrectly assigning control 
observations to the treatment group, then, is to bias the treatment coefficient to zero.  
Comparing the baseline results to the results presented in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 shows 
attenuation which is consistent with the hypothesis that (a) there is an effect of the 
treatment, as evidenced by the baseline results, and (b) using φ equal to one to define  
 TABLE 2.12: No effect for math under alternative definition of treatment status   
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is a student's end-of-grade test score in  
mathematics.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t offered single-sex classes for grade g, and equals zero otherwise.  
All regressions control for the race of the student and for the student's lagged test score.  Standard errors are clustered on 
school. 
        
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
        
 Male and female students 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Single-sex math classes 0.002 0.000 0.016 0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.018 
 [0.019] [0.015] [0.028] [0.027] [0.016] [0.012] [0.018] 
        
Observations 3220463 3220463 3220463 3220463 3220463 3220463 3220463
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.75
        
 Only male students 
        
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        
Single-sex math classes 0.000 0.004 0.021 0.018 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 
 [0.019] [0.015] [0.028] [0.027] [0.016] [0.012] [0.019] 
        
Observations 1628301 1628301 1628301 1628301 1628301 1628301 1628301
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.75
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 TABLE 2.12 (Continued) 
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
  
 Only female students 
        
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
        
Single-sex math classes 0.004 -0.003 0.010 0.007 -0.017 -0.019 -0.024 
 [0.019] [0.016] [0.028] [0.028] [0.015] [0.013] [0.019] 
        
Observations 1592162 1592162 1592162 1592162 1592162 1592162 1592162
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.75
        
School effects No Yes No No No Yes No
Grade effects No Yes No Yes No No No
Year effects No Yes No No No No No
School-by-year effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Year-by-grade effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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 TABLE 2.13: No effect for reading under alternative definition of treatment status 
This table reports estimates of equations (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is a student's end-of-grade test score in  
reading.  Treatment equals one if school s in year t offered single-sex classes for grade g, and equals zero otherwise.  All 
regressions control for the race of the student and for the student's lagged test score.  Standard errors are clustered on 
school. 
        
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
        
 Male and female students 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Single-sex  -0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.012 -0.006 -0.005 
     reading/English classes [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.008] [0.011] 
        
Observations 3003708 3003708 3003708 3003708 3003708 3003708 3003708
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.69
        
 Only male students 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        
Single-sex  -0.007 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.015 -0.007 -0.007 
     reading/English classes [0.014] [0.010] [0.016] [0.015] [0.013] [0.009] [0.013] 
        
Observations 1515070 1515070 1515070 1515070 1515070 1515070 1515070
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.69
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 TABLE 2.13 (Continued) 
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
  
 Only female students 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
        
Single-sex  -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 
     reading/English classes [0.012] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] 
        
Observations 1488638 1488638 1488638 1488638 1488638 1488638 1488638
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.69
        
School effects No Yes No No No Yes No
Grade effects No Yes No Yes No No No
Year effects No Yes No No No No No
School-by-year effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Year-by-grade effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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the treatment group results in misassignment of observations from control to 
treatment, thereby attenuating the coefficient estimate. 
 
Period (t + 1) Treatment & Period t Value Added 
Perhaps the principle concern regarding the validity of this analysis is a 
correlation between the error term and the treatment variable.  While the school-by-
year and year-by-grade effects are certainly powerful controls, it still may be the case 
that the effect measured by the coefficient on ௚ܶ௦௧ is confounding unobservables with 
a student being enrolled in a school-year-grade which offers single-sex classes. 
 Suppose that a particular cohort of students is “bad”, and that their “badness” 
is unobservable to the researcher.  A principal or group of parents may offer single-sex 
classes for this cohort as a way to help improve their test scores, the single-sex classes 
may have no effect on test scores, the cohort may continue to perform poorly, and the 
researcher will find a negative treatment effect due to the correlation between 
unobservable “badness” and the offering of single-sex classes.   
The school-by-year effects are designed to “compare” students in the same 
school in the same year but in different grades, and the year-by-grade effects are 
designed to “compare” students in the same year in the same grade in different 
schools.  These are powerful controls, and they remove much of the concern about 
unobservables biasing the coefficient, but of course they do not completely remove 
this concern.  A check against this bias is to estimate the following equations: 
 
            ݕ௜௚௦௧ െ ߚ′′ݕ௜௚௦௧ିଵ ൌ ߙ′′ ൅ ߛ′′ ௚ܶ௦௧ାଵ ൅ ௜ܺ௚௦௧ᇱ ߠ′′ ൅ ߱௦௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧௦ᇱᇱ                           (3) 
 
 ݕ௜௚௦௧ െ ߚ′′′ݕ௜௚௦௧ିଵ ൌ ߙ′′′ ൅ ߛ′′′ ௚ܶ௦௧ାଵ ൅ ௜ܺ௚௦௧ᇱ ߠ′′′ ൅ ߬௧௚ ൅ ߝ௜௧௦ᇱᇱᇱ .                      (4) 
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Everything is defined in these equations as in equations (1) and (2).  The only 
difference is that the treatment variable is advanced in time one year.  So the 
regressions estimate the effect of future treatment on current test score value added.30 
 If ܿ݋ݒሺߝ௜௧௦, ௚ܶ௦௧ሻ ് 0, then it stands to reason that ܿ݋ݒሺߝ௜௧௦, ௚ܶ௦௧ାଵሻ may not be 
equal to zero as well — if treatment status in the current-period is correlated with 
some unobservable characteristic of a student or cohort of students, and if that 
unobservable characteristic lasts more than one period, then we might expect 
treatment status in the next-period to be correlated with the present-period 
unobservable.   
 Of course, being enrolled in a school-year-grade which offers single-sex 
classes next year cannot affect this year’s end-of-grade test scores.  So a statistically 
significant coefficient on ௚ܶ௦௧ାଵ would raise the concern that the baseline regressions 
are not adequately controlled, and that the treatment coefficient in the baseline 
regressions is biased. 
 The results of these models are presented in Table 2.14.  The top panel 
presents results using end-of-grade math scores, and the bottom panel presents results 
using end-of-grade reading scores.  Columns (A) through (G) represent the same 
configurations of control variables used in the previous tables.   
The results for end-of-grade math scores are encouraging: of the five models 
with two-way effects, only the year-by-grade and school effects model has a 
statistically significant treatment coefficient.  Interestingly, the model without two- 
                                                 
30 This test is based on Avery, Kenkel, Lillard, and Mathios (2007).  They study how smoking behavior 
is affected by the advertisement of smoking cessation products.  To explore potential reverse causality 
driven by the possibility that cessation product advertisers target smokers who are relatively more likely 
to quit smoking, Avery et al regress current-period smoking behavior against future advertisements.   
 TABLE 2.14: Future-period treatment & current-period value added     
This table reports estimates of equations (3) and (4).  The dependent variable is a student's end-of-grade test score in either 
reading or mathematics in period t.  Treatment equals one if school s in year (t+1) offered single-sex classes for grade g, 
and equals zero otherwise.  All regressions control for the race of the student and for the student's period (t-1) test score.  
Standard errors are clustered on school. 
 (A) (B) (C') (D) (E) (F) (G) 
 Dependent variable: End-of-grade mathematics score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Single-sex math classes -0.037 -0.051 -0.023 -0.033 -0.047 -0.048 -0.036 
 [0.032] [0.022]** [0.024] [0.026] [0.042] [0.023]** [0.026] 
        
Observations 407035 407035 407035 407035 407035 407035 407035
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.77
        
 Dependent variable: End-of-grade reading score 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Single-sex  -0.117 -0.073 -0.060 -0.057 -0.110 -0.072 -0.052 
     reading/English classes [0.015]*** [0.020]*** [0.032]* [0.032]* [0.018]*** [0.020]*** [0.033] 
        
Observations 340744 340744 340744 340744 340744 340744 340744
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.70
        
School effects No Yes No No No Yes No 
Grade effects No Yes No Yes No No No 
Year effects No Yes No No No No No 
School-by-year effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Year-by-grade effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
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way effects (but with school, year, and grade effects) has a statistically significant 
treatment coefficient.  This is evidence that only controlling for main effects is not 
adequate.  The results for end-of-grade reading scores should raise concerns about the 
baseline results.  Every coefficient which is significant in the baseline results (reported 
in Table 2.6) is significant in the falsification test.  Since it cannot be that treatment 
next period affects scores this period, there must important unobserved factors biasing 
the treatment coefficient. 
 
V.   Concluding Discussion 
This paper studies the effect of a school offering single-sex classes on the test 
scores and conduct of students.  Estimates are produced using both within-school-by-
year and within-year-by-grade variation.  Four results from this study are highlighted 
in this discussion: (1) the heterogenous effect of the treatment on test scores, (2) the 
average effect of the treatment, (3) the discriminatory effect across genders, and (4) 
the sensitivity of the results. 
There is wide heterogeneity in the effect across schools, with some school-
year-grades having higher average end-of-grade gains to reading scores (a positive 
coefficient) associated with their offering single-sex classes and most school having 
lower average scores. 
Advocates of single-sex classes are quick to emphasize that simply segregating 
students by gender is no panacea — teachers must be trained to teach in a single-sex 
environment, and some advocates even argue that different teaching methods should 
be used for boys and for girls.  It is possible, then, that the heterogeneity documented 
in this paper is evidence in support of the advocates’ assertion: some schools are doing 
a good job implementing single-sex classes, and some are not.   More research is 
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needed on the specific practices offered by the schools to determine whether this 
speculative observation is grounded in fact. 
Using either empirical model, school-year-grades which offer single-sex 
reading and math classes have lower end-of-grade scores as measured by a common 
treatment effect variable.  In several models the magnitude of the effect is quite large, 
similar in size to the black-white test score gap.  While the school-specific treatment 
variables suggest that some schools may be successfully enhancing student outcomes 
by offering single-sex classes, the evidence presented in this study suggests that the 
average effect is not positive.   
A concern among opponents of single-sex education is that such programs will 
be discriminatory — relative to co-ed classes, single-sex classes will help students of 
one gender to learn better while hurting the ability of the other gender to learn.  I find 
weak evidence that this discriminatory effect is present. 
A fruitful direction for future research is to quantify the actual implementation 
of single-sex classes.  Through a survey or through interviews, a researcher could first 
ascertain with more certainty which schools are offering these programs and which are 
not.  In addition, the researcher could record exactly what is happening in these 
classes: are boys and girls simply separated and taught using traditional teaching 
methods, or are innovative, gender-specific methods used?  If gender-specific methods 
are used, what are they?  Quantifying these survey results and linking them to test 
score data would allow an empirical investigation not only of the effects of a school 
offering single-sex classes, as I have done here, but also of the types of gender-
specific instruction offered at these schools.  This would go a long way to settling the 
heated debate over single-sex education. 
 There are at least two caveats which need to be addressed in interpreting the 
results of this study.  The first is the sensitivity of the results to the coding of the 
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treatment variable.  Under the more conservative coding scheme (which requires a 
school-year to offer several single-sex classes before students enrolled in its associated 
school-year-grade can be coded as receiving the treatment) this paper finds a negative 
and sizeable effect of single-sex classes on student outcomes.  However, when the 
conservative requirement is removed, the treatment effect coefficient is statistically 
insignificant and its magnitude is very close to zero.  While I argue that the baseline 
coding of the treatment variable is the more correct of the two, the evidence from the 
robustness check does not support the hypothesis that the treatment effect is negative.  
The second caveat is that future treatment affects current end-of-grade reading 
scores, though this is not true for math.  This implies that even the powerful school-
by-year and year-by-grade effects are not adequately controlling for unobservables in 
the end-of-grade reading regressions. 
 On balance, then, perhaps the most responsible conclusions from this paper are 
these: there is evidence that schools which offer single-sex math classes are hurting 
the end-of-grade math scores of their students, there is evidence that schools which 
offer single-sex classes in reading/English are not helping their students to increase 
achievement on end-of-grade reading tests, and some schools are implementing single-
sex classes more successfully than others.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PAYDAY CREDIT, OVERDRAFTS, AND BANKRUPTCY, BOTH 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL31  
 
Donald P. Morgan,32 Michael R. Strain,33 and Ihab Seblani  
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite a dozen studies, the welfare effects of payday credit are still debatable.  
We contribute new evidence to the debate by studying how changes in payday credit 
supply affect bank overdrafts (such as returned checks), bankruptcy, and “informal 
bankruptcy,” where debtors are in default without the benefit of bankruptcy protection 
from debt collectors.  We use household complaints against debt collectors as a proxy 
for informal bankruptcy.  We find some evidence that households switch from 
informal bankruptcy to bankruptcy when payday credit supply expands.  That finding 
provides an alternative interpretation of a recent finding that payday credit access 
“tips” households into bankruptcy.  Our most robust finding is that returned check 
rates and overdraft fee income at banks tend to decline when payday credit supply 
expands.  A hundred dollar payday loan is probably cheaper than a hundred dollar 
overdraft, so this finding may indicate payday credit access helps some consumers 
avoid costlier alternatives.  
                                                 
31 JEL classification: G21, G28, I38 
Key words: payday credit, consumer welfare, bounced checks, overdrafts, debt collectors, dunning, 
bankruptcy, informal bankruptcy. 
32 Morgan and Seblani are Research Officer and Assistant Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. Address correspondence to don.morgan@ny.frb.org. 
33 Strain is a Ph.D. student in Economics at Cornell University. 
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I. Introduction 
Payday lenders supply credit by cashing and holding (without depositing) 
customers’ personal checks for a few weeks.  Their product can be seen as a less 
automated, possibly cheaper, version of the overdraft credit depository institutions 
supply when they cover depositors’ overdrafts.  
Whether payday lending helps or hurts its users depends on who asks the 
question and who gets asked.  A survey of payday credit consumers commissioned by 
a payday lending trade group found relatively high rates of customer satisfaction, 
although dissatisfied customers wished the service were cheaper (Elliehausen and 
Lawrence 2008).  Consumer advocates tend to see payday lending as harmful because 
it is expensive, because some users borrow repeatedly, because payday lenders may 
congregate in Hispanic and African American neighborhoods (Damar 2009), and 
because payday lenders have gone to great lengths – even partnering with banks – to 
circumvent state usury limits.  In their own defense, payday lenders claim their loans 
help households with short-term debt problems to avoid further problems.  
The disparate views of payday lending are writ large in state payday loan laws.   
A few states are more or less laissez faire while others, mostly in the Northeast, have 
never allowed payday lending.  Eight states have closed active payday credit markets, 
including Arizona just this year.  
   Economic theory is ambiguous as to whether the invention of another form 
of overdraft credit should raise or lower household welfare. Textbook theory predicts 
households should be weakly better off having an alternative available if for no other 
reason than increased competition.  Moreover, if the new product enables better 
consumption smoothing, households benefit as a result.  Of course, textbook models 
assume symmetric information between lenders and borrowers and perfectly rational, 
time-consistent borrowers, and violations of those assumptions are easily imaginable.  
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To the extent these problems plague overdraft credit users, the invention of another 
form of overdraft credit could make users worse off.         
Academic empirical research on the welfare effects of payday credit access, 
though highly energetic, began just a few years ago.  Except for Zinman (2010), that 
research to date is still in working papers.34  These early findings from the dozen 
studies thus far are mixed.  Our paper extends the literature by looking at new 
outcomes that seem particularly germane to the debate.  
Broadly speaking, we study two outcomes: bankruptcy and overdrafts.  While 
the former is more dramatic, the latter seems at least as pertinent.   Payday and 
overdraft credit are essentially the same product so it is easy to imagine how someone 
with a job but a temporarily empty checking account might take out a cash payday 
loan to avoid bouncing checks or overdrawing their account in other ways.   Avoiding 
overdrafts, it turns out, is a common reason why payday credit users say they turn to 
payday credit (Cerillo 2004, Stegman and Faris 2003).   We measure overdrafts in two 
ways: by returned checks and by overdraft fee income at banks.  Those variables are 
direct counterparts; every fee paid on a returned check or ATM overdraft is revenue 
for the counterparty depository institution.  Both variables are measured with error 
(because of aggregation) but as we show, the error does not bias our estimates of the 
coefficients of interest, though it does inflate the standard error of the estimates.  
We also study multiple bankruptcy outcomes: Chapter 7, Chapter 13, and 
“informal bankruptcy” (Dawsey and Ausubel 2004), where debtors are in default 
without the protection from debt collectors that bankruptcy provides.  Given default, 
borrowers have to decide whether to seek bankruptcy protection or to endure debt 
                                                 
34 See Morgan (2007), Morgan and Strain (2008), Skiba and Tobacman (2008a, 2008b), Campbell et al. 
(2008), Stoianovici and Maloney (2008), Morse (2009), Carrell and Zinman (2009), Melzer (2009), 
Wilson et al. (2008), Melzer and Morgan (2010), and Hynes (2010). 
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collectors.  One hypothesis we consider is whether changes in payday credit supply 
cause substitution between bankruptcy and unofficial bankruptcy.    
Our proxy for informal bankruptcy is complaints against lenders and debt 
collectors filed by households with the Federal Trade Commission.35  Those data are 
new to this study; we obtained them under the Freedom of Information Act.  
According to the FTC:  “Abusive (debt) collection practices … are known to cause 
substantial consumer injury” (Commission 2006, p.1), so complaints might be 
associated with consumer welfare, the ultimate outcome of interest.  We provide 
auxiliary evidence that complaints are a reasonable proxy for informal bankruptcy, but 
even if they were not, it still seems worthwhile to see how they vary with payday loan 
supply.  
Our data reflect market events, not field-experiment or laboratory outcomes, so 
we face the usual problem of distinguishing supply from demand. The goal is to 
estimate how exogenous changes in payday credit supply affect outcomes; the 
problem is that those same outcomes may drive payday credit demand.  To avoid bias, 
we use changes in states’ payday loan laws to identify changes in payday credit 
supply.  We study how the outcomes change after law changes in nineteen states, 
including bans in eight states (including D.C.) and the passage of enabling legislation 
in eleven states.  Given those events, we estimate fixed effect difference-in-difference 
regression models where delta (the diff-in-diff) measures the change in outcomes after 
a ban or the passage of enabling legislation relative to the change in states where laws 
were constant. The models control for state economic conditions and demographic 
characteristics that likely correlate with outcomes and payday loan demand.  
We find some evidence of substitution along two margins.  Consistent with 
one study, we find some evidence that Ch. 13 bankruptcy rates decrease when payday 
                                                 
35 People can complain by calling 1877-FTC-HELP on line.  
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loans are banned.  That first finding suggests payday lending is harmful.  However, in 
those models where we find lower rates of Ch. 13 after payday loan bans, we observe 
higher rates of informal bankruptcy/complaints against lenders and debt collectors.  
That suggests some households may use payday credit to avoid debt collectors by 
filing for Ch. 13.  The welfare implications of that substitution are not obvious.   
Perhaps more importantly, we find no evidence that complaints against lenders and 
debt collectors increase when payday loan supply increases.  If anything, the 
relationship between complaints and payday credit supply is negative.    
Our most robust finding is that returned check rates and overdraft fee income 
at banks decrease when payday credit supply expands.  That finding suggests that 
borrowers substitute payday lenders’ variety of overdraft credit for the bank variety 
when the former is available.   A payday loan can be cheaper than a small overdraft so 
that substitution could save households money.  In fact, our estimates suggest that 
households served by a given Federal Reserve Check Processing Center save about 
$38 million per year on average in overdraft fees after states pass enabling legislation.  
Falsification tests suggest the link between payday credit supply and those overdraft 
outcomes is not merely coincidence.   
Our findings add to the nascent literature on the welfare effects of payday 
credit access.  In particular, our evidence of substitution from informal to formal 
bankruptcy suggests an alternative interpretation of Skiba and Tobacmans’ (2008a) 
finding that payday credit “tips” marginal payday credit users into bankruptcy; if the 
informal substitution hypothesis is correct, marginal borrowers that are already in 
default may use payday credit to “step” into bankruptcy to avoid debt collectors.  Our 
findings also reinforce Zinman (2010).   He finds that households in Oregon expected 
to bounce more checks after payday loans were banned there, but in the event they did 
not report bouncing more checks relative to their counterparts in Washington.  Our 
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findings using actual returned checks and overdraft fee income data suggest that 
households do indeed overdraw their accounts less frequently when payday credit 
supply contracts.  
The next section presents background on the overdraft credit market.  Section 
III discusses our regression strategy and taxonomy of state payday loan laws.  Section 
IV presents the regression results.  Section V comprises robustness tests, falsification 
tests, and potential bias.  VI concludes with policy observations and suggestions for 
future research.    
 
II. The Overdraft Credit Market and Its Players 
Payday loans are said to be small, short, and insecure.  The typical loan is 
commodity-like:  $300 for two weeks of credit secured by proof of employment and a 
personal, post-dated check for $345 drawn on the borrowers’ checking account.  Two 
weeks later the lender deposits the check and the credit is extinguished.  At those 
terms, the annual percentage rate on a payday loans is 390 percent. 
Given that business model, we know for sure that payday credit consumers are 
employed and “banked.” That suggests they are not the poorest of the poor.  On the 
contrary, the comparative survey by Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008) found that 51 
percent of payday loan users earned $25,000 to $50,000 annually.36  Payday customers 
were more likely than the average household to have attended college (36 percent 
versus 21 percent) but less likely to have graduated (19 percent versus 35 percent).   
Payday loan demand seems to have a demographic profile, although this 
profile is blurry.  Damar (2009) finds payday lenders are more likely to enter 
predominately Hispanic, well-banked zip codes in Oregon, but he finds no difference 
for predominately African American zip codes.  Looking across counties, Prager 
                                                 
36 Twenty-five percent earned more than $50,000 annually. 
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(2009) finds just the opposite racial pattern.  (We control for racial shares in our 
regressions.)  
It is important to recognize that some, perhaps most, payday credit users had 
debt problems that predate their first payday loan.  After all, who else but over-
indebted, credit constrained consumers would borrow at such terms?  In fact, past 
problems with debt collectors and bounced checks, two outcomes we study, were 
primary predictors of whether lower income households in North Carolina demanded 
payday loans (Stegman and Faris 2003).  Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001) found that 
61 percent of payday customers were “maxed out” on their credit cards.  We stress the 
possibility that payday credit users may have had pre-existing debt problems because 
it is crucial to the hypothesis that households may switch from informal bankruptcy 
(where they are already in default) to formal bankruptcy when payday credit supply 
expands.  
 Payday credit is closely akin to the overdraft credit (“protection”) supplied by 
depository institutions.  Both financial intermediaries supply credit by postponing 
depositing a check or debiting an account for a time, providing float in the interim.  
Certain usage patterns are common as well; as with payday credit, some depositors 
overdraft repeatedly and revenues from those “core” depositors accounts for a 
disproportionate share of overall overdraft revenues (FDIC 2008, Campbell et al. 
2008).   
The welfare benefits of payday credit are debatable only if one departs from 
textbook models of consumer credit with symmetric information and fully rational, 
time-consistent borrowers.   If lenders are better informed than borrowers, for 
example, unsuspecting borrowers can be made worse off by a voluntary credit 
transaction (Morgan 2007).   Alternatively, if payday credit users are naïve hyperbolic 
discounters that systematically overestimate their commitment to repay “short-term” 
 145
loans, access to payday credit might make them worse off (Paige and Tobacman 
2008b).  In fact, repeat borrowing by some payday credit users may be indicative of 
information asymmetries and/or behavioral biases.  Moreover, counseling prospective 
payday credit borrowers about the possibility of repeat usage does reduce demand for 
some borrowers (Bertrand and Morse 2009).  Thus, one is theoretically and 
empirically justified in doubting the welfare benefits of payday credit.  
In fact, the literature to date is quite mixed.  For every study suggesting payday 
credit help users (Morgan and Strain 2008; Morse 2009; Zinman 2010), there is 
another study that finds harm (Melzer 2009; Carrel and Ziman 2009; Skiba and 
Tobacman 2008a).  Thus, the question of whether payday credit helps or hurts users, 
and how, remains unsettled.  
 
III. Regression Models and Payday Loan Laws  
 To identify the link between changes in payday credit supply and the outcomes 
we study, we estimate difference-in-difference regressions of the form: 
 
Outcomest = δBanst + δ ́Enabledst + α + αs + αt +  Controlsst γ + εst.        (A) 
The dependent variable is one of several outcomes we study, suitably scaled, in state s 
in month or quarter t.  We discuss and source the outcomes below and in the appendix.  
The key variables in model (A) are the dummy variables Banst and Enabledst.  
Banst equals one (zero) after (before) state s banned payday lending.  Enabledst equals 
one (zero) after (before) state s passed enabling legislation.37  The coefficients on 
those variables, δ and δ ́, measure the difference-in-difference in Outcomest associated 
with a change in Banst or Enabledst.  Under any hypothesis about the relationship 
                                                 
37 For laissez faire states that allow payday lending without explicit enabling legislation, Enabledst 
equals one for all t.   
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between payday credit supply and the outcomes, we would expect δ and δ ́ to have 
opposite signs.  We do not force |δ| = |δ ́|, however, in case one or other corresponding 
variables is a better proxy for supply.  Note that because (A) includes the usual state 
fixed effects, δ and δ ́ are identified off within-state variation. Many panel data studies 
dimensioned like ours stop with (A), but we also estimate versions with a state-
specific trend for robustness.  Some results depend on whether the state specific trend 
is included. 
We maintain the standard assumption that Ban and Enabled are exogenous 
with respect to the outcomes.  In truth, both variables may reflect the relative interests 
and power of the four main stakeholders in the overdraft credit market: consumers, 
consumer advocates, payday lenders, and payday lenders’ competitors.  Given the 
confluence of so many, possibly offsetting, forces, it seems natural to follow the 
literature and take the law changes as exogenous.  We discuss that assumption in more 
detail later in the paper.      
Controlsst is a vector of economic variables – log income, income growth, 
unemployment rate, home price index -- and demographic characteristics -- the share 
of population that are Black, Hispanic, Asian, and have college degrees.  The 
economic variables are monthly or quarterly. The demographic characteristics are 
annual. All the data range between 1998 and 2008.   
Table 3.1 reports our taxonomy of payday loan laws.  Our coding largely 
follows but extends the coding in Morgan and Strain (2008), Melzer (2009), Melzer 
and Morgan (2010), Zinman (2010), Hynes (2010), and our own research of state 
laws.  We do not claim our coding captures every binding law change, or that we have 
not included any non-binding changes.  In particular, payday lenders were operating in 
many states even before enabling legislation was passed.  Our supposition is that 
supply may have increased after enabling legislation as the new laws may have  
 TABLE 3.1: Payday lending laws in the 50 states and DC: January 1998 - December 2008*   
States without Law Changes:  States with Law Changes: 
Always Banned  Always Legal  Banned Date Enabled Date 
Connecticut  California Montana  Arkansasb December 2007 Alabamab June 2003 
Maine  Colorado Nebraska  D.C.  November 2007 Alaska June 2004 
Massachusetts  Delaware Nevada  Georgia May 2004 Arizona April 2000 
New Jersey  Florida New Mexico Maryland June 2000 Arkansas April 1999 
New York  Idaho Ohio  North Carolina December 2005 Hawaii July 1999 
Vermont  Ilinois South Carolina Oregon July 2007 Michigan November 2005 
  Indianaa South Dakota Pennsylvania November 2007 New Hampshire January 2000 
  Iowa Tennessee  West Virginia June 2006 North Dakota April 2001 
  Kansas Texas     Oklahomab September 2003 
  Kentucky Utah     Rhode Island July 2001 
  Louisiana Washington    Virginia April 2002 
  Minnesota Wisconsin       
  Mississippi Wyoming       
    Missouri            
Sources: Morgan and Strain (2008), Melzer (2009), Morgan and Melzer (2010), Zinman (2010), Hynes (2010), Authors' research. 
a Indiana passed a law "enabling" payday loans.  We follow Hynes (2010) and code Indiana as always allowing payday lending. The results are robust to 
excluding Indiana 
b The legality of payday lending was ambiguous in these states at times (See Fox and Mierzwinski (2001) and Carrel and Zinman (2009)). The results are 
robust to excluding those states.  
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provided safe harbors to payday lenders that were hesitant to enter without protection.  
We are confident that the bans are binding, however, based on the annual store counts 
by Stephens Inc., an investment bank that tracks the payday lending industry.  
Furthermore, to the extent the legal changes are not binding, it biases us against 
finding any relationship between the law changes and outcomes.  
 
IV. Findings  
We study bankruptcy, complaints, and then overdrafts.  Background on each 
outcome comes at the beginning of each section.  Summary statistics and sources are 
reported in the appendix.   Means of the outcomes are also reported in the regression 
tables.  
 
4.1.a Bankruptcy 
Three papers have already examined the link between bankruptcy and payday 
credit access. Their findings are mixed.  Stoivanici and Mahoney (2008) and Hynes 
(2010) find no relationship or a mixed relationship in their studies using state and 
county data.  Using borrower-level data and a regression discontinuity design, Skiba 
and Tobacman (2008a) find that marginal applicants approved for a payday loan are 
more likely to file Ch. 13 than are marginal, rejected applicants.   
In considering the hypothesis that variation in payday credit supply may cause 
substitution between bankruptcy and informal bankruptcy, it is important to remember 
that -- conditional on a borrower already being in default -- filing bankruptcy has costs 
and benefits.  The costs are real and potentially substantial: court and attorney fees, 
diminished credit score, and stigma, a catch-all term for the non-pecuniary costs of 
filing bankruptcy.   A main benefit of bankruptcy is protection, the automatic stay that 
halts all collection efforts by lenders and debt collectors, at least on unsecured debts.  
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Bankruptcy is clearly a bad outcome but it may not be the worst outcome; for a 
borrower already in default, bankruptcy may be preferable to informal bankruptcy.    
We study personal bankruptcy filings per 10,000 persons at the state level 
between 1998:Q2 and 2008:Q4 by Chapter. Table 3.2 reports the bankruptcy 
regression models.  The relationship between bankruptcy filings and the economic 
control variables seem sensible.  For example, bankruptcy under either Chapter is 
increasing in the unemployment rate.  Income growth is positively related to Ch. 7 
rates and negatively related to Ch. 13 rates. Those opposing signs make sense; Ch. 13 
filers have to share income with creditors, so growing income means a growing 
absolute obligation to creditors.  Ch. 7 filers get to keep all their future income so all 
else the same, they may be more likely to use Ch. 7 when income is increasing.   
A few of the racial variables are significant in some models.  Ch. 7 rates are 
higher in states with proportionately more Asian households.38  In the standard, fixed 
effects model, Ch. 7 rates are lower and Ch. 13 rates are higher in states 
proportionately more black households.  We return to the latter result momentarily.  
Turning to δ and δ ́, we observe no significant relationship between Ch. 7 and 
either Ban or Enabled, though we do see some link between Ban and Ch. 13.  In the 
model without controls, δ is negative and significant at the five percent level.  With 
controls, δ remains significant at the ten percent level.  In the model with state specific 
trends, δ remains negative but is insignificant.   
 
                                                 
38 Higher Ch. 7 demand in states with disproportionately more Asians could reflect filing by failed 
entrepreneurs that used credit cards to finance their business.   
 TABLE 3.2: Does Payday Credit Supply Affect Bankruptcy Demand? 
Reported are OLS regression coefficients [robust t-statistics] estimated over 2244 state-quarter observations between 1998:Q1 
and 2008:Q4.  Banned equals one (zero) after (before) state s banned payday lending. Enabled equals one (zero) after (before) 
state s passed enabling legislation.  All models include state and date fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 Dependent variable (mean) = bankruptcy filings per 10000 persons under … 
 Ch. 7 (8.25)  Ch. 13 (2.95) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Banned -0.65 -0.73 -1.16  -1.02 -0.93 -0.48 
 [0.69] [1.04] [1.06]  [2.02]** [1.71]* [1.31] 
Enabled -0.44 -0.31 -0.49  0.06 0.01 -0.07 
 [0.72] [0.88] [1.18]  [0.31] [0.05] [0.22] 
Unemployment rate  0.37 0.40   0.26 0.19 
  [1.84]* [1.83]*   [2.36]** [1.94]* 
Log (income)  -8.69 -3.52   1.90 0.83 
  [2.14]** [0.93]   [1.09] [0.61] 
Income growth   6.30 3.81   -2.05 -1.53 
  [2.77]*** [1.72]*   [2.05]** [1.84]* 
Home Prices   -0.01 -0.02   0.00 0.00 
  [6.72]*** [4.90]***   [1.28] [2.53]** 
Black share  -22.60 -108.76   18.69 2.89 
  [1.97]* [1.51]   [2.45]** [0.09] 
Hispanic share  -10.49 -23.25   -20.35 21.53 
  [1.19] [0.66]   [3.94]*** [1.41] 
Asian share  11.15 18.21   -0.19 0.60 
  [4.03]*** [3.32]***   [0.15] [0.22] 
College share  3.97 0.15   3.89 5.80 
  [0.75] [0.03]   [1.44] [2.29]** 
Constant 4.52 91.99 35.09  0.56 -21.19 -9.01 
  [14.82]*** [2.17]** [1.03]   [5.13]*** [1.16] [0.73] 
State specific trend? No No  Yes  No  No Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.87 0.88   0.93 0.94 0.96 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%      
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Though not particularly strong, the evidence here that Ch. 13 rates decrease 
with payday loan bans is consistent with Skiba and Tobacman (2008a).   Before 
interpreting that result, we investigate how informal bankruptcy, as proxied by 
complaints against lenders and debt collectors, varies with payday credit supply.  
Recall that Stegman and Faris (2003) found that past problems with debt collectors 
was a primary reason (along with bounced checks) that lower income households 
demand payday credit. So it seems apt to study the relationship between complaints 
against debt collectors and payday credit supply. 
 
4.1.b    Complaints (Informal Bankruptcy)  
 The complaints data we study are collected by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), the agency charged with enforcing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 
1978. The FTC keeps tabs for complaints against lenders and debt collectors.39  We 
observe the data from January 1998 when the FTC created its hotline (1-877-FTC 
HELP) and there is a strong, positive trend in the series.40     
The rate of complaints is low; the mean number of complaints against lenders 
and debt collectors collectively was only 1.41 per 100,000 persons per year. However, 
the FTC believes that only a “small percentage” (Commission 2006, p.4) of 
households being harassed by debt collectors actually complain to the FTC.  We view 
the low rate of complaints as a scaling issue; presumably every defaulted debtor 
suffers some dunning unless and until they declare bankruptcy, so latent complaints 
might be the same order of magnitude as bankruptcy rates.  Despite the low rate of 
                                                 
39 “Lenders” comprises banks, credit unions, and other lenders (finance companies, mortgage lenders, 
installment lenders, health care lenders, and other lenders.)  The FTC does not have a separate field for 
payday lenders. 
40 The litany of complaints received by the FTC in 2005 (percent of total): exaggerating amount or legal 
status of debts (43), calling continuously, before eight am, or after nine pm (25), obscene language (12), 
repeatedly calling family, friends, and neighbors (11), false threats of dire consequences (10), 
impermissible calls to employer (6), revealing debt to third parties (5), threatened violence (0.4).   
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complaints, we maintain that changes in the rate could still reliably measure changes 
in debt problems.   
We also see complaints against lenders and debt collectors as a potential proxy 
for “informal bankruptcy,” where borrowers are in default with the benefit of 
bankruptcy protection (Dawsey and Ausubel 2004).  Defaulted-but-not-bankrupt 
debtors are subject to debt collectors’ full treatment — dunning, wage garnishment, 
law suits, etc. — so it seems natural to assume that some debtors in that state will seek 
protection elsewhere, by complaining to the FTC for example.   
Note that model (A) controls for some issues that might compromise the use of 
complaints as a proxy for informal bankruptcy.  For example, Dawsey et al. (2008) 
show that bankruptcy and informal bankruptcy rates vary predictably with state-level 
protections against debt collectors and wage garnishment, but the state effects in (A) 
control for such differences to the extent they are constant within states.41 While debt 
collectors’ efforts may vary with business conditions, the economic control variables 
and date effects help account for cyclical effects. 
Identification theft (ID theft) might also compromise complaints; some 
complainants may appeal to the FTC over harassment about debts incurred by an ID 
thief.  If ID theft covaries with payday credit supply, our delta estimates would be 
biased.  We control for state-specific, time-varying differences in ID theft by 
predicting ID theft by state using annual ID theft rates per capita by state between 
2002 and 2008.42  The prediction model includes all the variables on the right side of 
(A) including the state-specific trend.43     
                                                 
41 Dawsey et al. (2008) find those laws are mostly constant within states. 
42 ID theft rates by state are available from various issues of the Federal Trade Commissions’ Consumer 
Sentinel Network Data Book and Consumer Sentinel Annual Fraud and Identity Theft Reports 
http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports.shtml 
43 Apart from the fixed effects and state trend, only education was (positively) correlated with ID theft, 
presumably because education is positively correlated with internet usage.   
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Before investigating how complaints vary with payday credit access, we digress to 
show that complaints seem to satisfy necessary conditions to proxy for informal 
bankruptcy in that they are positively related to defaulted debt and negatively related 
to Ch. 13.  Table 3.3 reports auxiliary regressions to that effect, where defaulted debt 
is charge-offs of credit card loans by unit banks, i.e., banks operating in a single state.  
The pattern of coefficients is as predicted; complaints are positively related to credit 
card charge-offs and negatively related to Ch. 13 rates.  In particular, complaints are 
significantly negatively related to Ch. 13 bankruptcy rates in the standard fixed effect 
models and they are positively related to credit card chargeoffs in the model that 
includes a state specific trend.  In the latter model, we can reject at below the ten 
percent level that the coefficients on charge-offs and Ch. 13 are jointly equal to zero.    
Having provided some evidence that complaints are a proxy for informal bankruptcy, 
Table 3.4 reports regressions of informal bankruptcy/complaints.  To emphasize 
substitution between bankruptcy and informal bankruptcy, we report corresponding 
regressions of Ch. 13 bankruptcy rates.  Only credit card chargeoffs are significant in 
explaining informal bankruptcy/complaints in the model with state specific trends, but 
a number of variables are significant in the standard fixed effects model.  In that 
model, informal bankruptcy/complaints are significantly related to income, income 
growth, and the home price index.  We also observe significantly lower informal 
bankruptcy/complaints in states with a higher share of black households and lower 
informal bankruptcy/complaints in states with higher share of Hispanic households.   
Consistent with the substitution hypothesis, we observe just the opposite relationship 
between those demographic variables and formal bankruptcy/complaints under Ch. 13.   
 
 TABLE 3.3:  Auxiliary Regressions: Do Complaints Increase with Credit Card Chargeoffs and Decrease in Ch. 13 
Filing Rates? 
Reported are OLS regression coefficients [robust t-statistics] estimated using state-monthly observations between January 1998 
and December 2008.  Banned equals one (zero) after (before) state banned payday lending. Enabled equals one (zero) after 
(before) state passed enabling legislation. Predicted ID theft is forecasted using state-year data over 2002-2008.  All models 
include state and date fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state.  Bottom line reports p-value of F-test whether Ch. 
coefficients on 13 filings and credit card chargeoffs are jointly zero.  
 Dependent Variable (mean): Complaints against Lenders & Collectors per 100,000 (1.41) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Credit card net chargeoff  rate 0.69 0.57 0.69  0.70 0.60 0.72 
 [0.87] [1.06] [2.29]**  [0.90] [1.13] [2.41]** 
Ch13 filings per 10000 persons -0.27 -0.12 -0.03  -0.26 -0.11 -0.02 
 [3.45]*** [1.81]* [0.76]  [3.25]*** [1.60] [0.45] 
Ch 7 filings per 10000 persons 0.01 0.02 0.02     
 [0.22] [1.13] [1.43]     
Predicted ID theft  0.01 -1.73   0.01 -1.70 
  [2.42]** [1.35]   [2.46]** [1.32] 
Unemployment rate  0.00 -0.14   0.00 -0.14 
  [0.13] [1.46]   [0.02] [1.40] 
Log (income)  -1.43 1.24   -1.50 1.20 
  [2.16]** [1.02]   [2.24]** [0.98] 
Income growth   0.68 0.53   0.73 0.55 
  [1.78]* [1.43]   [1.90]* [1.46] 
Home Prices   0.00 -0.05   0.00 -0.05 
  [2.62]** [1.35]   [2.56]** [1.32] 
Black share  -21.71 773.36   -21.96 760.13 
  [4.20]*** [1.33]   [4.24]*** [1.30] 
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TABLE 3.3 (Continued) 
 Dependent Variable (mean): Complaints against Lenders & Collectors per 100,000 (1.41) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Hispanic share  9.67 349.91   9.62 344.08 
  [2.50]** [1.37]   [2.49]** [1.33] 
Asian share  5.46 -1335.10   5.65 -1313.28 
  [2.31]** [1.35]   [2.39]** [1.32] 
College share  -0.04 99.35   -0.03 97.73 
  [0.03] [1.36]   [0.02] [1.32] 
Constant 0.45 15.11 -276.37  0.46 15.81 -271.78 
  [5.71]*** [2.18]** [1.37]   [6.16]*** [2.27]** [1.33] 
State specific trend? No No  Yes  No  No Yes 
Observations 5877 5868 5868  5877 5868 5868 
Adjusted R-squared 0.85 0.87 0.89  0.85 0.87 0.89 
F-test p-value    0.149 0.065     0.187 0.058 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%      
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 TABLE 3.4:   Payday Credit Supply, Bankruptcy, and Informal Bankruptcy/Complaints 
Reported are OLS regression coefficients [robust t-statistics] estimated between January 1998 and December 2008.  Banned equals one (zero) 
after (before) state s banned payday lending.  Enabled equals one (zero) after (before) state s passed enabling legislation.  Predicted ID theft is 
forecast using state-year data over 2002-2008.  All models include state and date fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
Complaints vs. Lenders & 
Debt Collectors per 100,000 
(1.41)  Ch.13 Filings per 10,000  (2.95)    
Log (Complaints vs. Lenders & 
Debt Collectors / (Complaints vs. 
Lenders & Debt Collectors + 
Ch.13 Filings) (0.73) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)     (7) (8) (9) 
Banned  0.27 0.26 0.03  -1.02 -0.92 -0.47     0.09 0.08 0.073 
 [1.82]* [2.36]** [0.58]  [2.02]** [1.76]* [1.30]     [0.97] [0.94] [2.13]** 
Enabled  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.06 0.00 0.01     -0.06 -0.08 0.042 
 [0.44] [0.68] [0.94]  [0.31] [0.01] [0.03]     [0.54] [0.91] [0.60] 
Credit card net 
charge-off rate  0.69 0.72   -1.47 -1.23      0.43 0.609 
  [1.42] [2.47]**   [1.02] [1.07]      [1.12] [2.08]** 
Predicted ID theft   0.01 -1.72   -0.01 -0.04      0.01 -2.025 
  [2.83]*** [1.33]   [1.47] [1.48]      [4.56]*** [2.26]** 
Unemployment rate  0.00 -0.14   0.25 0.19      -0.03 -0.175 
  [0.14] [1.41]   [2.24]** [1.86]*      [1.02] [2.53]** 
Log (income)  -1.48 1.22   1.89 0.88      -1.22 1.465 
  [2.43]** [1.00]   [1.03] [0.65]      [2.05]** [1.66] 
Income growth   0.76 0.55   -2.01 -1.51      0.70 0.689 
  [2.14]** [1.47]   [1.90]* [1.77]*      [2.26]** [2.27]** 
Home Prices   0.00 -0.05   0.00 -0.01      0.00 -0.050 
  [2.84]*** [1.34]   [1.55] [2.81]***      [1.56] [2.16]** 
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 TABLE 3.4 (Continued) 
 Dependent Variable (mean): 
 
Complaints vs. Lenders & Debt 
Collectors per 100,000 (1.41)  Ch.13 Filings per 10,000  (2.95)    
Log (Complaints vs. Lenders & 
Debt Collectors / (Complaints vs. 
Lenders & Debt Collectors + 
Ch.13 Filings) (0.73) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)     (7) (8) (9) 
Black share  -22.55 769.88   21.27 22.54      -5.76 904.406 
  [4.79]*** [1.31]   [2.67]** [0.67]      [1.47] [2.22]** 
Hispanic share  10.13 348.05   -16.31 7.57      1.39 403.948 
  [2.63]** [1.34]   [2.77]*** [0.51]      [0.50] [2.24]** 
Asian share  6.03 -1329.10   -20.99 -91.32      6.75 -1561.657 
  [2.71]*** [1.33]   [1.53] [1.47]      [4.28]*** [2.26]** 
College share  -0.56 98.80   4.20 7.98      -0.87 115.156 
  [0.46] [1.34]   [1.58] [2.68]**      [0.98] [2.25]** 
Constant 0.40 15.73 -274.85  0.56 -20.33 -13.96     -2.61 9.94 -321.287 
  [5.57]*** [2.47]** [1.34]  [5.13]*** [1.05] [1.20]       [28.02]*** [1.59] [2.27]** 
State specific 
trend? No No  Yes  No  No Yes     No  No Yes 
Observations 5934 5868 5868  2244 2225 2225     5934 5868 5868 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.85 0.87 0.89  0.93 0.94 0.96       0.92 0.93 0.95 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%    
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Turning to δ and δ ́, we observe that informal bankruptcy/complaints are 
positively related to Ban in the standard fixed effects models.  Consistent with the 
substitution hypothesis, the models where δ is significantly negative in the informal 
bankruptcy/complaints regressions correspond precisely to the models where δ is 
significantly positive in the Ch. 13 bankruptcy regressions.  The estimates in model (2) 
of Table 3.4 imply that complaints against lenders and debt collectors rise by 19 
percent relative to average (1.41).  That figure seems plausible, though we have no 
real metric to gauge plausibility.   Perhaps the most notable aspect of Table 3.4 is the 
absence of evidence that complaints against lenders and debt collectors increase with 
payday credit supply.  If anything, the relationship is negative.  
The outcome in the final set of regressions in Table 3.4 is the log ratio of 
informal bankruptcy to Ch. 13 plus informal bankruptcy.44  That ratio directly 
measures substitution between informal and formal bankruptcy.  Neither δ nor δ ́ is 
significant in the standard, fixed effects model, but δ is positive and significant at the 
five percent level in the model with state specific trends.  The estimate in model (9) 
implies informal bankruptcy as a proportion of total bankruptcy increases by ten 
percent after payday loan bans. 
Overall, the bankruptcy findings suggest that payday loan bans have weakly 
significant and opposing effects on formal and informal bankruptcy rates/complaints, 
with the former tending to rise and the latter tending to fall after bans.  The welfare 
implications of that substitution are ambiguous except that it happens under a 
constraint on payday loan supply.   At a minimum, it does suggest a possible 
alternative interpretation of Skiba and Tobacmans’ (2008a) finding that payday credit 
access causes or “tips” marginal loan applicants into bankruptcy.   Marginal payday 
loan applicants (who barely qualify for loans) may be on the verge of bankruptcy in 
                                                 
44 We omit Ch. 7 as we find no evidence of substitution between Ch. 7 and informal bankruptcy 
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the first place and thus face intense pressure from debt collectors.  We can only 
speculate on the transmission, but perhaps the extra credit from payday lenders affords 
them the opportunity to buy bankruptcy protection.45      
 
4.2 Overdrafts    
 Avoiding overdrafts is a common theme among payday credit users.  In his 
study of the Oregon payday ban, Zinman (2010) found that payday credit users there 
expected to bounce more checks after the ban.  In a survey of 2000 payday credit 
users, Cerillo (2004) found that 66 percent reported demanding payday loans to avoid 
bouncing checks. Morgan and Strain (2008) and Melzer and Morgan (2010) find that 
returned check rates decline after payday bans.  We extend their findings by looking at 
more law changes, including enabling legislation, and by looking at the counterpart to 
returned checks, namely overdraft fee income at depository institutions.   
 
4.2.a Returned Checks 
The returned checks data are from Federal Reserve Check Processing Centers 
(Fed CPC).  Although checks are declining as a medium of payment, the Fed was and 
is a major player in check processing.  For example, the 43 CPC operating in 2003 
cleared about 38 percent of the estimated 36.6 billion checks drawn on U.S. banks and 
credit unions that year.46  
Checks are observed at the CPC level so the returned checks regression model 
is  
 
Rcst = δBanst + δ ́Enabledst  + α + αc + αt + Xst γ + Zdtκ + εcst,         (B) 
                                                 
45The $274 fee for filing Ch. 13 filing is about the size of the typical payday loan.  
http://www.wiwb.uscourts.gov/ch13_filing_req.htm 
46 http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/other/2004/20040802/attachment2.pdf.   
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where Rcst denotes the number or dollar amount of returned checks at CPC c in s at t.  
A CPC can process checks drawn on depository institutions from other states in the 
Fed district it serves so we include economic control variables measured at the Fed 
District level (Zdt) as well.47  Standard errors are clustered at the CPC level.   
The fact that a CPC may process checks drawn on depository institutions in 
other states creates error in the dependent variable.  Under the assumption that 
changes in payday loan laws in state s do not affect returned checks in other states, our 
estimates of δ and ߜ′ are unbiased.  Their t-statistics are biased downward, however, so 
we are less likely to reject δ = 0 and ߜ′ = 0 than if “pure” state level check data were 
available.48 
In response to decreased aggregate demand for checks, the Fed began merging 
CPCs in response in 2004.   In cases where the mergers involved a CPC in a state 
where payday loan laws changed, we adjust the checks data and the right-hand side 
variables in model (B) following a procedure intended to minimize potential 
attenuation bias created by mergers.  The procedure depends on whether the legal 
change occurred before or after the CPC merger, and whether the CPC in the state 
where the law changed was the “target” or “acquirer” in the merger.  We treat both the 
dependent variable and right-hand side variable differently in each case.  In cases 
where the legal change preceded the merger and the acquiring CPC was located in the 
state where the law changed, we follow the bank merger literature and create pro 
forma series by adding the returned checks at the merging CPC at time zero.  In all 
other cases, we did not create pro forma series as that would add unnecessary noise to 
                                                 
47 Fed District level economic data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis “Fred” dataset. 
48 To see where aggregation does and does not create bias, decompose the number or value of returned 
checks at CPC c into checks drawn on state s and checks drawn on another state ~s:  ܴ௖ ൌ ܴ௦ ൅ ܴ~௦.  
We wish to estimate ܴ௦ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߜܤ௦ ൅ ߜ′ܧ௦ 	൅ ߝ௦, where B denotes Ban and E denotes Enabled.  
Plugging the first equation into the second yields the estimating equation: ܴ௖ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߜܤ௦ ൅ 	ߜ′ܧ௦ ൅ ߝ௦ ൅ܴ~௦.  Our estimates of δ and ߜ′ are consistent so long as cov(ܴ~௦,	ܤ௦ሻ = 0 = cov(ܴ~௦,	ܧ௦ሻ. The t-
statistics will be biased downward, however, because ݒܽݎሺߝ௦ሻ ൅ ݒܽݎሺܴ~௦ሻ ൐ ݒܽݎሺߝ௦ሻ.	    
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the dependent variable.   Instead we use a dummy variable to account for any shift in 
the mean in returned checks after the merger.  In all cases, we created weighted values 
of the right hand side variables where the weights were the respective share of checks 
processed at the merging CPC.49   
Returned checks are measured per number or per dollar amount.  We predict 
the former will be more correlated with payday credit supply because depositors who 
use payday credit are likely apt to have lower income than depositors who do not and 
thus write (and possibly bounce) smaller checks.     
 Table 3.5 reports the returned check regressions. Several of the economic controls are 
significant in some models but we do no not discuss those in detail.  We observe one 
demographic effect: the number and dollar amount of returned checks are higher at 
CPCs located in states with more blacks in the standard fixed effects model.  That 
result is consistent with Campbell et al. (2008) who find that involuntary deposit 
closures are higher in counties with proportionately more black households.   
Turning to δ and δ ́, we see no evidence that increased payday supply is 
associated with more returned checks.  On the contrary, δ is positive in all models and 
δ ́ is negative.  Furthermore, one or the other coefficients is significant at the five 
percent or one percent level in the regression of the number of returned checks (the 
outcome  arguably more closely associated with small dollar check writers), even in 
                                                 
49 We have confirmed the returned check results using logs of returned checks and the rate of returns 
per check process and per $100 of checks processed. We have also confirmed the results using pro 
forma values for all the CPC located in states that experienced a law change where we use control 
variables for the state with the “acquiring” CPC or if we create population shares of the states where the 
merging CPCs were located. 
 TABLE 3.5: Fewer Bounced Checks when Payday Loan Supply Increases 
Reported are OLS regression coefficients [robust t-statistics] estimated between 1998:Q1 and 2008:Q3.  Banned equals one (zero) 
after (before) state s banned payday lending. Enabled equals one (zero) after (before) state passed enabling legislation.  All models 
include CPC and date fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by CPC. 
 Dependent Variable (mean): 
 Thousands of returned checks (1335)  $Millions of returned checks (1238)  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  
Banned  301.81 272.43 360.32  238.70 105.75 115.64  
 [1.05] [1.63] [3.49]***  [0.61] [0.66] [0.46]  
Enabled  -191.42 -188.01 -150.11  -166.55 -102.17 -48.29  
 [2.46]** [2.84]*** [1.06]  [2.20]** [1.70]* [0.56]  
Unemployment  rate  41.05 -23.78   -6.69 -29.28  
  [0.84] [0.78]   [0.12] [0.71]  
Log (income)  3037.07 763.87   2490.26 1060.24  
  [2.07]** [1.08]   [1.47] [1.04]  
Income growth   -1750.01 -520.91   -1239.87 -505.47  
  [2.07]** [1.17]   [1.35] [0.84]  
Home Prices   -2.27 1.61   -1.15 2.23  
  [2.31]** [0.83]   [1.16] [1.02]  
Black share  20304.63 8285.89   38291.11 7264.80  
  [2.12]** [1.16]   [2.71]*** [0.84]  
Hispanic share  5612.53 8036.95   13519.08 12982.47  
  [1.01] [1.25]   [2.46]** [1.70]*  
Asian share  -4924.94 -2772.50   15742.24 8311.83  
  [0.24] [0.18]   [0.68] [0.42]  
College share  209.32 -49.41   246.61 130.01  
  [0.18] [0.05]   [0.15] [0.11]  
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 TABLE 3.5 (Continued) 
 Dependent Variable (mean): 
 Thousands of returned checks (1335)  $Millions of returned checks (1238)  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  
District log income  -6859.97 -4024.19   -3227.85 -1087.32  
  [2.06]** [1.15]   [0.97] [0.31]  
District Income growth   1003.20 1820.96   -1605.56 -107.93  
  [0.40] [0.53]   [0.49] [0.03]  
District unemployment   -57.70 40.63   -112.24 30.88  
  [0.84] [0.83]   [1.74]* [0.76]  
Constant 2288.06 35065.85 37734.72  1739.70 -2386.25 7230.84  
  [21.65]*** [1.07] [1.07]   [11.60]*** [0.07] [0.21]  
State specific trend? No No  Yes  No  No Yes  
Observations 1550 1550 1550  1550 1550 1550  
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.92 0.95   0.83 0.94 0.97  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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the model with state specific trends.  Note that, as predicted, δ and δ ́ are larger in 
absolute value and more significant in the regressions of the number of returned 
checks than in the regressions of the dollar amount of returned checks.  That 
differential effect provides some evidence that the link between returned checks and 
payday credit supply is causal.  
The implied magnitudes are substantial.  The estimate of δ ́ in model (2) 
implies the number of returned checks increases by 14 percent relative to average after 
the passage of enabling legislation.  The dollar magnitudes are also large; the number 
of returned checks falls by 188,000 per quarter after states pass enabling legislation. 
At $50 per returned check ($25 to the bank and $25 to the merchant), that implies a 
savings to households of $37.6 million per year per CPC in returned check fees.50  
The returned checks regressions indicate households bounce fewer checks 
when payday credit is available.  Below we look at overdrafts from the other side.    
 
4.2.b Fee Income at Banks  
Every overdraft, whether covered or not, generates revenue for the 
counterparty depository institution.  Overdraft fees have become an important source 
of revenue for depository institutions.  The median bank studied in FDIC (2008) 
earned 43 percent of its noninterest income and 21 percent of its net operating income 
from overdraft fees.51  
 We measure overdraft fee income by the “Services Charges on Deposit 
Accounts” item on the Call Reports banks file with their federal regulators.  Unlike 
with checks, fee income is observed at the state level because we limit the sample to 
unit banks which operate in a single state.  There is error in the variable nonetheless, 
                                                 
50 188000*4*$25 
51 FDIC (2008) Table VIII-2, p. 58. Data on the costs of providing overdraft credit is not available, so 
the revenue figures overstate the importance of overdraft profits relative to net income.    
 165
because the services charges item measures fee income from sources other than 
overdraft fee income.  Under the assumption that income from those other components 
is uncorrelated with the payday loan supply, our estimates of delta will be unbiased 
but their statistical significance will be biased downward.52  
The mean of service charges on deposit accounts over 1998 to 2009:Q1 at the 
1917 unit banks in our sample was $145 million.  The mean fee per resident was $31.  
The dependent variables of our regressions are the log of those variables:  log of fee 
income or log of fee income per capita.53     
Table 3.6 reports the fee income regressions.  Fee income is almost entirely 
orthogonal to the economic control variables, but several demographic variables are 
significant in some models.  In the standard fixed effects model with controls, fee 
income is lower in states with a high share of college educated residents, presumably 
because better educated households are better at avoiding overdrafts or contesting the 
fees.  In those models, fee income also tends to be lower in states with a higher share 
of Asian households.  In the fixed effects models with state-specific trends, fee income 
is higher in states with a higher share of Hispanic residents.   
As with some earlier results, the estimates of δ and δ ́ depend on the model.  In 
the model with state specific trends, none of the previous relationships just noted hold 
up, not even the sensible relationship between College Share and fee income.  In those 
models δ and δ ́ are both insignificant.  By contrast, in the fully controlled standard 
fixed effects model without a trend, δ and δ ́ have the opposite sign, as predicted, and 
both are significant at the ten percent level.  The estimate of δ in model (5) implies the 
                                                 
52  The logic for this claim follows from footnote 14.  Simply imagine R denotes Revenue and ~s 
denotes fee income from other (non overdraft) sources.   
53 “Unlogged” fee income and income per capita were unpredictable by model (B).  
 TABLE 3.6:  Fee Income at Bank Falls with Payday Loan Supply 
Reported are OLS regression coefficients [robust t-statistics] estimated between 1998:Q1 and 2008:Q2.  Banned equals one (zero) 
after (before) state s banned payday lending. Enabled equals one (zero) after (before) state passed enabling legislation.  All models 
include state and date fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state. 
 Dependent Variable (mean): 
 Log of Fee Income (10.7)  Log of Fee Income per Capita (2.56) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Banned  0.24 0.30 0.18  0.22 0.30 0.17 
 [1.30] [1.77]* [1.44]  [1.26] [1.75]* [1.39] 
Enabled  -0.30 -0.34 0.18  -0.29 -0.33 0.18 
 [1.58] [1.75]* [1.05]  [1.51] [1.70]* [1.04] 
Unemployment rate  0.09 0.06   0.10 0.07 
  [1.16] [1.00]   [1.25] [1.01] 
Log (income)  0.81 0.11   0.92 0.05 
  [0.31] [0.07]   [0.35] [0.03] 
Income growth   -0.28 0.15   -0.41 0.15 
  [0.12] [0.10]   [0.18] [0.10] 
Home Prices   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
  [1.80]* [1.07]   [1.81]* [1.13] 
Black share  5.36 18.10   4.98 16.82 
  [0.70] [0.70]   [0.66] [0.65] 
Hispanic share  -3.13 20.73   -5.78 20.30 
  [0.33] [1.76]*   [0.62] [1.72]* 
Asian share  -2.76 -1.57   -2.67 -1.52 
  [2.12]** [1.05]   [2.04]** [1.01] 
College share  -3.45 -2.10   -3.50 -2.11 
  [1.90]* [1.30]   [1.95]* [1.31] 
Constant 8.25 0.51 13.73  1.81 -6.96 8.22 
  [92.72]*** [0.02] [0.96]   [19.73]*** [0.26] [0.57] 
State specific trend? No No  Yes  No  No Yes 
Observations 2113 2113 2113  2113 2113 2113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.94   0.78 0.79 0.89 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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log of fee income increases about 12 percent relative to average.   The corresponding 
estimate of δ ́ implies the log of fee income falls by 13 percent relative to average after 
the passage of enabling legislation, so the effects of bans and enabling legislation are 
roughly symmetric. 
As we see them, the fee income results provide weak evidence confirming the 
more robust findings on actual overdrafts.   They provide no evidence that payday 
credit access leads to significantly higher overdraft fee income for banks. 
 
V. Falsification Tests, Robustness, and Potential Biases  
This section reports falsification tests, shows that the results are robust to the 
exclusion of states with ambiguous payday loan laws, and discusses potential biases. 
 
5.1 Falsification Tests 
By construction, the difference-in-difference regressions we estimate are 
intended to identify causal connections between outcomes and payday loan supply.   
As further evidence, Table 3.7 reports falsification tests that indicate whether Ban 
and/or Enabled are correlated with outcomes that one would not expect to vary with 
payday loan supply.54  To save space, we report only δ and δ ́ even though the 
regressions include the full set of controls.  The falsification results indicate that Ban 
and Enabled are uncorrelated with home prices, the unemployment rate, and
                                                 
54 We thank a referee for suggesting falsification tests.  
  
 
 
 
TABLE 3.7:  Falsification Tests 
Reported are coefficients on Banned and Enabled in regression of outcome indicated in column heading.   First regression for each 
outcome includes state and date fixed effect. Second includes state specific trend and fixed effects. All regressions include controls 
reported in main regressions excluding the one used as the outcome variable. Row heading indicates sample and/or re-coding. 
    Dependent Variable 
    Home prices   Unemployment  Log (income)  Black share  Hispanic share   Asian share  
     fe 
fe +  
trend    fe 
fe +  
trend   fe 
fe +  
trend   fe 
fe +  
trend   fe 
fe +  
trend    fe 
fe +  
trend  
Banned   -12.90 -4.58  -0.38 -0.05  -0.02 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00  
   [0.63] [0.47]  [1.64] [0.23]  [1.30] [0.14]  
[0.44
] [0.90]  [0.22] [1.23]   [0.93] [0.43]  
Enabled   -11.67 -11.29  0.12 -0.25  0.01 -0.01  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00   -0.01 -0.01  
    [0.58] [1.43]  [0.82] [1.25]  [0.97] [0.65]  
[0.51
] [0.75]  [0.23] [0.60]   [1.11] [1.23]  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%      
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demographic shares. These falsification tests provide further evidence that the 
relationships between payday loan supply and outcomes identified above are not 
merely coincidental.  
 
5.2 Robustness to excluding ambiguous states 
There is, or was at times, some ambiguity in the status of payday lending in 
Alabama (AL), Arkansas (AR), and Oklahoma (OK).55  Table 3.8 shows that the main 
results are mostly unchanged when those states are excluded.   We still observe the 
weak negative link between Ch. 13 and Banned as in the main results, but with the 
three ambiguous states excluded, this link is not quite significant at the ten percent 
level.  In the model of Ch. 13 with the state specific trend, we obtain a new result 
suggesting that Ch. 13 rates fall significantly when payday lending is enabled.  While 
that new result may go against the informal-formal bankruptcy substitution hypothesis, it 
does not suggest that payday credit access is tipping households into bankruptcy.  More 
generally, the somewhat unstable Ch. 13 results are consistent with the mixed findings in 
the literature.  
The results on the number of returned checks with AL, AR, and OK excluded 
change slightly, but not in a uniform direction.  The absolute size and significance of 
δ ́ falls in the model with fixed effects model, but estimate of δ in the model with state-
specific trends becomes larger and more significant.   
Excluding the ambiguous states strengthens the results on fee income per 
capita.   In the main results, δ and δ ́ were only significant at the ten percent level.  
With AL, AR, and OK excluded, δ remains positive at the ten percent level while δ ́ is 
significant at the five percent level. 
                                                 
55 See Fox and Mierzwinski (2001) for a discussion of ambiguity about payday loan status in Oklahoma 
and Carrell and Zinman (2009) for a discussion of ambiguity in Alabama and Arkansas.  We thank  a 
referee for bringing these ambiguous states to our attention.  
 TABLE 3.8:  Robustness Checks 
Reported are coefficients on Banned and Enabled in regression of outcome indicated in column heading [robust t-statistics].   
First regression for each outcome includes state and date fixed effect. Second includes state specific trend and fixed effects. All 
regressions include controls reported in main regressions. Row heading indicates sample and/or re-coding. 
    Ch. 13 per 1000  
Complaints v 
lenders  
Number of returned 
checks 
 log (fee income)  
log (fee income 
per capita) 
    residents  
and debt 
collectors   at unit banks  at unit banks 
     fe 
fe +  
trend   fe 
fe +  
trend   fe 
fe +  
trend   fe 
fe +  
trend   fe 
fe +  
trend 
Main Results Banned -0.93 -0.48  0.26 0.03  272.4 360.3  0.30 0.18  0.30 0.17 
   [1.71]* [1.31]  [2.36]** [0.58]  [1.63] [3.49]***  [1.77]* [1.44]  [1.75]* [1.39] 
  Enabled 0.01 -0.07  0.04 0.04  -188.0 -150.1  -0.34 0.18  -0.33 0.18 
    [0.05] [0.22]  [0.68] [0.94]  [2.84]*** [1.06]  [1.75]* [1.05]  [1.70]* [1.04] 
                  
Excluding  AL, 
AR,  OK Banned -0.93 -0.39  0.28 0.00  271.4 356.9  0.32 0.19  0.31 0.18 
   [1.62] [0.97]  [2.49]** [0.04]  [1.59] [3.50]***  [1.79]* [1.43]  [1.76]* [1.38] 
  Enabled 0.10 -0.47  0.01 0.03  -121.9 -34.8  -0.50 0.19  -0.50 0.19 
    [0.72] [2.25]**  [0.13] [0.78]  [1.68]* [0.60]  [2.21]** [0.79]  [2.15]** [0.79] 
                  
MD Recoded 
June 2002 Banned -0.98 -0.59  0.25 0.02  275.7 305.0  0.24 0.12  0.23 0.11 
   [1.92]* [1.71]*  [2.34]** [0.29]  [1.59] [2.23]**  [1.18] [0.84]  [1.16] [0.80] 
  Enabled 0.00 -0.07  0.05 0.00  -188.2 -146.6  -0.34 0.17  -0.34 0.17 
    [0.02] [0.25]  [0.79] [0.12]  [2.85]*** [1.04]  [1.77]* [1.02]  [1.72]* [1.01] 
                  
Excluding Indiana  Banned -0.91 -0.48  0.27 0.03  274.3 363.2  0.29 0.18  0.28 0.17 
    [1.71]* [1.33]  [2.42]** [0.59]  [1.62] [3.54]***  [1.69]* [1.44]  [1.67] [1.38] 
  Enabled 0.03 -0.07  0.05 0.04  -192.0 -148.1  -0.35 0.18  -0.35 0.18 
    [0.17] [0.22]  [0.72] [0.93]  [2.86]*** [1.05]  [1.79]* [1.05]  [1.74]* [1.04] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
                
170 
171 
 
5.3 Potential Biases 
As already noted, we follow the literature in taking the changes in payday loan 
laws as exogenous.  If that assumption is violated, δ and δ ́ will be biased.  For 
example, if payday lenders see an exogenous increase in household debt problems in a 
state, say increased overdrafts, as an opportunity to enter a state, they seem likely to 
lobby for enabling legislation.  That would impart an upward bias on δ ́.  Note 
however, that their competitors in the overdraft credit market, depository institutions, 
would tend to lobby against enabling legislation (or for bans), so the two forces would 
tend to offset.  A priori, the net bias seems ambiguous.56    
Our estimates of δ and δ ́ will also be biased if we have excluded any state- 
specific, time-varying variables that are correlated with both the outcomes and the 
legal changes.  We have included the most likely covariates, namely the economic and 
demographic variables, and we have confirmed our results when we control for the 
share of population that are female or in the military.57   However, there may be other 
covariates that we have overlooked.  
 
VI.    Conclusion 
Despite a dozen studies, the question of how payday credit affects its users 
remains unanswered.  Economists do not even agree on the sign of the effect, much 
less the transmission.  Our findings obviously do not settle the debate, but they do 
                                                 
56  The interest of consumers and consumer advocates will also tend to offset to the extent they see 
payday credit differently. Consumers who, rightly or wrongly, see  payday credit as palliative for their 
debt problems will tend to resist bans and lobby for enabling legislation.  Consumer advocates, who 
tend to view payday credit as exacerbating users problems, will tend to support banks and lobby against 
enabling legislation.  
57 Neither the share of population that is female of the share in the military were correlated with the 
outcomes.  
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contribute to it by illuminating how households rearrange their financial affairs when 
payday loan supply changes.   
We find some evidence that after payday credit bans expand households switch 
from formal bankruptcy, where they are protected to from debt collectors, to informal 
bankruptcy, where they are exposed.  The welfare implications of that substitution are 
ambiguous except that it results from a tightened credit constraint.  We should qualify 
by noting that none of our evidence about bankruptcy, either the decrease in Ch. 13 
associated with payday credit bans or the substitution toward informal bankruptcy is 
particularly strong so further study of the formal-informal bankruptcy substitution 
hypothesis is clearly called for.   Perhaps the more important point to note about the 
complaints we use to proxy for informal bankruptcy is that we find no evidence that 
complaints against lenders and debt collectors increase with payday credit supply.  If 
anything, the relationship is negative.  
We find stronger evidence that overdrafts decline when payday credit supply 
expands.  That suggests households substitute the payday variety of overdraft credit 
for the bank version when the former is available.  Small overdrafts are more 
expensive than payday loans, so that finding suggests payday credit bans force 
households to use costlier alternatives.  In hindsight our overdraft findings should not 
come as too much of a surprise as avoiding overdrafts is a common theme among 
payday credit users (e.g. Zinman 2010, Cerillo 2004).  
Some caveats are called for.  First, none of our outcomes, except perhaps 
complaints, measure actual welfare and all of them, except perhaps bankruptcy, are 
measured with error.  We stress that the measurement error in the returned checks and 
fee income data attenuates the statistical significance of our findings for those 
variables without biasing the estimates but bias in some other direction for some other 
reason is always a concern with data generated in the market instead of in a laboratory 
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or in the field.  Second, although the state fixed effect in our models control for 
constant differences, the possibility remains that we have omitted some time-varying 
variable that is correlated with payday loan supply and the outcomes we study.  If so, 
our estimates of the effects of payday credit supply on overdrafts and informal 
bankruptcy will be biased.  
Given those caveats, we avoid drawing welfare or policy conclusions except to 
observe that lawmakers seem to be ahead of economists on the welfare effects of 
payday credit access; some lawmakers are closing payday loan markets as though they 
know for certain payday credit lowers welfare.  To help economists catch up, we end 
with some suggestions for additional research.  First, a straightforward test of whether 
payday credit helps users smooth their consumption would be to test if purchases of 
certain items get postponed when payday credit becomes unavailable.  As a first 
approximation, that could be tested by comparing same store sales of items payday 
credit users are prone to demand before and after payday credit bans.  Second, not 
much attention has been paid to the payday credit enforcement mechanism, that is, 
how lenders get borrowers to repay.  If the primary enforcement mechanism is the 
refusal of future credit, then repeat borrowing that looks so suspicious to some 
observers may be inevitable; we would never observe equilibria with payday credit 
where everyone borrows just once.   Lastly, given our evidence that fee income at 
depository institutions falls when payday credit supply increases, the political 
economy of payday lending regulations seems ripe for study.  Are the usury limits that 
bind payday lenders the type that reflect public interest and raise household welfare 
(Glaeser and Scheinkman 1998) or the kind that reflect competing interests 
(Benmelich and Moskowitz 2009; and Krozner and Strahan)?   
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APPENDIX: CODING PAYDAY LOAN BANS 
 
Seven states and D.C. banned payday loans over our sample period.  Georgia 
(GA) declared payday lending a felony in May 2004 (O.C.G.A. § 16-17-1).  North 
Carolina (NC) closed its market in December 2005 after a series of law suits by NC 
Attorney General persuaded payday lenders to cease operation under the bank agency 
model.58 West Virginia (WV) tried to ban payday lending via deferred presentment 
under statute W. Va. Code § 32A-3-1(passed in 1998) and a usury limit (W. Va. Code 
§ 47-6-5b), but at least one firm, First American Cash Advance, continued operating 
under the bank agency model until June, 2006.59  Maryland (MD) banned payday 
lending through restrictions on fees charged by check cashers (MD Financial 
Institutions Code § 12-120) and small loan interest rates (MD Commercial Law Code 
§ 12-306) effective in 2000 and finally passed anti-loan brokering legislation (MD 
Commercial Law Code § 14-1902), effective June, 2002 to eliminate the agency 
payday lending model. Oregon closed its payday credit market by vigorously 
enforcing a 36 percent usury cap in July 2007 (Zinman 2010).   D.C. prohibited 
payday lending in November, 2007, by limiting fees on check cashing and prohibiting 
post-dated check cashing (D.C. Code § 26-317 and 26-319).  Despite a cap on small 
loan interest rates in Pennsylvania (P.A. 7 P.S. § 6201-6219), payday lenders were 
able to operate there via the bank agency model and a law that sanctioned loan 
brokering (P.A. 73 P.S. § 2181-2192).  Store numbers began falling after the FDIC 
restricted bank-payday lender affiliations in 2006.60 However, Advance America, the 
                                                 
58 “Payday lending on the way out in NC.” North Carolina Department of Justice Press release (March 
1, 2006) http://www.ncdoj.gov/News-and-Alerts/News-Releases-and-Advisories/Press-
Releases/Payday-lending-on-the-way-out-in-NC.aspx. Retrieved 2009-08-27 
59 “Attorney General McGraw Reaches Agreement with WV's Last Payday Lender, First American 
Cash Advance.” West Virginia Office of the Attorney General press release (May 9, 
2007).http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm?ID=337&fx=more.Retrieved 2009-09-01. 
60 Sabatini, Patricia. 2006. “Days May Be Numbered for State’s Payday Lenders.” Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette March 26. 
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largest national payday lender, did not stop lending and close its Pennsylvania stores 
until December, 2007.61  Arkansas (AK) is a difficult state to code because a number 
of court rulings have affected the supply of payday lending there. Oklahoma and 
Alabama are also problematic states to code (see Fox and Mierzwinski 2001 and 
Carrell and Zinman 2008).  In the robustness section, we confirm our results with 
Alabama, Arkansas, and Oklahoma excluded. 
                                                 
61 “Advance America Announces Decision to Close 66 Remaining Centers in Pennsylvania.”  
December 18, 2007 Press release 
http://investors.advanceamerica.net/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=282418.Retrieved 2009-09-01.   
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